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Abstract
Wage gaps between industries have increased over the past few decades in the US.
Nevertheless, labour clusters in the low-wage sector, which is puzzling. This thesis
explores a series of questions to seek the underlying factors: (i) Are there any
frictions in inter-sectoral labour mobility? (ii) If so, can labour mobility frictions
account for labour market distortions? (iii) What is the primary source of frictions?
Chapter 1 corroborates empirical evidence for the existence of labour mobility
frictions using US micro-data: (i) The unexplained wage gap has increased, (ii) the
flow of labour from the high- to the low-wage sector has risen but has declined in the
reverse direction, (iii) the worker’s wage significantly increases only by moving to the
high-wage sector, but such mobility does not happen often, and (iv) the pecuniary
cost of moving to a new sector has increased.
Chapter 2 evaluates the role of mobility frictions in labour market dynamics.
While the neoclassical model without frictions cannot alone explain the labour mar-
ket distortions, a multi-sector model embedded with frictions can illustrate that
barriers to labour mobility act as a decisive factor in determining labour clustering
and the wage gap. The main finding is that the degree of mobility frictions has
increased, thus being much higher after 2000 than it was in the 1990s. As a result,
the wage disparity and labour misallocation have worsened and non-trivial economic
losses have occurred.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that differential job matching efficiency between sec-
tors is a crucial source of labour mobility frictions. Importantly, differing matching
efficiency stems from sectoral productivity gap. A two-sector search and match-
ing model can satisfactorily explain the labour market distortions by showing that
the productivity-driven matching efficiency gap triggers the wage gap and labour
misallocation.
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Introduction
The sectoral wage gap is one of the most widely discussed issues today. Inter-
sectoral labour mobility has been an extensively researched subject since Lewis’s
dual economy (1954). These two topics are inextricably linked because the wage
gap functions as a driving factor in labour mobility between sectors. According to
conventional neoclassical economic theory, sectoral wages will be equalised through
the free movement of labour across sectors.
However, what do we really know about their dynamics and evolution in the
labour market? Contrary to the theory, wage gaps between industries have been
persistent and increasing over the past few decades in the US. Notwithstanding,
labour tends to cluster in the low-wage sector in lieu of moving to the high-wage
sector. Why does labour not flow in such a way as to make sectoral wages converge?
Do these observations against the theory suggest the existence of frictions in labour
mobility? What, if any, frictions exist in the labour market? The questions above
have thus motivated this research to explore inter-sectoral labour mobility and the
wage gap more deeply.
This is also a live issue, particularly for advanced labour markets where indus-
tries have experienced unbalanced growth and sectoral wage gaps are substantial.
Barriers to labour mobility generate an inefficient allocation of labour and human
capital in an economy and exacerbate wage differentials and, by extension, they
could damage growth potential and raise inequality. Such barriers might addition-
ally lead individuals to make sub-optimal choices in their economic activities since
these barriers can act as significant constraints for them. This, in turn, implies
1
2that if labour mobility frictions are removed, labour reallocation results in efficiency
gains.
With this emphasis on labour mobility, especially between high- and low-wage
sectors, I focus on the link between inter-sectoral labour mobility and the wage gap
and tailor my model to explain this relationship, which cannot be addressed by other
studies. This thesis argues that labour mobility frictions can play a decisive role in
influencing the dynamics of the labour market by hindering labour movement across
sectors, and so aims to identify the source of these barriers in the labour market.
Chapter 1 draws attention to empirical evidence for labour mobility frictions that
throws some light on the puzzling phenomenon in the labour market. The first piece
of evidence is that the wage gaps are large and have widened during the last two
decades, driven by a rise in unexplained factors. This increase in the unexplained
wage gap suggests the presence of frictions preventing wage equalisation across sec-
tors. Second, the dominant change in the US labour transition across sectors in the
2000s and beyond is that workers in the high-wage sectors tend to vertically move to
the low-wage sectors whereas workers in the low-wage sectors primarily move hori-
zontally within their sectors, which results in numbers of labourers clustering in the
less productive sectors (henceforth referred to as ‘labour clustering’). Third, even
within a group, i.e. same characteristics, job and work experience, workers’ wages
will significantly increase when they move from the low- to the high-wage sector.
Nonetheless, the downward labour flow has largely increased while the upward drift
has decreased. Lastly, pecuniary costs of mobility, which exist as job search and
moving costs, have increased. All of this evidence implies the existence and increase
of frictions in upward labour mobility.
Chapter 2 evaluates the role of labour mobility frictions in labour market dy-
namics. I first verify that a standard canonical multi-sector model without labour
mobility frictions is incapable of simultaneously explaining both the increase in the
wage gap between the high- and the low-wage sectors, and labour concentration in
the low-wage sector. The standard model also fails to fit the data regarding the
3wage gap and labour allocation in the US. I present a multi-sector general equilib-
rium model with the rigidity of labour mobility between sectors to see the effects
of mobility frictions in the labour market. Introducing limited substitutability in
labour supply across sectors can contribute to an explanation of why many workers
get stuck in the low-wage sector despite higher potential wage options available in
other career paths, as well as why sectoral wages are diverging. From my calibrated
model using the US data, the degree of labour mobility frictions is estimated. The
main finding is that the degree of mobility frictions has increased over the course
of more than 25 years, thus being much higher after 2000 than it was in the 1990s.
As a result of this, the wage disparity and labour misallocation have worsened, and
non-trivial economic losses have occurred.
Chapter 3 shows that differential job matching efficiency between sectors is an
important source of labour mobility frictions. I first provide stylised facts on job
matching and its efficiency from the US labour market. The first fact is that filling a
job vacancy takes much longer in the high-wage sector than in the low-wage sector.
The second fact shows that this vacancy duration gap is largely attributed to the
difference in matching efficiency between sectors rather than the difference in market
tightness. The third fact is that sectoral matching efficiency has been inversely
correlated with its productivity because increased productivity in a sector can cause
skill mismatch between firms and job seekers. Based on these empirical facts, I
develop a two-sector search and matching model whose key feature is the salient
difference in matching efficiency between sectors originating from the gap in sector-
specific productivity. The model illustrates that a productivity-driven matching
efficiency gap exacerbates the matching frictions and impedes inter-sectoral labour
mobility. Thus, this friction process impinges on the labour market negatively in
a way that widens the wage gap and triggers labour misallocation across sectors,
which cannot be explained by the productivity gap alone.
Chapter 1
Empirical Evidence on Labour
Mobility Friction
1.1 Introduction
Wages across industries have been diverging in the United States over the past few
decades. Figure 1.1 shows the trend of real wages by industry for the US since 1950.
Not only does the distribution of wage levels widen (Figure 1.1(a)),1 but the growth
rates of wages differ substantially across industries (Figure 1.1(b)). Figure 1.2 shows
a positive relationship between the log of real wage in 1998 and its subsequent growth
across 66 sub-industries in the US. This scatter diagram supports the notion of wage
divergence. All these figures imply that there is no (unconditional or conditional)
convergence in industrial wages in both level and growth rate.
Notably, while wage gaps are increasing, the industries which account for a grow-
ing share of employment are mostly low-wage2 services such as accommodation &
1The variance of logs of per capita real wages across industries in the US has increased from
0.125 in 2001 to 0.175 in 2017, or 39.6% (source: BEA).
2The classification of the high-wage and the low-wage sectors is different from the categorisation
of the high-skilled and the low-skilled jobs. The former is associated with the average labour
productivity in a sector or an industry while the latter is related to the qualifications required by
a job. Thus, any sector can have both the high-skilled and the low-skilled jobs. In this research,
4
5(a) real wage (b) real wage index (1950=100)
Figure 1.1: Real wages per full-time employee by industry, US
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) ‘National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) Tables 6.6 B-D’
Notes: Nominal wage is converted to real wage via US CPI (All items, 1982-84=100). The data
for ‘Finance & Real Estate’ and ‘Other Services’ after 1998 are the arithmetic mean of their
sub-industries. ‘Other Services’ include accommodation, education, health, etc. The government
sector is excluded.
food services, retail trade, and educational services (Table 1.1). In contrast, the
employment share in high-wage services (e.g. finance & insurance, information) has
only slightly increased over the course of the last 20 years despite their high wage
levels and growth rates. This indicates that structural transformation (or employ-
ment shift between sectors)3 in the US has proceeded contrary to that in the ideal
competitive labour market.
One possible explanation relates to technological changes such as automation
and capital deepening (see, for example, Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008; Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011). If technological progress complements labour, we would expect
to see a rise in wages for the industries which employ high technology. Although
we focus on the former classification.
3Although the term ‘sector’ is the same as the term ‘industry’ in some literature defining both
as an aggregate of firms with a similar business type, ‘industry’ is here defined as an individual
sub-industry, e.g. construction, and ‘sector’ is defined as a group of sub-industries, e.g. high-wage
sector.
6Figure 1.2: Per capita wage and its growth for 66 sub-industries, US
Source: BEA ‘NIPA Tables 6.3D, 6.4D’
Notes: Variables are transformed by taking logarithms to observe the elasticity. The dashed
line is the regression line by OLS (Y = 0.13X−1.20, R2 = 0.17). When dropping data points
outside of the range between the 10th to 90th percentile in terms of wage growth to consider
outliers, the regression also shows a positive relationship (Y = 0.07X − 0.54, R2 = 0.11).
Table 1.1: Structural transformation and average wages by industry since 1998, US
industries employment share real wagea
(growth, %p) level (thou.$) growth (%)
total - 46.26 0.83
agriculture -0.10 26.46 0.68
mining 0.03 84.03 1.48
utilities -0.12 87.05 1.27
construction -0.11 49.39 0.98
manufacturing -6.28 56.61 0.82
servicesb 6.63 44.27 0.93
high-wage ser. 0.28 70.28 1.26
low-wage ser. 6.36 31.43 0.79
Source: BEA ‘NIPA Tables 6.3D, 6.4D’
Notes: aThe real wage level is calculated as the sectoral mean of the nominal wage divided
by US CPI (All items, 2010=100). The real wage growth is the annual growth rate between
1998-2017. bThe low- (high-) wage service is the group of below- (above-) average wage
service industries.
7this story can explain what is happening to wages in the data, it cannot explain why
workers are failing to move to the industries that offer higher wages. Alternatively,
if the technology is labour displacing, we have a story about why workers are not
moving to the high technology industries. However, the fall in labour demand in
the industries cannot explain why wages in the industries increase.4
According to the standard neoclassical push and pull theory of labour mobility
(Lewis, 1954; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007), no wage gap exists between sectors. With
the assumptions of perfect labour mobility and competition, when sectoral wages
diverge from each other due to, for example, changes in sectoral productivity or
preference over goods, wages will be equalised by labour reallocation. If the wage
in one sector (say sector 2) is higher than that in another (sector 1), workers move
from sector 1 to sector 2 until both wages are the same.
Although this neoclassical model provides a clear intuition for labour allocation
and mobility, the real labour market dynamics have not been characterised satis-
factorily by itself. Indeed, the observations from the US suggest the opposite. This
research thus begins with the following question: Why has labour concentrated in
the low-wage sector even though the wage gap between sectors has increased?
What is missing in the conventional theory is the role of various barriers to
labour movements known as labour mobility frictions. In reality, just as most market
transactions involve multiple types of frictions, barriers, or trading costs, there exist
numerous frictions in the labour market, typically in the form of labour adjustment
costs and time to move between sectors such as search costs. Even when all workers
have equal skills and background and they are equally productive in all sectors, some
workers would have trouble moving to better-paying industries in the presence of
mobility frictions.
4Besides, we can leave this issue aside while analysing the disaggregated labour market between
the high- and the low-wage sectors for the following reasons: The changes in skill distribution by
sector is relatively constant since the 1990s, and technology changes, e.g. automation, occur not
only in high-wage industries but also in low-wage industries. See the Appendix 1.A.1 for details.
8Furthermore, obstacles to inter-sectoral labour mobility impinge on economic
growth, theoretically and empirically. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Vollrath (2009a)
stress that within-country labour misallocation caused by mobility frictions is the
main reason for the differences in total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP) and
income level across countries. Put differently, mobility frictions could generate inef-
ficient allocation of labour and human capital in an economy, and damage growth
potential. The constraints on labour mobility distort labour allocation, also causing
individuals to take sub-optimal choices in their sector-switching decisions. This, in
turn, implies that if the frictions are removed, labour reallocation results in efficiency
gains. However, the research about frictions in inter-sectoral labour mobility is still
in the initial stage. Existing studies are limited in accounting for the labour market
distortions. This lack of explanation motivates me to identify the source and form
of mobility frictions and the channel of linking it with the wage gap.
Throughout this thesis, great emphasis is placed on the key role of labour mo-
bility frictions in explaining both the labour clustering and the widening wage gap.
As a first and necessary step, this chapter examines the presence of mobility fric-
tions from various angles such as sectoral wages, labour flow, and mobility costs.
By analysing data from the US labour market, I find extensive empirical evidence
for the existence and even the increase of labour mobility frictions between high-
and low-wage sectors. Based on this evidence, we will further explore the effects of
mobility frictions on labour market dynamics and the main source of frictions later
in the following chapters.
This chapter is structured as follows. Standard neoclassical theories of the wage
gap and labour mobility are revisited, and a literature review of the determinants of
the wage gap and inter-sectoral labour mobility is included in section 1.2. Section
1.3 presents empirical evidence on the existence of labour mobility frictions from
the US labour market. In section 1.4, a discussion about the source of frictions is
presented and section 1.5 concludes. The Appendices provide further details about
the empirical works.
91.2 Standard Theory and Literature Review
1.2.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Wage Gap and Labour Mo-
bility: What It Can and Cannot Explain
This section introduces the standard neoclassical theory with a two-sector model
which briefly explains how a dual economy works, and how the wage gap and labour
allocation are determined in a frictionless framework.
We begin by assuming that, in the spirit of Acemoglu (2001), the technology for
producing the unique final good is a form of the constant elasticity of substitution
(henceforth, CES) between intermediate goods, meaning that the final output is
produced by combining two sectors’ goods.
Y = F (Y1, Y2) ≡
(
Y
σ−1
σ
1 + Y
σ−1
σ
2
) σ
σ−1
(1.2.1)
where Y is the output of the final goods and Yj is the output of the sector j ∈ {1, 2}.
σ ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between two intermediate goods.5
Each sector uses labour inputs Lj to produce its output.
Yj = Zj · Lαjj , j ∈ {1, 2} (1.2.2)
where Zj represents the sector-specific technology, and αj ∈ (0, 1) is the labour
income share. The total labour force N (= L1 + L2) is normalised to one.
In perfect competition, sectoral wage Wj is the same as the value of marginal
product of labour.
5 The elasticity of substitution is the elasticity of the output ratio of two goods with respect
to the ratio of their marginal products
σ = − %∆ (Y2/Y1)
%∆ (MPY,2/MPY,1)
= −%∆ (Y2/Y1)
%∆ (P2/P1)
where MPY,j is the marginal product of sector j’s goods and Pj is the real price of sector j’s goods.
The first order condition MPY,j = Pj is used in the last equivalence.
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Wj = VMPL,j = MPL,j · Pj = αjPjYj
Lj
(1.2.3)
where MP and VMP denote the marginal product and its value, and Pj is the
real price of sector j’s goods. The price of the final goods is assumed to be the
numeraire, P ≡ 1.
Then, the wage gap between sector 1 and sector 2 can be defined as
W2
W1
=
α2P2Y2
L2
α1P1Y1
L1
=
L1
L2
· α2
α1
· Y2
Y1
· P2
P1
(1.2.4)
=
L1
L2
· α2
α1
·
(
Y2
Y1
)σ−1
σ
=
α2
α1
·
(
Z2
Z1
)σ−1
σ
· L
α˜1
1
L α˜22
where α˜j ≡ 1− αj(σ − 1)/σ. The first equivalence in the second line is justified by
the first order condition, Pj = MPY,j, from the profit maximisation of the final good
firm,6 and the sectoral production functions are used in the second equivalence. The
wage gap is eventually affected by two factors given the labour income shares7 and
the elasticity of substitution: (i) the productivity gap and (ii) labour allocation.
However, if the conditions of perfect labour mobility and homogeneous workers are
satisfied, the wage gap will disappear by labour reallocation between sectors, which
is analogous to an arbitrage process, and thus the law of one wage holds. It implies
that if both wages are different from one another, workers have an incentive to
move from the low-wage sector to the high-wage sector, which in turn leads to wage
equalisation between sectors.
This equation can describe the processes of labour reallocation and the wage
equalisation between the two sectors following changes in the labour demand side, i.e.
6From the final good firm’s profit maximisation (Π = Y −P1Y1−P2Y2), the marginal product
of sector j’s goods can be derived as P1 = MPY,j = (Yj/Y )
−1/σ
.
7One of Kaldor’s facts is that the capital and labour income shares are roughly constant over
a long time span. However, Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long, and Poschke (2018) demonstrate that the
labour income share in manufacturing has declined much more than the one in services in the US
since the 1980s, and therefore both labour income shares have converged to around 0.64.
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sector-biased technological change. We start from the law of one wage (W2/W1 = 1).
Now, suppose that technological progress takes place in sector 2, denoted by an
increase of Z2. The following three cases lend themselves to variations in the value
of σ.
Case 1. When the two goods are substitutes, or σ ∈ (1,∞),
W2
W1
=
α2
α1
·
(
Z2
Z1
)σ−1
σ
>0
· L
α˜1∈(0,1)
1
L
α˜2∈(0,1)
2
(1.2.5)
If Z2 rises, ceteris paribus, the wage gap grows. Then, labour moves from sector 1 to
sector 2 to bring the wage gap back to unity.8 This reflects the ‘labour pull’ theory
since technological progress in sector 2 consequently pulls labour out of sector 1,
which is described by Lewis (1954).9
Case 2. When the two goods are complements, or σ ∈ (0, 1),
W2
W1
=
α2
α1
·
(
Z2
Z1
)σ−1
σ
<0
· L
α˜1∈(1,∞)
1
L
α˜2∈(1,∞)
2
(1.2.6)
When Z2 increases, ceteris paribus, the wage gap goes down. To equalise both wages,
labour moves from sector 2 to sector 1. This represents the ‘labour push’ theory
because technology development in sector 2 pushes labour out of sector 2, which is
shown by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).10
8If L α˜11 /L
α˜2
2 decreases (increases), if and only if αj ∈ (0, 1) and L1 + L2 = N(≡ 1), L1/L2
decreases (increases). The proof is as follows:
L α˜11
L α˜22
↓ ⇐⇒ d ln L
α˜1
1
L α˜22
< 0 ⇐⇒ α˜1
α˜2
d lnL1 < d lnL2
where α˜1/α˜2 is a positive number. Since the total labour force N is normalised, d lnL1 and d lnL2
must have different signs. To make the above inequality hold, d lnL1 < 0 and d lnL2 > 0. This
guarantees that L1/L2 decreases.
9Lewis (1954) presents a dual economy where technological progress and physical capital ac-
cumulation in the modern sector attracts labour out of the traditional sector.
10Ngai and Pissarides (2007) highlight that if the substitutability between industrial goods is
low, structural transformation occurs in such a way that labour moves from the high TFP growth
sectors to the low ones. Likewise, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) emphasise that technological
advancement in the capital-intensive sector causes its share of production factors to fall with the
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Case 3. When the elasticity of substitution between two goods is unity, or σ = 1,
W2
W1
=
α2
α1
· L1
L2
(1.2.7)
where technological progress has no effect on the wage gap and labour allocation.
In summary, when σ 6= 1, technological changes make the wage gap deviate
from unity in the absence of any labour mobility. The neoclassical theories can
explain that in a world of perfect labour mobility, labour will move between sectors
in a direction that brings the wage gap back to unity to make the law of one wage
hold. As in Table 1.2(a), in response to changes in the productivity gap (Z2/Z1),
labour allocation (L2/L1) changes in the same direction as the wage gap (W2/W1)
in the neoclassical framework. What these theories cannot explain is the previously
mentioned stylised fact that labour has clustered in the low-wage sector even though
the wage gap has widened, which poses a puzzle as illustrated in Table 1.2(b).
Table 1.2: Neoclassical theory and labour market puzzle
(a) neoclasscial theory (b) labour market puzzle
Z2
Z1
↑
case 1. σ ∈ (1,∞) W2
W1
↑ L2
L1
↑
W2
W1
↑ L2
L1
↓case 2. σ ∈ (0, 1) W2
W1
↓ L2
L1
↓
case 3. σ = 1
W2
W1
-
L2
L1
-
1.2.2 Literature Review
The relationship between inter-sectoral labour mobility and the wage gap is a topical
issue, especially for advanced labour markets. While much progress has been made
to explain structural transformation and the wage gap, most existing studies on the
assumption of less-than-one elasticity of substitution between products.
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topic have dealt with the migration between agriculture and non-agriculture (so-
called ‘rural-urban migration’) in developing economies (Harris and Todaro, 1970;
Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh, 2014; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013). However, in
advanced economies, the employment share in agriculture is low and constant.11
Indeed, these countries have experienced the divergence of sectoral wages and un-
balanced growth within non-agriculture industries which adversely affect sustainable
growth.
Theoretically, wage disparity and inter-sectoral labour mobility are inextricably
linked. The Lewis model (1954) suggests that the central process in a dual economy
consists of labour flow from a traditional, or low-wage, sector into an expanding mod-
ern, or high-wage, sector positing the assumption of free labour mobility. However,
this ideal labour mobility does not happen; instead considerable wage differentials
between sectors exist.
No consensus has emerged in the literature as to why the wage gap has been
widening, and whether or not labour is efficiently allocated between sectors. Here,
we shall explore the issues posed by the wage gap and inter-sectoral labour mobility
and seek to find evidence for labour mobility frictions.
1.2.2.1 Wage Gap
Krueger and Summers (1988) establish a stepping stone on the literature of the
sectoral wage gap by highlighting the role of the ‘efficiency wage’, i.e. above the
competitive wage, in explaining the reason for the wage gap. They argue that some
firms pay more than the value of the marginal product to employees in order to
avoid turnover costs. Subsequent research focuses on the worker’s skill premium (e.g.
schooling, experience, or unobserved ability) to account for the wage gap. Since the
increase in observed characteristic premium accounts for a small part of the increase
11The employment share in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting in the US has been merely
below 1% since 2000 (source: BEA).
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in the wage gap, the theories rely on ex-ante differences in workers’ unobserved
abilities for uncovering a large unexplained part of the wage gap (Gibbons and Katz,
1992; Katz and Autor, 1999). According to this hypothesis, labour is efficiently
allocated in an economy on the basis of its unobserved ability, called ‘self-selection’.
Young (2013) shows that the urban-rural wage gap can be well explained by this
view. He discovers that workers migrate in both directions between urban and rural
areas, demonstrating that workers sort themselves into sectors depending on their
ability. Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015, 2018) support the impact of a worker’s
ability on the wage gap by empirically showing that the difference in human capital
mostly accounts for the inter-industry wage gap in the US. They find that different
returns to human capital between workers are mainly attributed to the differences
in unobserved abilities.
In contrast to the arguments outlined above, many studies suggest that frictions
or barriers to labour mobility, which do not exist in the Walrasian equilibrium, are
crucial factors for the wage gap between sectors. Mortensen (2003, pp.6) states that
“Wage dispersion is largely the consequence of search friction and cross-firm differ-
ences in factor productivity”. Manning (2011) points out job search frictions as a
primary source of imperfect competition in the labour market, which may violate
the law of one wage. Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) claim that a puzzle of the
large labour productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture remains even
after adjustment for measurement error and human capital. They propose that one
of the main culprits is a restriction on labour mobility within a country. Martins
(2004) and Ferreira (2009) show that inter-industry wage gaps in Portugal are still
sizable and persistent after controlling for both observed and unobserved hetero-
geneities. The authors argue that there are non-competitive forces which account
for wage differentials, but they do not examine what these forces or frictions are.
Plasman, Rycx, and Tojerow (2006) find similar results using data from Belgium.
According to Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), the wage gap and structural change
of employment can be affected by indirect barriers to labour movements into the in-
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dustry sector. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) maintain that large labour productivity
gaps between sectors in Latin America and Africa are caused by abnormal labour
flows from high productivity sectors to low productivity ones. Barth et al. (2016)
find that the increase in the earnings gap between individuals in the US after the
1970s is mostly attributed to changes in earnings among establishments. They sug-
gest a new analysis of introducing a policy on promoting labour movements between
firms by conjecturing that imperfect labour mobility could be a primary source of
the earnings gap. The role of occupation-specific skills in labour mobility and the
wage gap is discussed in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) who examine the rela-
tionship between occupational mobility and the wage gap. The authors assert that
less mobile occupation-specific skills impinge on the distribution of workers’ skills
and thus end up increasing wage gaps across occupations.
1.2.2.2 Labour Mobility Frictions
Empirical studies have demonstrated the existence of imperfect labour mobility
across sectors. Horvath (2000) estimates a relatively low elasticity of substitution
of labour between industries in the US using data based on the number of hours
worked. Beaudry and Portier (2011) assume that labour mobility between sectors
is insufficient to equalise the returns to labour across sectors by showing a sizable
difference between labour income growth and employment growth by industry in
the US. Such observations have naturally led to the research on what causes labour
mobility frictions and why mobility frictions exist and persist in the labour market.
However, no consensus yet exists (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013).
Since Lewis’s seminal work on the dual economy (1954), many studies have
explored the determinants of labour reallocation and its dynamics between sectors.
Harris and Todaro (1970) maintain that the flow of labour between agriculture
and non-agriculture takes place when expected wages are unequal in both sectors.
According to their theory, uncertainty in getting a job in urban area acts as a barrier
to labour migration, and thus in equilibrium actual wages may not be the same in
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both sectors. Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007) argue that labour mobility from
agriculture to industry is restricted by subsistence needs for food in line with the
Schultz’s food problem.12 Hayashi and Prescott (2008) regard a non-economic force
in labour supply side as a primary source for explaining unchanged employment
share in the agricultural sector despite a substantial wage gap between agriculture
and non-agriculture during prewar Japan. They point out that the contemporary
patriarchal social system is a dominant barrier to rural-to-urban labour mobility.
Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) put an invisible cost of labour movements between
industries into their model as an indirect barrier. The mobility cost leads to a
relatively low wage in agriculture and the overuse of labour in the sector.
Search and matching models also provide some idea of the source of labour
mobility frictions. McCall (1970) find matching frictions in the process of job search
on the basis of the presence of involuntary unemployment. Diamond, Mortensen,
and Pissarides propose a general equilibrium search and matching model, named
‘DMP model’ (Pissarides, 2000) which demonstrates that matching between workers
and firms is costly since job seekers pay a search cost to find a better job and each
employer is faced with a recruitment cost. In line with this, Phelan and Trejos
(2000) show that even a small search and matching type cost in labour reallocation
significantly slows inter-sectoral labour mobility.
Acquisition of sector-specific skills can act as mobility friction. Caselli and Cole-
man (2001) suggest that workers need to acquire related skills to switch sectors,
and stress that the US structural transformation, or labour movements out of agri-
culture, is due to the declining cost of acquiring manufacturing-specific skills over
time. Elliott and Lindley (2006) find that in the UK labour market workers who
have industry-specific skills are less mobile across industries, while low skilled work-
ers tend to be mobile, supporting the Jones’ (1971) specific factor model. Hsieh et
12Schultz (1953) argues that less productive countries devote a large proportion of production
factors to producing food to satisfy subsistence needs (cited in Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson,
2007).
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al. (2013) model heterogeneous costs of acquiring human capital and discrimination
by employers as frictions to occupational labour mobility, which drive the difference
between a worker’s wage and marginal product. Thus, it is assumed that the degree
of mobility frictions varies based on personal characteristics and current occupation.
Finally, how does labour misallocation caused by mobility frictions affect an
economy? Hsieh and Klenow (2009) argue that misallocation of capital and labour
inputs lowers aggregate TFP in a country, and evaluate that manufacturing TFPs in
China and India could increase by a third through the reallocation of production in-
puts. Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990) estimate that the availability of job mobility op-
tions increases a worker’s expected earning and boosts aggregate output. Similarly,
Vollrath (2009a) points out that since similar production factors receive different
earnings in a misallocated labour market, a policy of enhancing inter-sectoral factor
mobility significantly raises levels of aggregate income and TFP within a country.
Hayashi and Prescott (2008) claim that labour misallocation between urban and
rural sectors is the main cause of prewar Japan’s stagnation. Likewise, Graham and
Temple (2006) create a two-sector model in which labour reallocation between sec-
tors has substantial positive impacts on the income level. According to Restuccia,
Yang, and Zhu (2008), the removal of barriers to labour movements could reallocate
previously misallocated labour and improve overall labour productivity in a country.
Hsieh et al. (2013) place greater importance on efficient labour allocation by showing
that the improved allocation of human capital accounts for 15 to 20 percent of the
growth in output per worker in the US between 1960 and 2008.
Despite the numerous research on the wage gap and inter-sectoral labour mobil-
ity, little is still known about their interactive relationship and the source of mobility
frictions, especially within non-agricultural sectors. Furthermore, existing studies
are not satisfactory in explaining the labour market puzzle; that is, the labour clus-
tering into the low-wage sector despite the widening wage gap. This thesis could
thus shed light on the link between the wage gap and labour mobility by identifying
the role and source of labour mobility frictions.
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1.3 Empirical Evidence on Labour Mobility Fric-
tions from the US
This section presents extensive evidence on the presence and increase of labour
mobility frictions from the US labour market.
1.3.1 Overview and Data
The US labour market is generally evaluated as the most flexible market which fol-
lows market economy principles.13 Hence, a closer observation on the US labour
market through micro-data could reveal the underlying root of labour market dis-
tortions in advanced economies.
This section begins with a measure of the magnitude of the unexplained wage
gap in the US as estimated by sectoral Mincerian earning equations. Next, the
degree of inter-sectoral labour mobility is measured at both aggregate and sectoral
levels. We also look at the changes in the average wage level of workers who move
to the high-wage sector. Lastly, how a worker’s mobility cost changes over time is
discussed. These analyses can determine whether labour mobility frictions exist and
if they are relevant to the wage gap.
The primary database for the US labour market used in this section is the Cur-
rent Population Surveys from the US Census Bureau (IPUMS-CPS).14 It provides
personal information on demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, race, and
person-level weight), years of schooling, employment status (e.g. employed or unem-
ployed, full-time or part-time), previous year’s wage, previous & current industries,
and so forth. For assessing wage gaps between sectors, I restrict the attention to the
13The US union density (number of union members/total number of employment) is 12.4% in
2003 much lower than most of the other advanced economies, e.g. UK 29.3%, Germany 22.6% in
2003 (Blanchflower, 2006). The US ranked the lowest on employment protection among OECD
countries in 2015 (source: OECD employment protection indicators).
14IPUMS-CPS is a rearranged dataset of the US ‘Current Population Survey’ (CPS) which is a
monthly household survey.
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period 1991-2015 (last 25 years) and the age between 16 and 70. In some analyses,
the sample is limited to white male full-time, full-year employees in order to control
for workers’ demographic characteristics (i.e. race and gender) and hours worked.
Nominal wages are converted to real wages by deflating them with the consumer
price index (CPI) for all items.
To scrutinise the labour flow, I calculate indices representing the aggregate level
of inter-sectoral labour mobility using the EU KLEMS database which provides
the number of employees on the level of 72 industries in the US between 1978 and
2007. Labour transitions across sectors are also measured using the information of
an individual’s previous and current industries in the IPUMS-CPS database during
the period 1991-2015. The sample here is restricted to persons who switch sectors.
Meanwhile, 146 sub-industries in the IPUMS-CPS database are classified into five
sectors: high-wage manufacturing (or HM, for short), low-wage manufacturing (LM),
high-wage services (HS), low-wage services (LS), and other production industries
(OI) including agriculture, mining, construction, utility, and public administration.15
If a sub-industry is either a top 20 percent in terms of mean wage level since 1991, or
shows both above-average wage level and growth rate in its upper category industry
since 1991, it is classified as a high-wage sector.16 Otherwise, it is assigned to a
low-wage sector.
1.3.2 Evidence 1: The Increasing Unexplained Wage Gap
We test the hypothesis that wage gaps between sectors are large and increasing
even after controlling for workers’ observed characteristics. To test this, sectoral
15See the Appendix 1.A.2 ‘Sector classification’ for details.
16The first criterion (top 20% industries in the wage level) is arbitrary, but the sector classifi-
cation is little changed with different cutoffs such as 10% or 30%. Regarding the second criterion,
the reason to consider both wage level and growth rate is that when workers make decisions about
a sector switch, they maximise the expected present value, which is consistent with dynamic sector
choice models (e.g. Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren, 2010). Thus, workers take account of the
current wage as well as the future wage level or its expected growth when switching sectors.
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Mincerian earning equations for full-time, full-year white male workers is estimated
as
lnWi,j = αj + β1,jSCHi,j + β2,jEXPi,j + β3,jEXP
2
i,j + εi,j (1.3.1)
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the real wage of individual i in
sector j, lnWi,j. SCHi,j is years of schooling, EXPi,j is work experience, and εi,j
is an i.i.d. error term with zero mean. Here, the work experience is calculated by
the Mincer’s way (= age - years of schooling - 6). The concave pattern of lifetime
earnings is captured by its squared term, EXP 2i,j.
For comparing sectoral wages, it is necessary to control different qualifications
between workers. This is known as the ‘Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition’. Through
this procedure, the mean wage difference between two sectors is decomposed to
explained and unexplained parts. For keeping the notation clean, after estimating
equation (1.3.1), the mean wage of sector j can be rewritten in vector notation as
l̂nWj = α̂j + X¯j b̂
′
j (1.3.2)
where X¯j (=[SCHj, EXP j, EXP 2j]) is a row vector of the averaged independent
variables in sector j, and b̂′j (=[β̂1j, β̂2j, β̂3j]
′) is a column vector of their coefficients.
Now, suppose two sectors, 1 and 2.
sector 1 : l̂nW1 = α̂1 + X¯1b̂
′
1
sector 2 : l̂nW2 = α̂2 + X¯2b̂
′
2
By subtracting one from the other, explained and unexplained components of the
wage differential between both sectors are derived as
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l̂nW2 − l̂nW1 = (α̂2 − α̂1) + (X¯2b̂′2 − X¯1b̂′1)
= (α̂2 − α̂1) + (X¯2b̂′2 − X¯1b̂′1) + X¯1b̂′2 − X¯1b̂′2
= (X¯2 − X¯1)̂b′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ (α̂2 − α̂1) + X¯1(̂b′2 − b̂′1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained
(1.3.3)
The ‘explained’ component reflects a portion caused by different schooling and
experience between two comparison groups. In other words, if two workers from
different sectors have the same skill, or X¯2 = X¯1, there exists no explained wage
gap. However, even given the same skill between workers, the ‘unexplained’ wage
gap remains owing to unobserved factors. This quantifies the difference in intercepts
between sectors plus the difference in the returns to workers’ qualifications.
The origin of the first term in the unexplained part, (α̂2 − α̂1), is unknown.
This term means that workers with zero schooling and experience get paid α̂1 in
sector 1 or α̂2 in sector 2. The difference may be caused by a difference in TFPs
between sectors and consumers’ preferences for the goods, or by the existence of
labour mobility frictions.
In the second term, (̂b′2 − b̂′1) reflects the difference in the return to workers’
schooling and experience between sectors. Regarding this term, there are two con-
flicting views in the literature (Herrendorf and Schoellman, 2018). According to
the ‘selection view’, the difference in the returns is attributable to the difference in
workers’ unobserved abilities so that a worker with high ability can earn more per
schooling or per experience than those with low ability. In contrast, the ‘sectoral
view’ attributes the difference in the returns to the different technologies between
sectors. Embedded within this view is the existence of labour mobility frictions
because the wage gap caused by the different technologies should reduce through
labour reallocation provided that mobility frictions do not exist. Under the sectoral
view, the persistent and widening wage gap implies the existence of labour mobility
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frictions. For example, Lee and Wolpin (2006), Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren
(2010), and Dix-Carneiro (2014) associate continuing divergence in wages with large
mobility costs. Romer (2012, pp.501-504) points out that only the former hypoth-
esis cannot convincingly explain all the findings of the entire wage gap. He refers
to four counter-evidences on the selection view: (i) a large portion of the wage gap
is inexplicable by workers’ unmeasured abilities (Katz and Summers, 1989), (ii) the
large wage cuts at new jobs for the labourers, who worked in high-wage firms but
lost jobs because of the firms’ shutdown, cannot be explained (Gibbons and Katz,
1992), (iii) high-profit industries typically have a high wage premium, and (iv) all
occupations including janitors and cleaners in high-wage industries earn high wages.
Figure 1.3 presents year-by-year estimations of the explained and unexplained
parts in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on the wage gaps between sectors. A
striking feature of the graphs is that the unexplained variations between high- and
low-wage sectors have increased since the early- and mid-2000s albeit some fluctu-
ations during the global financial crisis. The unexplained wage gap between the
high-wage manufacturing (HM) and the low-wage manufacturing (LM) rose from
7 percent (exp(0.064) − 1 ' 0.066) in 2001 to over 20 percent after 2012. That
part between the high-wage manufacturing (HM) and the low-wage services (LS)
rose by approximately 14 percentage points between 2001 and 2015. Similarly, the
unexplained variations between the high-wage services (HS) and the low-wage man-
ufacturing (LM), and the high-wage services (HS) and the low-wage services (LS)
increased by 14 percentage points and 13 percentage points during the period, re-
spectively. All these estimates are statistically significantly different from zero at
the 1 percent level.17
Table 1.3 shows that the proportion of the unexplained part in the total wage
gap has increased since 2000. The increases in the proportions between the high-
wage sector and the low-wage sector range from 16.4 percentage points (HS-LS) to
17See the Appendix 1.A.3 for the measurement of standard error.
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(a) HM - LM (b) HM - LS
(c) HS - LM (d) HS - LS
Figure 1.3: Decomposition of wage gaps, full-time full-year white male, US
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: All estimates are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The
grey shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.
40.4 percentage points (HM-LM) over the period.
In summary, the wage gaps have been large and increasing for a long period of
time, driven by a rise in unexplained factors. Therefore, labour mobility frictions
seem a promising avenue to explain the large and long-lasting wage differentials,
partly or mostly.
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Table 1.3: Proportion of unexplained part in wage gap, US
2001 (A) 2006 2011 2015 (B) (B-A)
total wage gap 0.228 0.281 0.258 0.288 0.061
HM-LM unexplained 0.064 0.145 0.163 0.198 0.134
percentage 28.3% 51.8% 63.2% 68.6% 40.4%p
total wage gap 0.305 0.307 0.324 0.359 0.054
HM-LS unexplained 0.236 0.257 0.305 0.341 0.106
percentage 77.2% 83.6% 94.2% 95.0% 17.8%p
total wage gap 0.337 0.390 0.367 0.398 0.061
HS-LM unexplained 0.003 0.083 0.099 0.134 0.131
percentage 0.8% 21.4% 27.0% 33.7% 32.8%p
total wage gap 0.415 0.416 0.433 0.469 0.054
HS-LS unexplained 0.195 0.214 0.262 0.297 0.102
percentage 47.0% 51.5% 60.5% 63.3% 16.4%p
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: The percentage is calculated as (unexplained part)/(total wage gap)×100.
1.3.3 Evidence 2: Downward Inter-sectoral Labour Mobil-
ity
In this part, we first examine the aggregate level of inter-sectoral labour mobility in
the US using macro-data. Then, the direction of labour transition is measured using
micro-data. The main finding here is that although aggregate labour mobility has
increased since the 2000s, labour flows from high- to low-wage industries or labour
tends to move within low-wage industries.
1.3.3.1 Aggregate inter-sectoral labour mobility
Several methods have been introduced in previous research to measure the extent
of inter-sectoral labour mobility. We follow two approaches. The first is the method
introduced by Davis et al. (1996, cited in Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004) called
industry reallocation of employment (henceforth, IR index, for short).
IRt,t−τ =
∑J
j=1 |Etj − Et−τj | − |
∑J
j=1E
t
j −
∑J
j=1E
t−τ
j |
0.5
∑J
j=1(E
t
j + E
t−τ
j )
(1.3.4)
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where Etj is the number of employees in sector j at time t, τ is a time lag, and J is
the total number of sectors. This method captures the fraction of workers who move
between sectors, which is independent of the change in the overall employment. The
first term in the numerator (
∑J
j=1 |Etj−Et−τj |) of equation (1.3.4) represents the sum
of the absolute values of the changes in individual sector’s employment between
time t − τ and time t, and the second term (|∑Jj=1Etj −∑Jj=1Et−τj |) refers to the
absolute value of the total change in the country’s employment between two points
of time. Hence, the numerator demonstrates net labour reallocation between sectors
independent of total employment changes. For example, if the sum of the changes in
each sector’s employment is bigger than the change in total employment, the level
of inter-sectoral labour mobility goes up; otherwise, it drops.18
The second method to measure the degree of aggregate labour mobility is to
use each sector’s employment share, called structural adjustment in employment
(henceforth, SA index). Charette et al. (1986, cited in Wacziarg and Wallack,
2004) apply this way to assess the long-term change in employment patterns within
a country.
SAt,t−τ =
1
2
J∑
j=1
|Stj − St−τj | (1.3.5)
where Stj is the proportion of sector j’s employees in all sectors at time t. By sum-
ming the absolute difference values of the employment share in each sector between
time t and time t − τ , it measures the magnitude of the structural employment
changes in an economy. Thus, a high value of the SA index can be interpreted as a
high degree of inter-sectoral labour mobility.19
Table 1.4 describes the trends of the indices for aggregate inter-sectoral labour
mobility in the US since the 1990s. Although the levels of both indices are different
from each other, the patterns are similar. In particular, the increase in labour
18The upper bound of the IR index rises as the number of sectors (J) increases. Its lower bound
is zero when employment changes in the same direction in all sectors.
19The upper bound of the SA index is 100 and its lower bound is zero.
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mobility since the 2000s is noticeable. Taking account of its link to sectoral wage
gaps, it tells us that despite the increased level of labour mobility since the 2000s,
the wage differentials puzzlingly have been persistent and increasing over the same
period. Why have wage gaps widened even in the high degree of labour mobility?
Table 1.4: Indices of aggregate inter-sectoral labour mobility, US
index early 1990s- late 1990s- early 2000s-
late 1990s early 2000s late 2000s
IR 0.71 2.46 3.26
SA 1.70 2.37 2.82
Source: Author’s own, from EU KLEMS (‘number of persons engaged’, 1990-2007, US)
Notes: ‘early’ (‘late’) denotes the first (second) half of each decade.
1.3.3.2 Direction of labour transition
Labour transition across sectors can be calculated as the fraction of switchers from
one sector to another sector,Mjj′/
∑
j′Mjj′ .20 Here,Mjj′ is the number of movers
from sector j at time t to sector j′ at time t + 1.21 Table 1.5 shows the matrices
of labour transition rates by sector in the US pre- and post-2000. Each cell of the
table presents the fraction of switchers from the row sector to the column sector
in any given period. For example, in the 1990s, if a full-time white male worker
in the high-wage manufacturing (HM) current year (t) intends to switch industries,
her transition probability to the low-wage services (LS) next year (t + 1) is 15.5
percent, statistically. The diagonal cell shows the fraction of workers who change
their industries within the sector. Comparing both periods, the rate of switching
from LM to HM dropped (19.5% → 16.6%) whereas that in the reverse direction
jumped (16.4%→ 32.8%). Likewise, the transition rate from HS to LS substantially
increased (34.4% → 44.8%) as opposed to a reduction in moving from LS to HS
20See the Appendix 1.A.4 for the statistics on switchers’ demographic characteristics.
21When j = j′, Mjj′ indicates the number of movers within sector j.
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Table 1.5: Labour transition rate by sector, full-time full-year white male, US
(a) 1991-2000
(%)
t+1 high-wage low-wage high-wage low-wage other
t manu. manu. ser. ser. industriesa
high-wage manu. 44.4 16.4 13.5 15.5 10.1
low-wage manu. 19.5 28.0 13.0 25.6 13.7
high-wage ser. 9.6 8.2 31.4 34.4 16.1
low-wage ser. 6.4 9.3 20.9 48.8 14.3
other industriesa 10.4 12.8 20.2 35.1 21.4
total 15.3 13.2 20.8 35.6 15.0
(b) 2001-2015 (excl.2007-2010)
(%, %p)
t+1 high-wage low-wage high-wage low-wage other
t manu. manu. ser. ser. industriesa
high-wage manu. 27.9 32.8 14.1 15.2 10.0
(−16.5) (+16.4) (+0.6) (−0.3) (−0.1)
low-wage manu. 16.6 32.0 12.8 24.8 13.9
(−3.0) (+3.9) (−0.2) (−0.9) (+0.2)
high-wage ser. 6.8 6.1 29.6 44.8 12.6
(−2.9) (−2.0) (−1.8) (+10.3) (−3.5)
low-wage ser. 4.9 6.7 19.7 55.8 12.9
(−1.5) (−2.7) (−1.2) (+7.0) (−1.4)
other industriesa 7.3 8.4 19.3 44.9 20.1
(−3.1) (−4.4) (−0.9) (+9.8) (−1.3)
total 9.9 12.7 20.6 42.8 13.8
(−5.3) (−0.5) (−0.1) (+7.2) (−1.2)
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: aOther industries include agriculture, mining, construction, utility, and public ad-
ministration. bThe numbers in brackets are the differences in transition rates between pre-
and post-2000 periods. cThe sum of each row in the two tables is not 100% because some
workers flow into unemployment. See the Appendix 1.A.5 for the full tables.
(20.9% → 19.7%). Compared to the period prior to 2000, a person who worked in
the low-wage sector (LM and LS) is more likely to be stuck in the same sector over the
period between 2001 and 2015 (28.0% → 32.0% and 48.8% → 55.8%, respectively).
In contrast, the probability of moving within the high-wage sector (HM and HS)
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dropped (44.4% → 27.9% and 31.4% → 29.6%, respectively). Particularly, the
labour transition into the low-wage services (LS) considerably increased in most
sectors since 2001 (35.6% → 42.8%).
Table 1.6 shows the modified labour transition rate by removing the effect of
the labour demand shift. Here, sectoral market size and each worker’s occupation
are additionally controlled. To put it concretely, the modified rate is calculated by
Table 1.6: Market size-adjusted labour transition rate by sector, full-time full-year
white male with controlling for occupation, US
(a) 1991-2000
(%)
t+1 high-wage low-wage high-wage low-wage other
t manu. manu. ser. ser. industries
high-wage manu. 67.5 18.0 4.7 2.7 7.0
low-wage manu. 33.1 44.2 6.2 5.6 11.0
high-wage ser. 23.7 16.2 23.5 12.6 24.1
low-wage ser. 15.1 19.1 17.1 26.6 22.1
other industries 22.4 22.6 14.1 12.0 28.9
total 36.3 23.3 12.2 11.6 16.7
(b) 2001-2015 (excl.2007-2010)
(%, %p)
t+1 high-wage low-wage high-wage low-wage other
t manu. manu. ser. ser. industries
high-wage manu. 44.6 42.2 4.7 2.1 6.4
(−22.9) (+24.1) ( - ) (−0.6) (−0.6)
low-wage manu. 30.0 49.8 5.4 4.2 10.6
(−3.1) (+5.6) (−0.8) (−1.4) (−0.3)
high-wage ser. 22.8 17.0 24.2 17.5 18.5
(−0.8) (+0.8) (+0.7) (+4.9) (−5.6)
low-wage ser. 17.5 17.4 17.4 27.7 19.9
(+2.4) (−1.6) (+0.3) (+1.1) (−2.2)
other industries 20.1 18.1 14.4 18.4 29.1
(−2.3) (−4.5) (+0.2) (+6.4) (+0.2)
total 28.4 29.2 13.1 13.7 15.7
(−7.9) (+6.0) (+0.9) (+2.0) (−1.0)
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
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multiplying a weight to the fraction of switchers as Mjj′/
∑
j′(Mjj′) × λj′ and by
restricting the sample to workers who switch sectors but keep the same occupation.
λj′ is the inverse of the share of persons engaged at sector j
′ which reflects the
sector’s labour market size. This table proves that labour still tends to cluster in
the low-wage sector even after controlling for the change in labour demand. When
compared to the period of pre-2000, the labour transition rates from HM to LM
and from HS to LS sharply rose (18.0% → 42.2%, 12.6% → 17.5%, respectively),
and the rates of staying within the low-wage sector (LM and LS) goes up (44.2%
→ 49.8%, 26.6% → 27.7%). As a result, labour has concentrated in the low-wage
sector.
In conclusion, the dominant change in the US labour transition after the 2000s, is
that workers in the high-wage sector tend to vertically move to the low-wage sector
whereas workers in the low-wage sector primarily move horizontally within their
sector, which results in labour clustering in the low-wage or less productive sector.
This suggests that there exist frictions in low-to-high sectoral labour mobility.
1.3.4 Evidence 3: A Large Change in Wage from Sector
Switch
I measure the average wage change from vertical movement between sectors. If a
worker’s wage significantly increases when she moves in the direction of low-to-high
given that all other conditions are the same, this with previous facts supports the
existence of labour mobility frictions. Put differently, despite this strong incentive
to move to the high-wage sector, the observation of labour flowing in the opposite
direction suggests that there exist some barriers which hinder workers from switching
sectors. However, if the previously discussed selection view on the wage gap is true,
there should be little change in wage when a worker switches sectors.
For the measurement of the wage change, the ideal data is workers’ wages before
and after switching sectors, but the IPUMS-CPS database only provides a worker’s
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previous year’s wage. I alternatively measure the difference in mean wages between
former and current industries. To see the wage change purely caused by the sector
switch, worker’s characteristics, occupation and work experience are controlled.
4E[ lnwit,t+1(j, j′) | occ, exp] (1.3.6)
≡ E[ lnwit+1(j′) | occ, exp]− E[ lnwit(j) | occ, exp]
where wit(j) is the wage level of individual i who works in the sector j at time t, and
E[lnwit(j) | occ, exp] is the mean of the logged wage of workers in sector j given a
fixed occupation, occ and work experience, exp. Thus, 4E[ · ] measures the average
wage change of a worker who switches sectors without changing the occupation, for
example, when an accountant with a 10-year career at an apparel firm (a low-wage
industry) moves to a shipbuilding company (a high-wage industry) and works as an
accountant as before.
Table 1.7 shows the average wage change by switching sectors. When a worker
moves from the low- to the high-wage sector, her wage increases by 13.3 percent
(exp(0.125) − 1 ' 0.133) on average during the period after 2001. In particular,
the increase in wage is substantial when a worker in the low-wage services switches
to the high-wage sector (LS → HM: 14.5%, LS → HS: 15.6%). This result is in
line with Krueger and Summers (1988) who find that the wages of switchers from
one industry to another averagely change by as much as the wage gaps between
both industries. Contrarily, when a worker moves from the high- to the low-wage
sector, her wage is likely to decrease averagely by about 8 percent after the 2000s.
Doubtless, the worker’s incentive from the low-to-high sectoral movement is far more
than the reverse. Nevertheless, the US labour market has shown that the downward
labour flow has largely increased while the upward drift has decreased as previously
found. Were the theory of perfect labour mobility valid, this kind of labour flow
should not happen.
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Table 1.7: Average wage change from sectoral switch, full-time full-year white male
with controlling for occupation and work experience, US
1991-2000 2001-2015 (excl.2007-10)
4E[ln(w)] std.err. obs. 4E[ln(w)] std.err. obs.
LMt → HMt+1 0.075∗∗ (0.015) 471 0.116∗∗ (0.015) 498
LMt → HSt+1 -0.039∗ (0.023) 247 0.039∗ (0.023) 351
LSt → HMt+1 0.113∗∗ (0.021) 288 0.135∗∗ (0.020) 397
LSt → HSt+1 0.092∗∗ (0.016) 836 0.145∗∗ (0.011) 1,521
Lowt → Hight+1 0.073∗∗ (0.009) 1,842 0.125∗∗ (0.008) 2,767
HMt → LMt+1 -0.068∗∗ (0.014) 485 -0.033∗∗ (0.007) 1,682
HMt → LSt+1 -0.163∗∗ (0.020) 333 -0.135∗∗ (0.017) 515
HSt → LMt+1 -0.030 (0.022) 247 -0.038∗∗ (0.018) 462
HSt → LSt+1 -0.114∗∗ (0.016) 846 -0.099∗∗ (0.007) 3,090
Hight → Lowt+1 -1.000∗∗ (0.009) 1,911 -0.078∗∗ (0.005) 5,749
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: ‘∗∗’, ‘∗’ indicate that the 4E[ln(w)] is not zero with a significance level of 5%, 10%,
respectively, using t-test. The t-statistic is defined as t = (ln w¯t+1 − ln w¯t)
√
n/s.e., where s.e. is
standard error and n is the size of sample.
1.3.5 Evidence 4: The Increasing Mobility Cost
Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010, henceforth, ACM) propose a method of
estimating the pecuniary loss from a sector switch, the so-called labour mobility
cost by setting up a dynamic model of workers’ sector switches.22 They use the data
of sectoral wages and the fraction of sector switchers for the period before 2000 from
the US CPS database. Following this method, I estimate the inter-sectoral labour
mobility cost and its trend to see how the mobility cost changes since the 2000s.
As in ACM, a worker maximises her utility in the sector choice problem by
choosing to remain at her current sector (j) or move to another sector (j′). The
worker’s optimisation problem can be written as
22Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) postulate that the labour mobility cost has two parts:
a common and an idiosyncratic (worker-specific) component. They define the common component
as the pecuniary loss in switching sectors which does not vary across individuals and estimate it
to examine the economy-wide level of mobility cost.
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U j(Lt, st, εt) = Wj,t + max
j′
{
εj′,t − φjj′ + βEt[V j′(Lt+1, st+1)]
}
(1.3.7)
where U j(·) is the value to a worker in sector j which is a function of the labour
supply Lt, a state st such as technology shock, and an idiosyncratic benefit εt. Wj,t
is the sector j’s wage, φjj′ > 0 is a pecuniary mobility cost when a worker moves
from sector j to sector j′. V j(·) denotes the average value of U j(·) across all workers,
or the expected value of being in sector j. β is the discount factor.
By optimising a worker’s choice in switching sectors, a Euler equation can be
derived as23
φjj′ + ε¯jj′,t (1.3.8)
= βEt [(Wj′,t+1 −Wj,t+1) + (φjj′ + ε¯jj′,t+1) + (Ω(ε¯j′,t+1)− Ω(ε¯j,t+1))]
where ε¯jj′,t ≡ βEt
[
V j
′
(Lt+1, st+1)− V j(Lt+1, st+1)
]
− φjj′ ,
ε¯j,t = (ε¯j1,t, · · · , ε¯jJ,t)
Ω(ε¯j,t) =
J∑
j′=1
∫ ∞
−∞
(εj′ + ε¯jj′,t)f(εj′)
∏
k′ 6=j′
F (εj′ + ε¯jj′,t − ε¯jk′,t)dεj′
ε¯jj′,t is the net value when switching sectors and Ω(·) is the additional value which
is the option to move to another sector. f(·) is the probability density function and
F (·) is the cumulative distribution function. Thus, this Euler equation shows that
the expected change in the future value by moving from sector j to sector j′ has
three components: (i) the wage gap, (ii) the expected value of being in sector j′ in
lieu of sector j, (iii) the difference in additional values.
With the assumption that idiosyncratic shocks follow an extreme value distribu-
tion, (1.3.8) gives the following linear regression equation as24
23See the Appendix 1.A.6 for the derivation.
24See the Appendix 1.A.6 for the derivation.
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(lnmjj′,t − lnmjj,t)− β(lnmjj′,t+1 − lnmj′j′,t+1) = (1.3.9)
− (1− β)
ν
φjj′ +
β
ν
(Wj′,t+1 −Wj,t+1) + ut+1
where mjj′,t denotes the faction of the labour force in sector j that moves to sector
j′, which indicates the gross labour flow from sector j to j′. β is set to 0.96 as in the
standard literature. ν is a parameter which is related to the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks and ut+1 is news revealed at t+ 1.
The data used in this estimation are the same as before. By using IPUMS-CPS
database, I construct the fraction of sector switchers, mjj′,t, and sector j’s real wage
Wj,t. Here, sectoral wages are normalised in such a way that each wage is deflated
by the average wage of the whole sample. The sample is restricted to the full-time
white males aged 16 to 70 and the period covers 26 years (1991-2015). The sector
classification follows ACM who aggregate sub-industries to six sectors: agriculture
& mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communication & utilities,
trade, and all other services.25
By running a panel regression, the average mobility cost φˆ in inter-sectoral
labour movements is estimated.26 Table 1.8 shows the results from the panel data
regression. Panel 1 shows the results of the generalised linear squares (GLS) re-
gressions by period. The generalised two-stage linear squares (G2SLS) regressions
are also conducted as in Panel 2 where instrumental variables are used because
the error term is likely to be correlated with the wages as the error term contains
news at time t + 1. ACM use lagged endogenous variables, (Wj′,t−1 −Wj,t−1) and
(lnmjj′,t−1 − lnmj′j′,t−1), as instrumental variables which are uncorrelated with the
25Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) point out that classifying samples into many sub-
industries makes them close to zero observations since the number of directions for labour flows
grows fast as the number of sectors increases. These six sectors are the same as the major sector
classification in the CPS database.
26This panel data regressions estimate the average moving cost across sectors as in ACM.
34
wages at time t+ 1.
Table 1.8: Estimations on labour mobility cost using panel data, US
Panel 1. GLS Panel 2. G2SLS (IV)
Total 1991-2000 2001-2015 Total 1991-2000 2001-2015
φˆ
27.968 19.438 34.168 29.022 24.206 31.294
(27.971)∗∗∗ (19.435)∗∗∗ (34.167)∗∗∗ (29.026)∗∗∗ (24.202)∗∗∗ (31.283)∗∗∗
νˆ
6.417 5.330 7.069 6.382 5.946 6.475
(6.409)∗∗∗ (5.338)∗∗ (7.070)∗∗ (6.389)∗∗∗ (5.953)∗∗∗ (6.470)∗∗∗
Wald χ2 11.67∗∗∗ 6.02∗∗ 6.30∗∗ 18.02∗∗∗ 15.25∗∗∗ 12.02∗∗∗
No. obs 750 300 450 720 270 450
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS, based on Artuc¸ et al. (2010)
Notes: The White robust variance estimator is used. Values within parenthesis indicate
t-statistics. Based on the Hausman test (p-value is 0.7399 for Panel 1 and 0.7969 for Panel
2.), the random effects model is applied.
Figure 1.4: Average mobility cost (φˆ), 10-year window rolling regressions, US
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS, based on Artuc¸ et al. (2010)
Notes: The shaded area is the 95% confidence interval. The value is the coefficient φˆ from
10-year window rolling regressions (G2SLS); e.g. the value in 2000 is the coefficient φˆ from
the regression for the period 1991-2000.
The results show that the average cost for workers to switch sectors, or φˆ, has
been much higher in the period after 2001 than before.27 The estimates of φˆ indicate
that the inter-sectoral mobility cost increased from 19 - 24 times the average wage
27A rise in νˆ means that the tails of the shock distribution fatten and thus a given worker is
more likely to change sectors due to idiosyncratic reasons such as nonpecuniary factors.
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in the 1990s to 31 - 34 times after 2000.28 Figure 1.4 is the plot of time-varying
coefficient φˆ estimated by 10-year window rolling regressions. The plot also describes
that the labour mobility cost has risen since the early 2000s except for the period
of the global financial crisis.
1.4 Sources of Labour Mobility Frictions
So far, we have observed a puzzling phenomenon of the increasing wage gap and
downward labour mobility. To offer an explanation of this puzzle, I have shown
evidence from the US labour market which suggests the existence of increasing
labour mobility frictions. This implies that workers now pay higher costs, in terms
of time and money, to move to other sectors than in the past. Such mobility frictions
thus distort labour allocation across sectors and further widen the wage gap.
We now discuss changes in the process of switching sectors. This discussion
provides potential avenues for opening the black box, the source of mobility frictions,
and for addressing what drives the frictions to increase over time.
1.4.1 Worker’s Sector Switch Process
There have been some studies on labour mobility frictions which encompass ob-
servable costs, for example, job search costs and training costs, as well as shadow
mobility costs such as uncertainty in matching. In general, when a worker tries to
switch sectors, she needs to pass through a series of steps as delineated in Table
1.9. The first step is to train transferable or specific skills required in the desired
industry.29 After that, the worker searches for better workplaces and applies for as
28These estimates are similar to ACM’s which is 22.065 in the baseline model for the period
1975 - 2000. According to ACM, the estimates of moving cost in the literature usually show a very
high cost (e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2003).
29The skills required in switching jobs are divided into firm-specific, industry-specific,
occupation-specific, and transferable (or general) skills. The first two skills are normally acquired
by the on-the-job training in a firm, and the others are obtained at schools or vocational training
institutions (off-the-job training).
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many jobs as possible, but faces constraints in terms of time and information cost.
Some applicants succeed in switching sectors, and others fail. The workers who fail
to change sectors try the first or second step again by extending their list of desired
jobs, or stay in their original places, while successful workers move to new places.
In this process, various types of costs and uncertainties are involved.
Table 1.9: Worker’s sector switching process
process mobility costs or frictions
step 1 getting transferable skills training costs and period
step 2 searching & applying for jobs
costs, time, and efforts in searching,
networking, and applying for jobs
step 3 matching
uncertainties (possibility of failure)
in switching sectors
step 4 moving
moving costs, and geographical
constraints, opportunity costs
Many studies find a lack of skills or training to be an important impediment
for a worker who is trying to shift to other sectors. Papers by Sicherman and
Galor (1990) and Dolton and Kidd (1998) suggest that workers need to invest in
skills for changing sectors or jobs and obtaining a superior wage option. Dolton and
Kidd (1998) theoretically and empirically show that investment in transferable skills
promotes inter-sectoral labour mobility, inferring that an individual needs to spend
money and time in order to enter a preferred sector. Likewise, Lynch (1991) reveals,
using training data from the US, that young workers, who participated in off-the-job
training to get transferable skills, were more likely to switch sectors so that they
would have better chances to find higher wage firms. This paper also shows that
people who earn a low income tend to move to a better workplace by investing in
human capital.
Even if individuals become equally productive and have the same skills through
training, different types of mobility frictions prevent some of them from switching
sectors. When attempting to move to other sectors, workers face frictions related
to search, moving, and opportunity costs (Bartel, 1979; Diamond, 1981). Further,
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according to the job search and matching theory, information about a better job and
job’s nature is costly and not easy to acquire so that workers pay costs in terms of
time and money while trying to shift to other sectors (Lippman and McCall, 1976).
Lastly, in the matching process, mobility frictions can come in the form of uncer-
tainty. Harris and Todaro (1970) point out that workers who try to change sectors
face the uncertainty of risking unemployment during the switching process.
Based on the sector switching process, three types of inter-sectoral labour mobility
frictions can be defined:
1. Training cost: To acquire skills (transferable and occupation-specific skills)
required by a sector, workers need to invest in training.
2. Search & Moving cost: This is a certain amount of time, effort, and money for
job search, application, and moving to switch sectors.
3. Matching uncertainty: Many, although not all, workers have the possibility of
failure in changing sectors.
1.4.2 Discussion: Sources of Mobility Frictions
Several hypotheses lend themselves as candidate explanations for the source of mo-
bility frictions which trigger anomalous labour allocation. These will be discussed
individually by type of frictions.
1.4.2.1 Training Cost
Workers consider what skills are required when thinking about a career change to a
different sector. Employers, of course, look for workers who can demonstrate a good
set of occupation-specific and transferable skills. Thus, training costs are a form
of affecting a worker’s acquisition cost of skills, and a levy imposed by employers
according to Hsieh et al. (2013). They assume that a worker’s consumption is set
as income less expenditure on human capital as
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c = w − e · (1 + τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
training cost
where w is an individual’s wage, and e is her expenditure on skills. τ is the additional
cost for human capital investment depending on a worker’s ability, demographics,
and current sector. Hence, the agent’s sector switch choice depends largely on how
much they pay for training.
As shown in Figure 1.5, the share of movers from the low- to the high-wage sector
is directly proportional to the share of vocational trainees in the previous year, and
this observation is consistent with empirical evidence in Veum (1997) that self-paid
job training raises the likelihood of leaving a job. He argues that skill acquisition
from training serves to improve job matches.
Importantly, it is observed that as the participation rate in vocational training
Figure 1.5: Training and upward labour mobility, US
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: Each share is measured against the total labour force. Vocational training is a
training program including business, technical, trade, or correspondence courses, other than
regular school or on-the-job training. The sample is restricted to persons aged 16-70 years.
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has decreased since the 2000s, so has the share of switchers to the high-wage sector.
In the relation to this, Cappelli (2012) emphasises that many good workers fail to
get a decent job in the US mainly due to a lack of training. Chang (2010) argues
that little public support for workers’ retraining and job search in the US renders
them less open to change their current jobs.
The reason for the decrease in training could be the change in training costs.
The statistics of education institution fees suggest the possibility of an increase in
training costs. The real tuition fee in the US public 4-year universities has increased
at an annual rate of 4.35 percent on average after the 2000s (3.33% in the 1990s)
while the real GDP per capita has increased just at an annual rate of 0.91 percent for
the same period (2.19% in the 1990s), meaning that the relative cost of training has
risen (source: The College Board, IMF). Furthermore, the US public expenditure
in labour market training programmes has dwindled markedly from 0.10 percent in
1990 to 0.03 percent in 2015 in terms of a percentage of GDP as in Table 1.10.30
Table 1.10: Public expenditure on training programmes, US
1990 2000 2010 2015
0.10% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03%
Source: OECD
Note: a percentage of GDP
1.4.2.2 Search and Moving Cost
Alvarez and Shimer (2011) defines job search as a costly activity that enables workers
to move to a new sector. According to Mortensen (2011), job search costs are an
investment in information to find job opportunities, and they act as an impediment
to the process of efficient labour allocation.
30The training programmes include institutional training, workplace training, integrated train-
ing, and special support for apprenticeship.
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Recently, with high accessibility to information, the time needed to search for a
job has become shorter, and the commission paid for job information has decreased.
For individual job seekers, however, input effort level on searching and applying for
a preferred job is higher since the supply of well-prepared competitors, e.g. uni-
versity leavers, has increased rapidly for these good jobs, meaning that the supply
of skills would exceed the demand for those skills (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In
the US, the number of Bachelor’s degrees increased at an annual rate of 3.1 percent
since 2001 which is more than twice as high as the rate (1.3%) in the 1990s (source:
US Department of Education). In particular, graduates with a Bachelor’s degree in
the fields of study related to the high-wage sector have increased much faster than
employment in that sector. As shown in Table 1.11, the number of graduates with a
Bachelor’s degree in an ICT-related field increased by 42.8 percent since the 2000s
while employment in the ICT industry decreased by 14.8 percent. This congestion
pressure also exists in the other high-wage industries including legal services (em-
ployment: 2.1% vs. graduates: 122.0%), finance & insurance (8.9% vs. 38.1%), and
bio-industry (15.8% vs. 138.9%). Therefore, the degree of competition for the high-
wage sector is likely to increase in abundance of those high-educated candidates who
are well equipped with good general or occupation-specific skills, and thus workers
in the low-wage sector compete with more people to enter the high-wage sector.
Table 1.11: Employment in high-wage sector and college graduates, 2001-2015, US
employment graduates with Bachelor degree
sector growth (%) major growth (%)
High-wage sector 0.2 Total 52.3
ICT industrya -14.8 ICTb 42.8
Legal services 2.1 Legal 122.0
Finance & Insurance 8.9 Business 38.1
Bio-industryc 15.8 Bio-scienced 138.9
Source: US Department of Education ‘HEGIS’, BEA ‘NIPA Table 6.5D’
Notes: acomputer and electronic products, Information and computer systems design and re-
lated services, bcommunications technologies, computer and information sciences, cchemical
products, hospitals, dbiological and biomedical sciences, health professions and related pro-
grammes
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Another reason for the high degree of congestion in the job search is associated
with an increase of the skilled elderly in the labour force, especially after the 2000s.
In the US, the compulsory retirement age was abolished in 1986, causing the labour
force participation rate of persons aged over 65 to increase from 12.4 percent in 1994
to 18.6 percent in 2014 (source: BLS).
In the last step of switching sectors, direct moving costs and indirect opportunity
costs are generated. The moving costs are a spatial constraint to labour mobility.
Some research shows that the housing market affects inter-sectoral labour mobility
via higher moving costs. Oswald (1997) claims that home ownership negatively
influences the worker’s geographical movement. According to Hyatt and Spletzer
(2013), workers worry about losing health insurance coverage, called ‘job-lock’, and
homeowners take their housing price into account, called ‘house-lock’, when they
consider transferring to other firms. The authors point out that the intensity of
job- and house-lock has increased during the past 10 to 15 years due to economic
crises. Likewise, Brown (2016) argues that the housing market recession in the
US during the 2000s discouraged workers from migrating to other regions as the
decline of house value led to a liquidity constraint. According to Bartel (1979), the
moving costs involve the loss of the spouse’s income and the cost of uprooting their
residence which are opportunity costs. The US family income data lend more weight
to the view of the increased opportunity costs. In the US, the gender wage gap fell
about 5 percentage points since the 2000s over the 1990s (source: OECD) while
the share of dual-income families remained high around 70 percent (source: BLS).
These observations indicate that sector switches of male workers generate higher
opportunity costs than in the past.
1.4.2.3 Matching Uncertainty
The uncertainty or the probability of failure in matching makes people hesitate to
attempt to switch sectors. There have been some studies aimed at revealing the
source of matching uncertainty in the labour market. Harris and Todaro (1970)
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regard the possibility of unemployment as the uncertainty for workers in shifting
from the rural sector to the urban sector. Since the 1990s, the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (DMP) type matching technology has been widespread in research on
matching frictions. In the DMP matching function, new job-worker matches (Ht)
depend on not only the number of job seekers (Ut) and vacancy postings (Vt) but
also matching efficiency (µ) which is an uncertain factor.
Ht = µ ·M(Ut, Vt)
Relatedly, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) indicate that skill mismatch, or the
gap in skill sets possessed by job seekers and skills required by industries, is one
possible determinant for the extent of matching efficiency. As a sector achieves faster
progress in technology, the sector requires a higher skill set from candidates so that
matching uncertainty or skill mismatch increases in the sector.31 For instance, with
the advent of the ICT (Information & Communication Technology) revolution, the
skills required by firms have changed. In the past, transferable skills were defined as
generic skills such as communication and collaboration skills, fundamental numeracy,
and literacy and computing skills, but these days many firms place more emphasis on
specific IT skills, critical thinking, foreign languages and sense of entrepreneurship
(Hart and Howieson, 2008). Not only does the change in skills required by firms
make workers train for a longer time, but it also entails an increase in the skill
mismatch between workers and firms. As a consequence, transferring to another
sector is more uncertain for workers.
Besides, asymmetric information between job seekers and firms should be con-
sidered. Firms prefer qualified workers to avoid adverse selection. However, the
rising number of highly educated candidates makes it difficult for firms to select the
best candidate for the job.
31We will discuss the effect of unbalanced productivity between sectors on matching efficiency
in Chapter 3.
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1.5 Conclusion
Frictional inter-sectoral labour mobility and the widening wage gap exacerbate in-
come inequality and hurt economic growth by creating inefficiencies in the labour
market. From the viewpoint of labour market dynamics, the increasing inflow of
labour into less productive sectors could trigger labour misallocation within an econ-
omy. Since barriers to labour mobility act as a significant constraint on economic
agents, it is hard to achieve the first-best equilibrium in the economy. Therefore,
labour mobility could be the key to improving economic disparity and promoting
economic growth. All these imply that the removal of labour mobility frictions leads
to a Pareto improvement.
The puzzling phenomenon of the low-wage sector clustering despite the increase
in the wage gap, cannot be explained by labour supply and demand in the com-
petitive market where labour moves freely across sectors. As a foundational step to
identify what makes this distortion, we have found multiple evidence of the existence
of labour mobility frictions from the US labour market: (i) The part of the wage
gap unexplained by variables in the standard wage equation has increased. This
implies that labour mobility frictions have increased since the unexplained wage
gap is caused by the mobility frictions, partly or mostly. (ii) Labour flows from
the high- to the low-wage sector increased, but labour flows in the reverse direction
declined, indicating that there exist barriers to upward labour mobility. (iii) Even
within a group, i.e. same characteristics, job and work experience, workers’ wages
significantly increase when they move from the low- to the high-wage sector. Put
differently, while the incentive to move to the high-wage sector is strong enough,
upward labour mobility does not happen often. (iv) Mobility costs from switching
sectors have gone up since the 2000s.
There are three types of frictions in the process of a worker’s sector switch. The
first one is the training costs. Participation in skill training has decreased due to
the increasing training costs. The second type of frictions is job search and moving
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costs which have risen because of the congestion in job search and the constraints on
geographical movement. Lastly, matching uncertainty is growing since technology
changes so fast that skill mismatch between job seekers and firms is larger.
By providing evidence of the existence and even the increase of labour mobility
frictions, and by identifying the source of frictions, this study motivates us to do
further research to examine the role of labour mobility frictions and its ripple effects
on the labour market, as well as on the whole economy.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Skill distribution by sector, US
Table 1A.1: Occupation distribution by sector, full-time full-year white male, US
sector period
occupation (skill)a
low-skill middle-skill high-skill
Low 1991− 2000 (%) 19.1 53.8 27.1
Wage 2001− 2015b(%) 19.2 53.2 27.6
change (%p) 0.1 -0.6 0.5
High 1991− 2000 (%) 7.5 43.5 49.0
Wage 2001− 2015b(%) 6.8 40.7 52.4
change (%p) -0.6 -2.8 3.4
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: aOccupations are classified by percentile of mean wage in 2000. I classifies 0-30 percentile
occupations as ‘low-skill’, 30-70 percentile as ‘middle-skill’, 70-100 percentile as ‘high-skill’.
bExcept 2007-2010
Table 1A.2: Degree of automation potential by industry, US
sectors
automation
sectors
automation
potential potential
accom. & food services 73% finance & insurance 43%
manufacturing 60% arts, entertain. & recreation 41%
agriculture 58% real estate 40%
transport. & warehousing 57% administrative 39%
retail trade 53% health care & social work 36%
mining 51% information 36%
other services 49% professionals 35%
construction 47% management 35%
utilities 44% educational service 27%
wholesale trade 44%
Source: McKinsey Global Institute Analysis “A Future that Works: Automation, Employment,
and Productivity”, Executive Summary, 2017
Notes: Automation potential is defined according to occupations or work activities within a sec-
tor that can be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology. McKinsey measures
this using BLS database.
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1.A.2 Sector classification
IPUMS-CPS provides each worker’s industry data based on the industry classifica-
tion in the year 1950 (code label: IND1950) or 1990 (IND1990). I use IND1950 for
period comparison because it provides a consistent set of industry codes in the his-
torical samples. Total 146 sub-industries are classified into five sectors: high-wage
manufacturing (HM), low-wage manufacturing (LM), high-wage services (HS), low-
wage services (LS), and other production industries (OI). If a sub-industry meets
either one of two following criteria, it is classified into the high-wage sector; other-
wise, it is assigned to the low-wage sector.
1. Top 20% sub-industries in terms of mean wage level since 1991
2. Sub-industries which satisfy both conditions: (i) above-average wage level, (ii)
above-average wage growth rate in its upper category since 1991
Table 1A.3: Sector classification, US
sector (No.) sub-industries (code)
HM (18) Blast furnaces, steel works, & rolling mills(336), Fabricated steel products(346),
Agricultural machinery & tractors(356), Office & store machines & devices(357),
Electrical machinery, equipment, & supplies(367), Motor vehicles & motor
vehicle equipment(376), Aircraft & parts(377), Ship & boat building & re-
pairing(378), Professional equipment & supplies(386), Photographic equip-
ment & supplies(387), Tobacco manufactures(429), Pulp, paper, & paperboard
mills(456), Drugs & medicines(467), Paints, varnishes, & related products(468),
Miscellaneous chemicals & allied products(469), Petroleum refining(476), Mis-
cellaneous petroleum & coal products(477), Rubber products(478)
47
sector (No.) sub-industries (code)
LM (41) Logging(306), Sawmills, planing mills, & millwork(307), Misc wood prod-
ucts(308), Furniture & fixtures(309), Glass & glass products(316), Cement,
concrete, gypsum & plaster products(317), Structural clay products(318),
Pottery & related products(319), Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral & stone
products(326), Other primary iron & steel industries(337), Primary nonfer-
rous industries(338), Fabricated nonferrous metal products(347), Not speci-
fied metal industries(348), Miscellaneous machinery(358), Railroad & miscel-
laneous transportation equipment(379), Watches, clocks, & clockwork-operated
devices(388), Miscellaneous manufacturing industries(399), Meat products(406),
Dairy products(407), Canning & preserving fruits, vegetables, & seafoods(408),
Grain-mill products(409), Bakery products(416), Confectionery & related prod-
ucts(417), Beverage industries(418), Miscellaneous food preparations & kin-
dred products(419), Not specified food industries(426), Knitting mills(436),
Dyeing & finishing textiles, excl. knit goods(437), Carpets, rugs, & other
floor coverings(438), Yarn, thread, & fabric mills(439), Miscellaneous textile
mill products(446), Apparel & accessories(448), Miscellaneous fabricated tex-
tile products(449), Paperboard containers & boxes(457), Miscellaneous paper
& pulp products(458), Printing, publishing, & allied industries(459), Synthetic
fibers(466), Leather: tanned, curried, & finished(487), Footwear, excl. rub-
ber(488) Leather products, excl. footwear(489), Not specified manufacturing
industries(499)
HS (24) Railroads & railway express service(506), Taxicab service(536), Water trans-
portation(546), Air transportation(556), Petroleum & gasoline pipe lines(567),
Telephone(578), Telegraph(579), Drugs, chemicals, & allied products(607), Elec-
trical goods, hardware, & plumbing equipment(616), Machinery, equipment,
& supplies(617), Petroleum products(618), Farm products-raw materials(619),
Drug stores(669), Banking & credit agencies(716), Security & commodity bro-
kerage & investment companies(726), Insurance(736), Advertising(806), Ac-
counting, auditing, & bookkeeping services(807), Miscellaneous business ser-
vices(808), Radio broadcasting & television(856), Medical & other health ser-
vices, excl. hospitals(868), Hospitals(869), Legal services(879), Engineering &
architectural services(898)
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sector (No.) sub-industries (code)
LS (44) Street railways & bus lines(516), Trucking service(526), Warehousing & stor-
age(527), Services incidental to transportation(568), Motor vehicles & equip-
ment(606), Dry goods apparel(608), Food & related products(609), Miscella-
neous wholesale trade(626), Not specified wholesale trade(627), Food stores,
excl. dairy products(636), Dairy products stores & milk retailing(637), Gen-
eral merchandise stores(646), Five & ten cent stores(647), Apparel & acces-
sories stores, excl. shoe(656), Shoe stores(657), Furniture & house furnish-
ing stores(658), Household appliance & radio stores(659), Motor vehicles &
accessories retailing(667), Gasoline service stations(668), Eating & drinking
places(679), Hardware & farm implement stores(686), Lumber & building mate-
rial retailing(687), Liquor stores(688), Retail florists(689), Jewelry stores(696),
Fuel & ice retailing(697), Miscellaneous retail stores(698), Not specified retail
trade(699), Real estate(746), Auto repair services & garages(816), Miscellaneous
repair services(817), Private households(826), Hotels & lodging places(836),
Laundering, cleaning, & dyeing services(846), Dressmaking shops(847), Shoe
repair shops(848), Miscellaneous personal services(849), Theaters & motion
pictures(857), Bowling alleys, & billiard & pool parlors(858), Miscellaneous
entertainment & recreation services(859), Educational services(888), Welfare
& religious services(896), Nonprofit membership organizations(897), Miscella-
neous professional & related services(899), Postal service(906), Federal public
administration(916), State public administration(926), Local public administra-
tion(936)
OI (19) Agriculture(105), Forestry(116), Fisheries(126), Metal mining(206), Coal min-
ing(216), Crude petroleum & natural gas extraction(226), Nonmetallic mining &
quarrying, excl. fuel(236), Mining not specified(239), Construction(246), Elec-
tric light & power(586), Gas & steam supply systems(587), Electric-gas utili-
ties(588), Water supply(596), Sanitary services(597), Other & not specified util-
ities(598), Postal service(906), Federal public administration(916), State public
administration(926), Local public administration(936)
Source: IPUMS-CPS
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1.A.3 Estimation of standard error in the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition (Jann, 2008)
The formula of variance for product of two independent random variables, X and
Y , is
V (X · Y ) = V (X){E(Y )}2 + V (Y ){E(X)}2 + V (X)V (Y )
where V (X) and E(X) denote the variance and the expected value of X, respec-
tively. Analogously, the variance of the unexplained part in the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition can be calculated. The unexplained part in equation (1.3.3) can be
simply written as X¯1(bˆ
′
2−bˆ′1). Taking the randomness of the regressors into account32
and assuming that two groups are independent, and coefficients and regressors are
uncorrelated, the variance estimator for this term is
Vˆ (X¯1[bˆ
′
2 − bˆ′1]) =X¯1[Vˆ (bˆ′2) + Vˆ (bˆ′1)]X¯ ′1 + (bˆ2 − bˆ1)Vˆ (X¯ ′1)(bˆ′2 − bˆ′1)
+ trace[Vˆ (X¯ ′1)Vˆ (bˆ2 − bˆ1)]
where Vˆ (bˆ′) is the variance-covariance matrix obtained from the regressions, and
Vˆ (X¯ ′) = X˜ ′X˜/[n(n − 1)] where X˜ = X − 1X¯ ′ and n is the sample size. X is the
observed data matrix and 1 is the column vector of ones. Since the last term on the
right-hand side is asymptotically zero, the approximate variance of the unexplained
part is
Vˆ (X¯1[bˆ
′
2 − bˆ′1]) ≈ X¯1[Vˆ (bˆ′2) + Vˆ (bˆ′1)]X¯ ′1 + (bˆ2 − bˆ1)Vˆ (X¯ ′1)(bˆ′2 − bˆ′1)
32Most variables in survey data such as CPS are random variables.
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1.A.4 Demographic characteristics on sector switchers
Table 1A.4: Summary statistics on switchers, US
(%)
period
gender race agec full/part college edu.
M F white o/w 15-49 50-70 full part Y N
total 1991-2000 48.1 51.9 85.4 14.6 73.4 26.6 79.3 20.7 46.0 54.0
samplea 2001-2015 48.2 51.8 79.5 20.5 70.6 29.4 79.7 20.3 53.4 46.6
change(%p) 0.1 -0.1 -5.9 5.9 -2.8 2.8 0.3 -0.3 7.4 -7.4
total 1991-2000 50.9 49.1 83.2 16.8 84.6 15.4 77.9 22.1 47.1 52.9
movers 2001-2015 50.1 49.9 77.2 22.8 78.3 21.7 79.6 20.4 54.1 45.9
change(%p) -0.7 0.7 -5.9 5.9 -6.4 6.4 1.7 -1.7 7.0 -7.0
movers 1991-2000 46.7 53.3 83.3 16.7 83.0 17.0 82.1 17.9 52.5 47.5
H to Lb 2001-2015 49.7 50.3 77.4 22.6 76.3 23.7 83.2 16.8 57.9 42.1
change(%p) 3.0 -3.0 -5.9 5.9 -6.7 6.7 1.1 -1.1 5.4 -5.4
movers 1991-2000 45.9 54.1 83.5 16.5 84.9 15.1 75.9 24.1 53.4 46.6
L to Hb 2001-2015 45.5 54.5 78.0 22.0 79.0 21.0 76.9 23.1 61.4 38.6
change(%p) -0.5 0.5 -5.5 5.5 -5.9 5.9 1.0 -1.0 8.0 -8.0
Source: IPUMS-CPS
Notes: aTotal sample is workers aged 16-70 years during 1991-2015, except for the period 2007-
2010, bThe number of movers between the high-wage sector (HM, HS) and the low-wage sector
(LM, LS)., cThe UK ONS (Office for National Statistics) defines older workers as those aged
over 50.
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1.A.5 Labour transition matrices
Table 1A.5: Labour transition rate by sector, all switchers, US
(a) 1991-2000
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI UN total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 38.9 16.8 16.3 19.4 8.4 0.1 100 9.3 7.5
LM 15.8 25.7 16.4 30.7 11.2 0.3 100 10.5 8.4
HS 5.9 6.8 35.6 40.1 11.3 0.3 100 24.1 19.3
LS 4.2 6.8 24.0 54.1 9.8 0.9 100 46.3 37.2
OI 7.6 10.3 24.1 40.6 16.3 1.0 100 12.3 9.9
UN 4.2 7.7 18.9 54.8 14.4 - 100 22.0 17.7
total 8.5 9.7 24.2 45.6 11.5 0.5 100 124.6 100.0
(b) 2001-2015 (except 2007-2010)
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI UN total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 27.2 28.9 15.8 19.3 8.7 0.1 100 12.9 6.2
LM 14.1 28.0 15.4 30.5 11.8 0.1 100 11.2 5.4
HS 4.3 4.7 32.1 49.2 9.7 0.1 100 44.7 21.6
LS 3.2 4.5 21.8 61.6 8.7 0.3 100 73.4 35.5
OI 6.2 7.2 23.2 46.7 16.3 0.4 100 20.8 10.1
UN 3.7 5.5 19.5 56.2 15.2 - 100 43.7 21.1
total 5.9 7.8 23.0 52.0 11.2 0.2 100 206.8 100.0
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: The acronyms denote sectors: HM high-wage manufacturing, LM low-wage
manufacturing, HS high-wage services, LS low-wage services, OI other industries,
UN unemployment.
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Table 1A.6: Labour transition rate by sector, full-time full-year white male, US
(a) 1991-2000
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI UN total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 44.4 16.4 13.5 15.5 10.1 0.1 100 4.1 15.4
LM 19.5 28.0 13.0 25.6 13.7 0.2 100 3.5 13.3
HS 9.6 8.2 31.4 34.4 16.1 0.2 100 5.3 20.0
LS 6.4 9.3 20.9 48.8 14.3 0.2 100 9.4 35.5
OI 10.4 12.8 20.2 35.1 21.4 0.1 100 3.9 14.7
UN 7.2 11.7 22.0 40.8 18.2 0.0 100 0.3 1.1
total 15.3 13.2 20.8 35.6 15.0 0.2 100 26.5 100.0
(b) 2001-2015 (except 2007-2010)
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI UN total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 27.9 32.8 14.1 15.2 10.0 0.0 100 6.0 13.6
LM 16.6 32.0 12.8 24.8 13.9 0.0 100 4.4 9.9
HS 6.8 6.1 29.6 44.8 12.6 0.0 100 10.3 23.4
LS 4.9 6.7 19.7 55.8 12.9 0.0 100 15.3 34.8
OI 7.3 8.4 19.3 44.9 20.1 0.1 100 8.0 18.1
UN 16.1 10.3 19.9 36.7 16.9 0.0 100 0.0 0.1
total 9.9 12.7 20.6 42.8 13.8 0.0 100 43.9 100.0
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: The acronyms denote sectors: HM high-wage manufacturing, LM low-wage
manufacturing, HS high-wage services, LS low-wage services, OI other industries,
UN unemployment.
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Table 1A.7: Market size-adjusted labour transition rate by sector, full-time full-year
white male with controlling for occupation, US
(a) 1991-2000
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 67.5 18.0 4.7 2.7 7.0 100 3.0 20.5
LM 33.1 44.2 6.2 5.6 11.0 100 2.1 14.4
HS 23.7 16.2 23.5 12.6 24.1 100 2.8 19.5
LS 15.1 19.1 17.1 26.6 22.1 100 4.9 33.7
OI 22.4 22.6 14.1 12.0 28.9 100 1.7 11.8
total 36.3 23.3 12.2 11.6 16.7 100 14.5 100.0
(b) 2001-2015 (except 2007-2010)
(%)
t+1 HM LM HS LS OI total observations
t (thou.) (%)
HM 44.6 42.2 4.7 2.1 6.4 100 5.4 15.7
LM 30.0 49.8 5.4 4.2 10.6 100 3.5 10.3
HS 22.8 17.0 24.2 17.5 18.5 100 8.5 24.8
LS 17.5 17.4 17.4 27.7 19.9 100 11.4 32.9
OI 20.1 18.1 14.4 18.4 29.1 100 5.6 16.3
total 28.4 29.2 13.1 13.7 15.7 100 34.5 100.0
Source: Author’s own, from IPUMS-CPS
Notes: The acronyms denote sectors: HM high-wage manufacturing, LM low-wage man-
ufacturing, HS high-wage services, LS low-wage services, OI other industries.
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1.A.6 Derivation of the linear equation of mobility cost (Artuc¸,
Chaudhuri, and McLaren, 2010)
A worker’s optimisation problem in switching sectors can be written as
U j(Lt, st, εt) = Wj,t + max
j′
{
εj′,t − φjj′ + βEt[V j′(Lt+1, st+1)]
}
(1.A.1)
= Wj,t + βEt[V j(Lt+1, st+1)] + max
j′
{εj′,t + ε¯jj′,t}
where U j(·) is the value to a worker in sector j which is a function of the labour
supply Lt, a state st, and an idiosyncratic benefit εt. Wj,t is the sector j’s wage,
φjj′ > 0 is a pecuniary mobility cost when a worker moves from sector j to sector
j′. V j(·) denotes the expected value of U j(·). β is the discount factor. ε¯jj′,t is the
net value when switching sectors as
ε¯jj′,t ≡ βEt
[
V j
′
(Lt+1, st+1)− V j(Lt+1, st+1)
]
− φjj′ (1.A.2)
By taking the expectation of (1.A.1) with respect to ε,
V j(Lt, st) = Wj,t + βEt[V j(Lt+1, st+1)] + Ω(ε¯j,t) (1.A.3)
where Ω(ε¯j,t) =
J∑
j′=1
∫ ∞
−∞
(εj′ + ε¯jj′,t)f(εj′)
∏
k′ 6=j′
F (εj′ + ε¯jj′,t − ε¯jk′,t)dεj′
ε¯j,t ≡ (ε¯j1,t, · · · , ε¯jJ,t)
where Ω(·) is the additional value which is the option to move to another sector. f(·)
is the probability density function and F (·) is the cumulative distribution function.
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By substituting (1.A.3) into (1.A.2), a Euler equation can be derived as
φjj′ + ε¯jj′,t = βEt
[
Wj′,t+1 −Wj,t+1 + βEt+1
(
V j
′
(Lt+2, st+2)− V j(Lt+2, st+2)
)
+ Ω(ε¯j′,t+1)− Ω(ε¯j,t+1)
]
= βEt
[
(Wj′,t+1 −Wj,t+1) + (φjj′ + ε¯jj′,t+1) + (Ω(ε¯j′,t+1)− Ω(ε¯j,t+1))
]
(1.A.4)
Now, define mjj′,t as the faction of the labour force in sector j that moves to
sector j′. Assume that ε follows an extreme-value distribution with zero mean as
f(ε) =
1
ν
exp
(
− ε
ν
− γ − exp
(
− ε
ν
− γ
))
F (ε) = exp
(
− exp
(
− ε
ν
− γ
))
where ν is a parameter which is related to the variance of idiosyncratic shocks and
γ is the Euler’s constant. With this distribution, ε¯jj′,t and Ω(ε¯j,t) can be rewritten
as33
ε¯jj′,t = ν (lnmjj′,t − lnmjj,t) (1.A.5)
Ω(ε¯j,t) = −ν lnmjj,t (1.A.6)
By substituting from (1.A.5) and (1.A.6) into (1.A.4), we get the linear regression
equation of the mobility cost.
(lnmt,jj′ − lnmt,jj)− β(lnmjj′,t+1 − lnmj′j′,t+1) = (1.A.7)
− (1− β)
ν
φjj′ +
β
ν
(Wj′,t+1 −Wj,t+1) + ut+1
where ut+1 is news revealed at t+ 1.
33See Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) for details and derivations.
Chapter 2
The Role of Labour Mobility
Friction
2.1 Introduction
While many workers desire to get a job in a sector which offers the most attractive
remuneration or benefit package, it is generally not easy for workers to switch sectors
during their careers for various reasons. Undoubtedly, a common reason is that they
do not have enough qualifications or do not meet criteria in terms of the education
or work experience required in the sector. However, while correct, this argument
forms only part of the story. Even when individuals have high levels of human
capital, they still have trouble switching sectors. As argued in Chapter 1, there is
compelling evidence for the presence of labour market frictions or barriers to inter-
sectoral labour mobility as well as an increase in their level, especially in advanced
economies. Thus, it is sufficiently likely that labour tends to gather in the low-wage
sector because of these frictions even though the wage gap between the high-wage
sector and the low-wage sector has increased, indicating the possibility of linking
inter-sectoral labour mobility with the sectoral wage gap. An example of this is
that an accountant in low-paying retail trade services has difficulties in moving to
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a position of accountant in high-paying IT manufacturing.
Since the Lewis’s ‘dual economy model’ (1954) and Krueger and Summers’s
‘efficiency wage model’ (1988), many studies have explored what drives labour real-
location between sectors (or structural transformation) and the sectoral wage differ-
entials. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) argue that structural transformation occurs
with technological change, showing that technology development in the capital-
intensive sector causes its labour allocation to fall. They consider that labour re-
allocation across sectors is attributed to the change in labour demand triggered by
technological progress. Likewise, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that structural
transformation comes about in such a way that labour moves from the high TFP
growth sectors to low ones. Regarding the sectoral wage gap, many studies focus
on a worker’s unobserved ability. According to Katz and Autor (1999) and Herren-
dorf and Schoellman (2015, 2018), labour is efficiently allocated in an economy on
the basis of unobserved ability, by the ‘self-selection’ mechanism. They claim that
the sectoral wage gap is explained by nothing but the differences in ability among
workers, and thus only high ability persons work in the high-wage sector.
As an alternative approach, many others pay attention to frictions in inter-
sectoral labour mobility leaving labour demand factors and workers’ ability aside.
Hayashi and Prescott (2008) find out the barrier to labour flow from the agricultural
to the non-agricultural sector as a reason for stalled labour mobility during prewar
Japan. Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) impose a restriction, or an exogenous
barrier to labour mobility, in a two-sector framework which results in a relatively
low wage in agriculture and then overuse of labour in the sector. According to
Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), the fact that workers hesitate to respond
quickly to sectoral wage differences is closely linked to considerable pecuniary costs
when switching sectors. Hsieh et al. (2013) point out labour market frictions as
the possible cause of the difference in occupational distribution by gender or race
group. Cardi and Restout (2015) show that an essential element to account for the
change in the wage gap between traded and non-traded sectors is imperfect labour
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mobility across sectors. The extant literature, however, falls short of clarifying the
relationship and interaction between the wage differentials and inter-sectoral labour
mobility. Furthermore, we can hardly find the research that demonstrates the effects
of labour mobility frictions on the wage gap and labour allocation between sectors.
In this chapter, I present a multi-sector general equilibrium model with the
rigidity of labour movements between sectors to show the role of mobility frictions
on labour market dynamics. While analysing the model, the relationship between
the wage gap and labour allocation will be evident. The proposed model partly
develops upon the existing models on the structural transformation and wage gap
but frictions in inter-sectoral labour mobility are fed into the model as constraints
for the household’s labour supply decision. Mobility costs, for example, the costs
and time spent in job search, training for skills required, and moving to a new place
act as direct constraints. Mobility uncertainty such as matching frictions between
workers and firms are associated with latent restrictions on switching sectors, which
come from economic fluctuation, policy changes, or skill mismatch, to name a few.
Hence, a household decides the allocation of members across sectors to maximise its
utility, taking account of such frictions as mobility costs and uncertainty in switching
sectors.
Incorporating labour mobility frictions into the model can contribute to an ex-
planation for the reasons why many workers get stuck in the low-wage sector despite
higher potential wage options available in other career paths. The mobility frictions
play a central role in distorting labour market by worsening the sectoral wage dif-
ferentials via labour misallocation. By contrast, factors of the labour demand side,
which have been a focus of much existing research, are not able to simultaneously
explain both the increasing wage gap and labour clustering in the low-wage sector.
Rather, the variations in labour demand side factors, e.g. technology progress, re-
sult in labour reallocation toward the sector whose wage level rises. Therefore, the
mobility frictions in the model are a key parameter to account for the labour market
puzzle.
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Additional findings suggest that the degree of labour mobility frictions has be-
come much higher after 2000 than in the previous decade. This higher level of
frictions gives rise to a non-trivial economic loss and even exacerbating labour mar-
ket distortions compared to a lower friction economy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2, a discussion
about the standard multi-sector model without frictions suggests the need to con-
sider imperfect labour mobility. Section 2.3 presents a multi-sector general equilib-
rium model embedded with labour mobility frictions and discusses further insights
into the frictions. Next, I calibrate the two-sector case (high- and low-wage sec-
tors) and explain the findings such as the degree of frictions, economic loss, and
dynamic responses to sector-biased shocks in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
The Appendices provide further details and derivations on the proposed model and
data.
2.2 A Multi-sector Model Revisited
In the standard multi-sector model (Acemoglu, 2001; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), the final good firm has a CES-type aggregator of pro-
duction function and each sector’s firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Yt =
(
J∑
j=1
γj · Y
σ−1
σ
jt
) σ
σ−1
(2.2.1)
Yjt = (ZjtLjt)
αK1−αjt (2.2.2)
where Yt is the output of the final goods, Yjt is sector j’s output, and γj ∈ (0, 1),∑
j γj = 1, is a parameter corresponding to technological distribution or the relative
importance of sector j’s goods in the aggregation production. σ ∈ (0,∞) is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Each sector uses labour and
capital inputs, Ljt and Kjt, to produce its output. Zjt is the sector-specific labour-
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augmenting technology, and α is the labour income share.
With these technologies, a stand-in household’s utility maximisation problem
can be written as follows:
max
{Ct+s, Nj,t+s,Kt+s+1}∞s=0
U = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
C1−θt+s
1− θ − ν
(∑J
j=1Nj,t+s
)1+χ
1 + χ
 (2.2.3)
s.t. Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt =
J∑
j=1
WjtNjt +RtKt + Πt (2.2.4)
where Ct is the household’s aggregate consumption of goods and Kt is the total
capital stock. Wjt is each sector’s real wage and Njt is labour supply for each
sector. Rt is the economy-wide, real rental rate of capital,
1 and Πt is the profit from
firms. β is the discount factor, and θ is the risk aversion parameter (the inverse of
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption). ν controls intratemporal
substitution between consumption and leisure, and χ represents the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply. δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
By solving this decentralised problem where no frictions exist, we get two condi-
tions which are (i) wage equality across sectors, namely, the law of one wage and (ii)
labour allocation which is the same as the ratio of nominal outputs between sectors
as2
(i)
Wjt
Wit
= 1 ⇐⇒ ∆ lnWjt = ∆ lnWit (2.2.5)
(ii)
Njt
Nit
=
PjtYjt
PitYit
⇐⇒ ∆ ln Njt
Nit
= ∆ ln
PjtYjt
PitYit
(2.2.6)
where the subscripts i, j denote any two sectors and Pjt is the price of sector j’s
goods. The explanation is straightforward. With the assumption of perfect labour
mobility across sectors, the level and growth rate of each sector’s wage are the same
1It is assumed that capital freely moves across sectors, so the capital rental rate Rt does not
depend upon which sector rents capital.
2See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
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as others. The relative labour allocation and its growth are equivalent to those of
the relative nominal output.
To evaluate the relevance of this standard model to the real economy, we explore
the wage gaps and labour allocation across all industry pairs in the US. To get
the trends of wage gaps of all industry pairs, I use the data of per capita wage by
industry from BEA NIPA. It consists of 38 sub-industries, so there are total 703
industry pairs (=38C2). Figure 2.1(a) displays the time series of the wage gaps of
all industry pairs in the US from 2000 to 2016. The time series are indexed to 1.0
in 2000 to visualise the relative change of each pair and check the convergence of
wage gaps. This figure does not support the relation of equation (2.2.5). Indeed,
wage gaps have spread over time. Euclidean distance of the wage gaps from wage
equality (the vector of ones) has also increased over time, succinctly describing the
divergence of wage gaps (Figure 2.1(b)).
(a) wage gaps across sectorsa (b) Euclidean distance from wage equalityb
Figure 2.1: Trend of wage gap, Wjt/Wit, US
Source: Author’s own, from BEA National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Notes: aEvery pair of 38 sub-industries (total 703 combinations = 38C2) is drawn.
bEuclidean
distance describes the distance of the vector of wage gaps (W1W1 ,
W2
W1
, W3W1 , ...,
W38
W37
) from the vector of
ones (1, 1, 1, ..., 1), or
√∑
i
∑
j 6=i(Wj/Wi − 1)2, where industrial wages are arranged in ascending
order. If Wj/Wi = 1, ∀ i, j, Euclidean distance will be zero.
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The second relation (2.2.6) is also not supported by actual data. I use the annual
data of the nominal value added and the number of employees by industry in the US
between 2000 and 2015 from EU KLEMS database.3 There are 29 sub-industries
and thus total 406 industry pairs (=29C2). Figure 2.2 plots the growth rates of
the relative employment share vis-a`-vis the growth rates of nominal output gap for
all industry pairs during the period 2000 - 2015. According to the model without
labour mobility frictions, both growth rates are the same and hence, graphically, all
industry pairs must be positioned on the black 45 degree line in the figure. However,
the slope of the red fitted line is even flatter than the black line, indicating that
many industry pairs have a higher growth rate in nominal output gap than the
growth rate in employment ratio, or vice versa. Simple panel data regressions of
employment ratio on nominal output gap show that the slope of nominal output gap
is significantly different from 1 in terms of both level and growth rate as in Table
Figure 2.2: Labour allocation and nominal output gap, US
Source: Author’s own, from EU KLEMS
Notes: The scatter plot depicts the growth rates of the relative labour allocation
(∆ ln(Njt/Nit)) against the growth rates of the nominal output ratio (∆ ln(PjtYjt/PitYit)).
The black line is 45◦ line and the red line is fitted line.
3The result is identical with the data of hours worked of employees.
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2.1. The results tell us that a one percentage point increase in the nominal output
gap (the growth of the nominal output gap) is linked to the increase of 0.29 (0.13)
percentage points of the employment ratio (the growth of the employment ratio).
Table 2.1: Panel GLS estimates of equation (2.2.6), US
Njt
Nit
= αt + β
PjtYjt
PitYit
+ cij + uij,t ∆ln
Njt
Nit
= αt + β∆ln
PjtYjt
PitYit
+ cij + uij,t
β 0.294 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.127 (0.008)∗∗∗
95% conf. [0.28, 0.31] [0.11, 0.14]
t(β) = 1 0.000 0.000
no.obs. 6,496 6,090
Source: Author’s own, from EU KLEMS
Notes: Hausman tests show that the random effects model is not rejected at (1) and is
rejected at (2). *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Values within ( )
indicate standard errors. t(β) = 1 reports the p-value of the test H0 : β = 1.
2.3 A Multi-sector Model with Mobility Friction
In this section, I present a multi-sector general equilibrium model with labour mo-
bility frictions. The economic environment consists of J industries, indexed by
j = 1, 2, · · · , J . The economy is populated by a stand-in infinitely lived household.
The household consists of a continuum of working-age members normalised at the
closed interval [0, 1] who are either employed in any one of J sectors, or are enjoying
leisure. All members are homogeneous in ability and thus equally productive across
sectors. The final good is produced as an aggregate of these J sectors’ intermediate
goods, and all goods and factor markets are competitive.4 In this model, the initial
4If markets are imperfectly competitive, there are heterogeneous goods and workers. Gal´ı
(2015) adopts the differentiated goods and labour supply to introduce price and wage stickiness.
The differentiated labour supply can also be applied when workers are heterogeneous in skills. In
this thesis, however, we focus on frictions in inter-sectoral labour mobility. For example, even if a
worker in sector 1 has the same skills as a worker in sector 2, it would be difficult for her in sector
1 to move to sector 2 because of various types of mobility frictions, e.g. training costs, search and
moving costs, and/or matching uncertainty. In this context, introducing heterogeneous workers
will be a type of mobility frictions as in Jones’ (1971) specific factor model.
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sectoral wage gap stems from the difference in the relative importance in produc-
ing the final goods or the relative level of technology. The allocation of members
across sectors is given at the beginning and then some try to switch sectors every
period. However, labour cannot move freely across sectors for two reasons. On the
labour demand side, finite substitutability between intermediate goods limits labour
movements. On the labour supply side, there exist barriers for members to move to
another sector. The barriers are called ‘labour mobility frictions’ on which we focus
in this chapter.
2.3.1 Model
2.3.1.1 Households
The household seeks to maximise its utility subject to the period budget constraint
which takes the form of
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt = WtNt +RtKt + Πt (2.3.1)
where Wt is the aggregate real wage index which is an aggregator of all sectors’
wages Wjt, and Nt is the aggregate labour supply index which is a combination of
labour supplies Njt for each of the sectors.
The household supplies its members to each sector as labour input, Njt. If
labour can freely switch sectors, all workers are willing to move to the sector which
pays the highest wage. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, frictions to labour
movements across sectors exist. I adopt a comprehensive labour mobility friction,
which includes all types of mobility frictions, in the form of limited substitutability
in labour supply according to Casas (1984), Horvath (2000), Cardi and Restout
(2015), and Katayama and Kim (2018). In line with this, the aggregate labour
supply index is assumed to be a CES-type form.5
5This is a parsimonious way to represent labour mobility frictions in the form of limited labour
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Nt ≡
(
J∑
j=1
ϕ
− 1
φt
j ·N
φt+1
φt
jt
) φt
φt+1
(2.3.2)
It is noted that workers are identical across sectors, but they face constraints in
switching sectors. The time-varying, deterministic parameter φt ∈ [0,∞) is the
elasticity of substitution in labour supply between sectors and controls the extent
to which labour can switch sectors. To keep the notation clean, I omit the time
subscript on φ. This parameter captures the degree of combined labour mobility
frictions. As φ→∞, labour supplies can be perfectly substitutable between sectors
(the so-called perfect labour mobility) and thus members would move to the highest
wage sector until all sectors’ wages are equalised. In this case, sectoral labour allo-
cation is determined only by the demand side of the labour market and thus (2.3.2)
reduces to Nt =
∑
j Njt. When φ < ∞, labour supplies are not perfect substitutes
and members cannot move freely across sectors. φ = 0 is the case of total immobility.
Hence, the smaller φ, the more difficult labour movements across sectors. A lower
level of φ represents a higher cost of labour reallocation in utility terms so that this
parameter can be thought of as a comprehensive mobility friction. This involves any
explicit mobility costs (e.g. job search and application fees, training costs, moving
costs) that workers pay, any opportunity costs, as well as unobserved frictions (e.g.
matching uncertainty, separation probability, changes in labour market institutions)
incurred when workers try to switch sectors.6 It is noteworthy that while there are
no pecuniary costs, the mobility costs can be captured in utility terms. When φ is
finite meaning that there exist mobility frictions, labour reallocation between sec-
tors increases the total labour supply, which leads to the decrease in the household’s
substitutability between sectors. The elasticity of substitution here is not the preference of the
household but exogenously given. By using this way, we simply show the role of mobility frictions
on the wage gap and labour allocation. However, we do not know what drives this parameter or
what the source is. In Chapter 3, we discuss the source of mobility frictions in more detail.
6These mobility frictions can depend on the sector or can be asymmetric, e.g. it might take
more time for workers to switch from the low- to the high-wage sector. Here, we focus on the
degree of economy-wide mobility frictions and its role in the labour market.
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utility (2.3.7).7 Thus, φ can be interpreted as labour supply adjustment cost (or
time constraint) in utility terms.
The parameter ϕj ∈ (0, 1),
∑
j ϕj = 1, is the weight of labour supply to sector j.
This parameter can be intuitively thought of as the long-term average proportion of
sector j in total labour supply.8 Thus, ϕj can be a public policy parameter because
the long-term labour supply to a sector is mainly determined by long-standing labour
market policies.
From this aggregate labour supply index, we can find the aggregate real wage
index as9
Wt =
(
J∑
j=1
ϕj ·W 1+φjt
) 1
φ+1
(2.3.3)
where Wjt denotes the real wage in sector j. When labour is totally immobile (φ = 0)
because of a very high level of mobility friction, the aggregate wage index will be
a linear combination of J sectors’ wages, Wt =
∑
j(ϕjWjt). As the level of friction
is lowered (φ increases), the contribution of the high-wage sector to the aggregate
wage increases due to labour moving to this sector.10
In this circumstance, the household’s optimisation problem can be broken down
into two parts. The household first needs to determine the optimal labour allocation
across sectors with a certain degree of labour mobility friction. This problem can
be solved in a way that the household minimises Nt for any given earning level
Qt ≡
∑
j(WjtNjt) by deciding labour allocation Njt. This is namely the disutility
minimisation problem since labour supply entails disutility to the household.
7From equations (2.3.2) and (2.3.7), the following relation is derived: ∂Ut∂Njt =
∂Ut
∂Nt
(−)
· ∂Nt∂Njt
(+)
< 0
8If we let ϕj be the average proportion of sector j in total labour supply over the time periods,
or N¯j/N¯ , equation (2.3.2) shows that the average total labour supply is equivalent to the sum of
the average sectoral labour supplies, N¯ =
∑
j N¯j .
9See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
10Sector j’s contribution to the aggregate wage can be expressed as ϕj(Wjt/Wt)
1+φ. As φ goes
up, sector j’s contribution increases relative to sector i’s, if Wjt > Wit.
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min
{Njt}j
Nt =
(
J∑
j=1
ϕ
− 1
φ
j ·N
φ+1
φ
jt
) φ
φ+1
(2.3.4)
s.t. Qt ≡
J∑
j=1
WjtNjt (2.3.5)
The optimal labour allocation conditions yield the labour supply function for each
sector.11
Njt = ϕj
(
Wjt
Wt
)φ
Nt (2.3.6)
The second problem is a dynamic problem where the household decides how much
to consume and save for physical capital, and how large a fraction of its members
to work. The household receives utility from consumption and incurs disutility
from labour supply. The household maximises its lifetime utility subject to the flow
budget constraint (2.3.1).
max
{Ct+s,Kt+s+1, Nt+s}∞s=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsU(Ct+s, Nt+s) = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
C1−θt+s
1− θ − ν
N1+χt+s
1 + χ
)
(2.3.7)
I assume that the utility function is separable in consumption and labour in
which the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing and the marginal disutility
of working is increasing.12 It is assumed, according to Hayashi and Prescott (2008),
that there is no barrier to capital mobility between sectors so that the real rental
rate of capital, Rt, is determined regardless of sector.
11See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
12We relax this assumption and examine a non-separable utility later. Analytical results reveal
that the non-separability of consumption and leisure in preferences does not affect the wage gap
and labour allocation.
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The first order conditions in the dynamic problem are
[Ct] C
−θ
t = λt (2.3.8)
[Kt+1] λt = βλt+1(1 +Rt+1 − δ) (2.3.9)
[Nt] λtWt = νN
χ
t (2.3.10)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. And the transversality condition is
lim
s→∞
βsλt+sKt+s = 0 (2.3.11)
2.3.1.2 Technologies and Firms
In the spirit of Acemoglu (2001), the technology for producing the unique final
output is assumed to take the following CES form between intermediate goods,
meaning that the final output is produced by combining J sectors’ goods.
Yt =
(
J∑
j=1
γj · Y
σ−1
σ
jt
) σ
σ−1
(2.3.12)
where the elasticity of substitution σ captures the extent of substitutability between
intermediate goods in producing the final goods.13 As σ →∞, J goods are perfect
substitutes and thus the final goods producers are willing to use only the cheapest
intermediate goods. When σ < ∞, the combination of inputs cannot be easily
adjusted. When σ → 0, J intermediate goods become perfect complements (or
Leontief production function), and when σ → 1, it is the case of the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
The final good firm’s profit maximisation yields the set of demands for the J
intermediate goods as14
13The elasticity of substitution is assumed to be the same between any two sectors in order to
make the multi-sector model tractable. In numerical analysis, we will discuss a two-sector case in
which the issue about the assumption of the same elasticity will lessen.
14See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
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Pjt = γj
(
Yjt
Yt
)− 1
σ
(2.3.13)
where Pjt is the price of each sector’s goods. The price of the final goods, Pt,
can be derived from the output aggregator (2.3.12) and is here assumed to be the
numeraire.15
Pt =
(
J∑
j=1
γσj · P 1−σjt
) 1
1−σ
≡ 1 (2.3.14)
The intermediate goods, Yjt, is produced competitively within the sector by using
labour and capital inputs, Ljt, and Kjt. The production function is assumed to be
the following Cobb-Douglas form.
Yjt = (ZjtLjt)
αK1−αjt (2.3.15)
where the labour income share, α, is assumed to be the same across sectors.16
Now, we can derive the factor prices from intermediate sectors’ cost minimisation
problems using the Shepard’s lemma and the equivalence between the price of goods
and its marginal cost since the intermediate goods are competitively produced. The
sectoral wages and capital rental rate are determined by17
Wjt = αγj
( Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Ljt
(2.3.16)
Rjt = (1− α)γj
( Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Kjt
= Rt (2.3.17)
15See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
16We will discuss the case of different labour income share between sectors later. This relaxation
has only level effects on the wage gap and labour allocation.
17See the Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation. Alternatively, the factor prices are exactly the same
as the marginal product of each factor from equation (2.3.12) or the value of marginal product of
each factor from equation (2.3.15). Since all markets are competitive, factor prices are derived just
by solving the finial firm’s optimisation problem as in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
70
Equation (2.3.16) pins down sectoral labour demand. Note that capital freely moves
so that the capital rental rate, Rt, is common across sectors.
2.3.1.3 Relative Labour Supply
What we are interested in is the relationship between labour allocation and the wage
gap in this economy where barriers to labour movements exist. Firstly, by dividing
any two sectors’ (i and j) labour supply functions (2.3.6) with each other, we can
derive
zsij,t =
ϕj
ϕi
· ωφij,t (2.3.18)
where ωij,t ≡ Wjt/Wit and zsij,t ≡ Njt/Nit are defined as the wage gap and the
relative labour supply, respectively. This equation demonstrates the relationship
between labour allocation and the wage gap on the labour supply side. An increase
(decrease) in the relative labour supply (zij,t) corresponds to an increase (decrease)
in the wage gap (ωij,t). Intuitively, if sector j pays higher wages than sector i and
their wage gap increases, workers are willing to devote their labour to sector j. Yet
there exists labour mobility friction φ which limits the labour allocation shift. As
the degree of labour mobility friction becomes greater (or φ is smaller), the rise in
the relative labour supply in relation to the increase in the wage gap is being smaller.
Within the model, φ generates disutility from inter-sectoral labour movements, and
this disutility will be the same size as the utility of consumption bought by the wage
gain from the movement without frictions.
By taking the logarithm of (2.3.18), we obtain a linear relationship as
lnzsij,t = ln
ϕj
ϕi
+ φ lnωij,t (2.3.19)
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2.3.1.4 Relative Labour Demand
On the labour demand side, from any two sectors’ marginal products of labour
(2.3.16), the following relationship is derived.18
zdij,t =
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)σ−1
σ 1
ωij,t
=
(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
1
ωij,t
)1+α(σ−1)
(2.3.20)
where zdij,t ≡ Ljt/Lit denotes the relative labour demand. By taking logs, we get
lnzdij,t = σ ln
γj
γi
+ α(σ − 1) ln Zjt
Zit
− (1 + α(σ − 1)) lnωij,t (2.3.21)
There is a negative relationship between the relative labour demand and the wage
gap. If sector j pays higher wages than sector i, sector j’s marginal cost and its
good price increase given the technology. Then, the final good producer’s demand
for sector j’s goods decreases and accordingly firms in sector j scale down their
production by reducing the comparatively high-priced labour inputs. In this case,
the substitutability of intermediate goods affects the relationship between the wage
gap and the relative labour demand. As the elasticity of substitution between in-
termediate goods (σ) becomes larger, meaning that intermediate substitutability is
higher, the final good producer can more easily replace intermediate goods with
cheaper ones (sector i’s goods). The relative labour demand (zdij,t) is more sensitive
to the change in the wage gap (ωij,t) as σ increases, and vice versa. When σ → 1,
the wage gap elasticity of the relative labour demand converges to unity.
18See Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
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2.3.1.5 Equilibrium
All goods, labour and capital markets are clear in equilibrium.
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (2.3.22)
Njt = Ljt ⇒ zsij,t = zdij,t (2.3.23)
Kt =
J∑
j=1
Kjt =
J∑
j=1
(κjt ·Kt) ,
J∑
j=1
κjt = 1 (2.3.24)
where κjt is the capital share of sector j. Sectoral labour market clearing condition
(2.3.23) is sufficient for equating the relative labour supply with the relative labour
demand.
A dynamic equilibrium given the sequence of exogenous variables {φt, Zjt}∞t=0,
j ∈ {1, 2} and the initial capital stock K0, is a sequence of prices, quantities, and
ratios {Ct,Nt,Kt+1,Pjt,Njt,Wjt,Rt,κjt,ωij,t,zij,t}∞t=0, satisfying (i) the household’s
optimisation conditions, (ii) the firms’ optimisation conditions, and (iii) the goods
and factor markets clearing conditions.
The optimal conditions besides the transversality condition can be reduced to
the following conditions.
(Euler equation)
1
Cθt
= β
1
Cθt+1
(1 +Rt+1 − δ) (2.3.25)
(intratemporal optimality)
Wt
Cθt
= νNχt (2.3.26)
(sectoral labour supply)
Njt = ϕj
(
Wjt
Wt
)φ
Nt (2.3.27)
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(demand for goods)
Pjt = γj
(
Yjt
Yt
)− 1
σ
(2.3.28)
(sectoral labour demand)
Wjt = αγj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Njt
(2.3.29)
(marginal product of capital)
Rt = (1− α)γj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Kjt
(2.3.30)
(free movement of capital)
κjt
κit
=
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)σ−1
σ
(2.3.31)
(relative labour supply)
zij,t =
ϕj
ϕi
· ωφij,t (2.3.32)
(relative labour demand)
zij,t =
(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
1
ωij,t
)1+α(σ−1)
(2.3.33)
(resource constraint)
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (2.3.34)
where auxiliary variables areWt =
(∑J
j=1 ϕj ·W 1+φjt
) 1
φ+1
, Yt =
(∑J
j=1 γj · Y
σ−1
σ
jt
) σ
σ−1
,
and Yjt = (ZjtNjt)
αK1−αjt .
74
2.3.2 Sectoral Labour Allocation and Wage Gap
2.3.2.1 Equilibrium Labour Allocation and Wage Gap
Now, the equilibrium labour allocation and wage gap can be simply characterised
from both log equations of the relative labour supply (2.3.19) and the relative labour
demand (2.3.21). The former equation in the (lnω, lnz) plane is a right-upward
sloping line with the slope of φ−1, shown as Figure 2.3. The latter one is a right-
downward sloping line with the slope of −{1 + α(σ − 1)}−1.
(a) change in φ (b) change in σ or Zjt/Zit
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium labour allocation and wage gap
Source: Author’s own
Notes: These graphs are drawn assuming 0 < ϕj/ϕi < 1. It is also assumed γj/γi > 1 and
Zj/Zi > 1 which imply that sector j’s wage is higher than sector i’s. These assumptions are
correspond to the calibrations in section 2.4 or actual data.
Figure 2.3(a) demonstrates how the wage gap and labour allocation change as
the extent of labour mobility friction changes. As the degree of friction is larger
(or φ is smaller), the wage gap is bigger and the relative labour allocation shrinks.
The equilibrium moves from point A to point B. The change in labour mobility
friction on the labour supply side can simultaneously explain the increasing wage
gap and labour clustering into the low-wage sector, namely the labour market puzzle
mentioned before.
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Figure 2.3(b) describes the equilibrium shift according to the changes in the
labour demand side. For example, when the elasticity of substitution between goods
(σ) is smaller or the ratio of productivities (Zjt/Zit) is lower, both the wage gap and
the relative labour allocation decrease. The changes from the labour demand factors
affect the wage gap and labour allocation in the same direction so that this channel
cannot illustrate the labour market puzzle by itself.
Finally, by combining the two conditions, (2.3.32) and (2.3.33), the equilibrium
wage gap and labour allocation can be analytically derived.
ω∗ij,t ≡
Wjt
Wit
=
[(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
ϕj
ϕi
)−1] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
(2.3.35)
z∗ij,t ≡
Njt
Nit
=
[(
γj
γi
)σφ(
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)φ(
ϕj
ϕi
)1+α(σ−1)] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
(2.3.36)
Figure 2.4 depicts the equilibrium wage gap and labour allocation with varied
levels of labour mobility friction and goods substitutability given that the other
factors are fixed. As expected, the wages diverge from each other and the relative
labour allocation of sector j (the high-wage sector) decreases as φ falls (or the degree
of labour mobility friction rises) given a certain level of σ. The higher mobility
friction, the harder labour shift, and hence the larger wage gap. By contrast, as
the elasticity of substitution between goods (σ) is lowered, ωij and zij all decline.
Intuitively, the limitation of goods substitutability devalues the relative importance
of sector j’s goods in producing the final goods because all goods become more
indispensable. This consequently decreases both the wage gap and the employment
ratio.
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(a) wage gap (b) labour allocation
Figure 2.4: Wage gap and labour allocation with mobility friction
Source: Author’s own
Notes: Sector j is assumed to be the high-wage sector. Accordingly, I set α = 0.66, γj/γi = 1.17,
Zj/Zi = 2.08 and ϕj/ϕi = 0.47 for this simulation. This setting is consistent with the calibration
of a two-sector case in section 2.4.
2.3.2.2 Further Insights on Labour Market Distortions
Without labour mobility frictions, or φ → ∞, the equilibrium wage gap between
sectors disappears in (2.3.35) as
ω∗ij,t |φ→∞ = 1 (2.3.37)
and the equilibrium labour allocation equation can be reduced from (2.3.36) to the
following form
z∗ij,t |φ→∞ =
(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)
(2.3.38)
In this frictionless labour market, the relative labour allocation only changes de-
pending on the structural parameters such as technology distribution, uneven tech-
nological progress, and the elasticity of substitution between goods.
On the other hand, when labour mobility frictions exist, or φ <∞, three kinds
of channels influence the wage gap and labour allocation from equations (2.3.35)
and (2.3.36), as shown in Table 2.2: (i) The first channel is the change in the degree
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of labour mobility frictions. (ii) The second channel is the shift in labour demand
across sectors whose driving force comes from the change in technologies. (iii) The
third channel is policy parameters such as changes in a long-range labour supply
plan or taxation system.19
Table 2.2: The channels which cause labour market distortions
φt (i)
(mobility friction) ↘ (ii)
ωij, zij ←− σ, Zjt, γj, α
↗ (technologies)
ϕj, τj (iii)
(policy parameters)
When it comes to the first channel, the change in the friction parameter, φ,
affects the wage gap and the relative labour allocation in the opposite direction as
previously explained. As mobility frictions increase, more workers cannot switch
sectors and thus the wage gap becomes larger compared to the case of a lower level
of frictions.
The second channel shows that, given the degree of labour market frictions,
sector-biased structural shocks or the change in technology parameters such as the
technology distribution and the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
can affect the wage gap and labour allocation in the same direction. The explanation
for this channel is straightforward. For example, sector j-biased technology shock
(a shock to Zjt/Zit) pushes up the sector’s output, and thereby its relative price
goes down and the demand for the goods expands. This leads to increases in sector
j’s labour demand and wage relative to sector i’s, with a higher than one elasticity
of substitution. For yet another example, if the sector j’s goods are used more in
producing the final goods than before (a rise in γj/γi), the labour demand in the
19We shall discuss an extended model with taxation (τ) later in this section.
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sector increases. As a result, both zij,t and ωij,t rise. However, their increments are
conditional on the degree of labour mobility frictions. As the degree is higher (φ is
smaller), the increase in the wage gap due to the changes in technology is larger and
the increase in the relative labour allocation is smaller.
Policy parameters can be one of the factors responsible for the wage gap and
labour allocation. With the existence of mobility frictions, the change in the ratio
of long-term labour supplies (ϕj/ϕi) affects the labour market.
20 For instance, if
the sector j’s long-term average labour supply becomes higher than before, firms in
sector j have less incentive to increase their wage level so that the wage gap would
shrink.
Additionally, taxation could also distort the wage gap and labour allocation.
Consider that a government levies a tax on each income. Now, the household budget
constraint (2.3.1) can be rewritten as
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt =
J∑
j=0
(1− τj)WjtNjt +RtKt − τk(Rt − δ)Kt + Πt
where τj is the differential tax on the labour income and τk is the net capital income
tax. From the equation system under this taxation scheme,21 the equilibrium wage
gap and labour allocation can be derived.
ω∗ij,t =
[(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
ϕj
ϕi
)−1(
1− τj
1− τi
)−φ] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
(2.3.39)
20As discussed in section 2.3.1.1, the parameter ϕj is the sectoral weight in the aggregate labour
supply (2.3.2) and it corresponds to the steady state proportion of sector j in total labour supply.
The long-term sectoral labour supply is generally determined by the government’s long-standing
labour market policies (e.g. government’s vocational training programme for the ICT industry,
manufacturing development plan, etc.) so that the parameter can be regarded as a public policy
parameter.
21See the Appendix 2.A.2 for details.
79
z∗ij,t =
[(
γj
γi
)σφ(
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)φ(
ϕj
ϕi
)1+α(σ−1)(
1− τj
1− τi
)(1+α(σ−1))φ] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
(2.3.40)
Even without labour mobility frictions, the wage gap cannot dissipate, which is the
so-called ‘inter-sectoral labour wedge’.
ω∗ij,t |φ→∞ =
(
1− τj
1− τi
)−1
(2.3.41)
However, this differential tax just has a level effect on the wage gap and labour allo-
cation, and so it by itself has limits in influencing the dual labour market dynamics
over time.22
To conclude, while various factors can influence the sectoral wages and labour
allocation directly or indirectly, they work only under the premise of the existence
and changes of labour mobility frictions. On top of that, the framework with mobil-
ity frictions can simultaneously explain both the widening wage disparity and the
labour clustering in the low-wage sector, which cannot be captured by the standard
canonical theories.
2.4 Quantitative Analyses: A Two-sector Case
In this section, quantitative analyses are conducted to see (i) how the degree of
labour mobility frictions changes over time, (ii) what would have happened, had
there been no labour mobility frictions, and (iii) the size of the economic loss caused
by mobility frictions. To make the simulation tractable, I divide industries into two
sectors, the low-wage sector (sector 1) and the high-wage sector (sector 2).
22The tax difference between sectors can explain the widening wage gap and labour clustering
even without mobility frictions if the tax difference has increased over time. If that is the case, the
tax difference can be one source of mobility frictions. However, US data show that the difference in
tax brackets between the high- and the low-wage sectors has been almost constant or even slightly
decreased over time. The tax bracket which matches the average wage in the high-wage sector
decreased from 28% in the 1990s to 25% after 2000 while that in the low-wage sector was constant
at 15% (source: US Tax Foundation).
80
2.4.1 Calibration
To conduct numerical simulations, it is necessary to discuss model calibration by
specifying parameter values. Calibrating the model in this section is mainly in-
tended to back out the degree of labour mobility frictions and replicate the key
characteristics of the labour market dynamics, particularly the labour clustering in
the low-wage sector and the increasing wage inequality between sectors, emphasising
the ripple effects of labour mobility frictions.
The model is calibrated at a yearly frequency based on the main target economy,
the US, since 1990. The industries are classified according to the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) at the 38 sub-industry level and the sub-
industries are divided into two sectors in terms of their ranks in the wage level as
Table 2.3.23
From the separable consumption-leisure function as the household’s utility, the
preference parameters are the discount factor, the relative risk aversion coefficient,
the inverse of Frisch elasticity, and the intratemporal substitution parameter {β, θ,
χ, ν}. I follow the standard practice in the choices of these parameters. The
discount factor, β, is set to the standard annual value of 0.96 from the literature,
and the risk aversion coefficient, θ, to 1.39 following the estimation for the US in
Gandelman and Herna´ndez-Murillo (2014). The inverse of Frisch elasticity, χ, is set
to 1.0 which is frequently used in the literature (Shi, 2011; Garin, Pries, and Sims,
2018). I set the scale parameter of labour disutility, ν, to 2.0 which is within the
range of the literature.24
The weight of labour supply to the high-wage sector, ϕ, is set to 0.32 to target
the average employment share of the sector between 1990 and 2016 since this weight
was defined as the long-term average proportion of a sector’s labour supply. The
23Three industries of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; real estate and rental and
leasing; government are excluded.
24Garin, Pries, and Sims (2018) emphasise that ν, correspondingly the steady state labour
supply N¯ , should be neither too big nor too small in order to avoid making labour reallocation
unnecessary and to make room for non-employment (N¯ < 1).
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Table 2.3: Sector classification
sector 1 (low-wage) sector 2 (high-wage)
industry wagea industry wagea
accommodation & food service 23.1 miscellaneous manufacturing 52.6
retail trade 30.9 electrical equipment & applications 54.9
other service (excl.government) 33.8 motor vehicles, trailers & parts 56.5
administrative & waste management 34.5 primary metals 57.6
apparel & leather & allied products 34.7 paper products 58.0
textile mills & textile product mills 37.0 machinery 58.7
wood products 37.4 wholesale trade 64.0
furniture & related products 37.8 other transportation equipment 73.9
educational services 38.3 professional & technical services 78.1
arts, entertainment & recreation 40.7 information 79.1
food & tobacco products 42.2 chemical products 79.6
printing & related activities 44.4 mining 83.9
plastics & rubber products 44.8 finance & insurance 84.7
health care & social assistance 45.6 utilities 85.5
transportation & warehousing 47.7 computer & electronic products 89.0
fabricated metal products 48.0 petroleum & coal products 91.5
nonmetallic mineral products 48.5 management of companiesc 98.9
construction 49.4 - -
Source: BEA NIPA
Notes: aAverage annual wages per full-time employee between 2000-2016, in terms of thou-
sand dollars. bThe cutoff between the two sectors is based on the average-linkage cluster
analysis using the Euclidean distance of industrial wages. See the Appendix 2.A.3 for details.
cThe industry ‘management of companies’ consists of firms engaged in managing compa-
nies or holding the securities and financial assets of companies. This industry is like any
other industry in terms of its occupations, as it includes, for example, managers, financial
specialists, IT programmers, and engineers.
labour supply weight of the low-wage sector is (1−ϕ) because there are two sectors.
As far as production functions are concerned, there are three technology param-
eters: the labour income share, the elasticity of substitution between two sectors’
goods, and the technology distribution {α, σ, γ}. The labour income share, α, is
set to 0.66 based on the average labour income share of the US total economy (excl.
agriculture) between 1991 and 2012, the source of which is OECD. The elasticity of
substitution between goods σ and the technology distribution parameter γ can be
identified using the two demand functions for intermediate goods as in Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008). By multiplying Yjt to both sides of (2.3.28) and dividing the
two sectors’ (1 and 2) demand functions, we obtain the following log-transformed
82
linear equation.
ln
(
P2t · Y2t
P1t · Y1t
)
= ln
(
γ
1− γ
)
+
σ − 1
σ
ln
(
Y2t
Y1t
)
The two parameters can be estimated by regressing the ratio of output values on
the ratio of volumes. The result shows that σ and γ are around 1.25 and 0.54,
respectively, using the real and nominal value added between 1990 and 2015 from
BEA’s NIPA tables.25
The depreciation rate of physical capital, δ, is set to 0.04 to match the average
depreciation rate since 1990 which is calculated by using the law of capital accumu-
lation (source: IMF WEO, PWT).
The baseline labour income tax rate is set to 0.25 for sector 1 (τ1) and 0.28 for
sector 2 (τ2) which correspond to the tax brackets of their sectoral average wages
in the US (source: US Tax Foundation). The tax rate on net capital income, τk,
is taken from the estimate in McDaniel (2011) which is 0.27 on average in the US
since 1990.
Table 2.4: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.96 discount factor
θ 1.39 relative risk aversion
χ 1.00 inverse of the Frisch elasticity
ν 2.00 disutility weight on labour
ϕ 0.32 labour supply weight in sector 2
α 0.66 labour income share
σ 1.25 elasticity of substitution between goods
γ 0.54 technology distribution
δ 0.04 capital depreciation rate
τ1 0.25 labour income tax rate in sector 1
τ2 0.28 labour income tax rate in sector 2
τk 0.27 net capital income tax rate
Notes: The main target economy is the US. The values are assigned to parameters in the
baseline model. The motivation for each value is described in the text.
25ln
(
P2t·Y2t
P1t·Y1t
)
= 0.1432 + 0.2015 ln
(
Y2t
Y1t
)
, R
2
= 0.6806
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2.4.2 The Degree of Labour Mobility Friction
We start with backing out the elasticity of substitution in labour supply between
sectors, φ, which reflects the degree of labour mobility frictions, to see how it has
changed over time. φ can be backed out by using other calibrated parameters and
actual time series data in conjunction with the equilibrium wage gap and labour
allocation equations, (2.3.39) and (2.3.40).
Three related input datasets are available from BEA NIPA and EU KLEMS:
industrial wages, employment, and TFPs. Figure 2.5 shows the actual time series
of inputs in the equations. As expected, the relative wage and technology26 of the
high-wage sector have increased while its labour allocation has decreased since the
1990s.
(a) wage gap (b) labour allocation (c) relative technology
Figure 2.5: Data from the US
Source: BEA NIPA, EU KLEMS
One of the ways to back out the friction parameter is to use the time series
of the wage gap and labour allocation.27 Firstly, by substituting out the relative
26EU KLEMS dataset provides not industrial TFP level but TFP growth. To obtain the tech-
nology ratio (Z2t/Z1t), I first estimate each sector’s TFP in 2005 by plugging the data of gross
value added, production inputs, and the calibrated α into the sectoral Cobb-Douglas production
functions. Then, the time series of sectoral TFP level are extracted by applying its growth rate.
27Since the data of industrial TFPs is also available, we can alternatively back out φ from
either of two equations to test the validity of the estimate. One by plugging the data of wage gap
and technology ratio into (2.3.39), and the other by plugging the data of labour allocation and
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technology (Z2t/Z1t) from (2.3.39) and (2.3.40), φ can be expressed as a function of
the wage gap and labour allocation as28
φt = F (ω12,t, z12,t) =
lnz12,t − ln ϕ1−ϕ
lnω12,t + ln
1−τ2
1−τ1
(2.4.1)
By inputting two of time series into this function, φ can be backed out as shown in
Figure 2.6. The line shows a downward move of φ since the 1990s. In this estimate,
the average level of φ between 2001 and 2016 was 0.38 which is 43.3 percent lower
than it was in the 1990s (0.67). In other words, the degree of mobility frictions
between the high- and the low-wage sectors has increased to a great extent over the
course of more than 25 years.29
Figure 2.6: Backed-out φ, US
Source: Author’s own, from BEA NIPA
Notes: The initial level of φ is adjusted from 0.33 to 0.81 in order not only to fit it with the
initial levels of alternative φs (See Appendix 2.A.4), but also to be sure to avoid a negative
value.
technology ratio into (2.3.40). The alternatives give similar estimates to that from (2.4.1). See
Appendix 2.A.4 for details.
28See Appendix 2.A.1 for the derivation.
29We discussed possible reasons for a rising degree of mobility frictions between the high- and
the low-wage sectors in section 1.4.2 in Chapter 1 and will explore a major source of labour mobility
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2.4.3 Distortions and Losses
Now, based on the estimated level of mobility frictions, numerical simulations are
conducted to see how labour mobility frictions impinge on the process of labour
allocation and the change of the sectoral wage gap.
Labour market distortions caused by mobility frictions are straightforward. Ta-
ble 2.5 reports the actual data of the wage gap and labour allocation from the US
labour market and the results of numerical simulations. Firstly, I set an economy
with the level of mobility friction φ = 0.7 as the baseline model since the wage
gap obtained from the model at this level corresponds to the actual wage gap in
the US during the 1990s. At φ = 0.7, the equilibrium wage gap between two sec-
tors (ω12 = W2/W1) is 1.830 which are similar to the US data of 1.821 during the
1990s. As a comparison, I also report the actual data during the period between
2001 and 2016 which describes that the relative labour allocation declined from
0.496 in the 1990s to 0.435 and the wage gap rose from 1.821 to 2.011. Thus, the
US labour market since the 2000s parallels the model economy with large mobility
Table 2.5: Steady state values, by level of friction, US
data baseline large friction small friction
1990-2000 2001-2016 φ = 0.7 φ = 0.4 φ = 0.0 φ = 1.0 φ = 3.0
ω12 1.821 2.011 1.830 2.038 2.566 1.692 1.341
z12 0.496 0.435 0.496 0.437 0.334 0.543 0.713
Y - - - -0.26% -0.35% 0.27% 1.49%
W - - - -1.49% -4.60% 1.09% 4.43%
C - - - -1.97% -6.35% 1.39% 5.35%
V - - - -1.12% -3.87% 0.75% 2.71%
Source: Author’s own, from BEA NIPA, EU KLEMS
Notes: The data of full-time equivalent employees and wages in the US are used. Aggregate
output (Y ), economy-wide wage level (W ), aggregate consumption (C), and welfare (V )
are percentage deviations from the steady state values in the baseline. The steady state
technology gap (Z2/Z1) is set to 2.08 which is the average value between 1990 - 2015 (EU
KLEMS). The baseline labour allocation (z12) is adjusted to fit the data between 1990 -
2000 (0.682→ 0.496) and the other labour allocation are adjusted with the same proportion.
frictions in Chapter 3.
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friction (φ = 0.4) where the relative labour allocation decreases and the wage gap
increases in the similar size as the actual data. With the assumption of immobile
labour, or φ = 0.0, the relative employment share of sector 2 diminishes to 0.334
and the wage gap jumps to 2.566. Such labour misallocation ends up causing non-
trivial economic loss compared to the baseline economy. The elevation in the level
of mobility frictions first triggers output (Y ) loss since workers are more inefficiently
distributed across sectors. It is followed by a fall in the economy-wide wage level
(W ) and aggregate consumption (C). This also causes a reduction of the welfare
(V ) because the consumption decreases and the aggregate labour supply increases
due to inefficient labour allocation. Here the welfare is defined as the present value
of household utility.30
Vt = U(Ct, Nt) + βEtVt+1 (2.4.2)
I conduct additional counter-factual simulations with lower levels of the mobility
frictions which produce opposite results to the case of large frictions. As mobility
frictions ease off (φ increases), labour allocation in the high-wage sector increases
and the sectoral wage gap converges to unity, leading to extending the economy’s
production possibility frontier. With a low degree of mobility frictions, e.g. φ = 3.0,
many workers move into the high-wage sector and then two sectors’ wages become
close to each other. The economy-wide wage and welfare drastically increase over
the baseline. Therefore, while the case with a low degree of mobility frictions fails to
account for the actual data, we can explain the labour market puzzle with a higher
degree of frictions.
Next, to build intuition regarding the role of labour mobility frictions in tech-
nological change, I first examine the effects of permanent technology progress in
30The steady state welfare level is derived as
V =
(
C1−θ
1− θ − ν
N1+χ
1 + χ
)
· 1
1− β
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the high-wage sector with variations of φ. Log-linearisation of the equilibrium wage
gap (2.3.39) and labour allocation (2.3.40) equations show the relationship between
sectoral technology progress and the relative wage growth, or labour reallocation as
follows:
ωˆ12,t =
α(σ − 1)
1 + α(σ − 1) + φ(Zˆ2 − Zˆ1) (2.4.3)
zˆ12,t =
α(σ − 1)φ
1 + α(σ − 1) + φ(Zˆ2 − Zˆ1) (2.4.4)
where the percentage deviation from the initial steady state is denoted by a hat.
According to these equations, higher technology growth in sector 2 relative to
sector 1 (Zˆ2 > Zˆ1) generates a rise in the relative wage of sector 2 and its relative
employment with the assumption of a more than one elasticity of substitution, σ > 1.
Importantly, the mobility friction parameter, φ, plays a major role in determining
the extent to which the wage gap and labour allocation change. When the degree of
mobility frictions is large enough (φ is very small), the wage gap greatly increases as
sector 2 biased technology progress occurs. For the labour allocation, by contrast,
the small φ offsets the relative technology growth effect. Table 2.6 displays the long-
term response of the wage gap and labour allocation to a one percent permanent
increase in the relative technology of the high-wage sector. It can be seen that in
the economy with a higher level of mobility frictions, the wage gap is more likely to
increase while workers struggle to move into the high-wage sector. This imperfect
labour mobility also suppresses economic gain as seen in the last four rows of the
table.
By adopting stochastic processes on sector-specific technology, we can assess the
extent to which this two-sector framework with mobility frictions contributes to
explaining observed fluctuations in the wage gap and labour allocation.
The sector-biased technological process, Zjt, is assumed to follow an exogenous
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Table 2.6: Wage gap and labour allocation responses to a permanent sector-specific
technology shock, Z2/Z1
(%)
baseline large friction small friction
φ = 0.7 φ = 0.4 φ = 0.0 φ = 1.0 φ = 3.0
ωˆ12 0.089 0.106 0.142 0.076 0.039
zˆ12 0.062 0.042 0.000 0.076 0.119
Yˆ 0.475 0.474 0.472 0.476 0.481
Wˆ 0.526 0.522 0.513 0.529 0.538
Cˆ 0.416 0.412 0.400 0.420 0.429
Vˆ 0.151 0.149 0.142 0.153 0.158
Source: Author’s own
Notes: The numbers give the responses of the variables in percent to a one percent perma-
nent increase in the relative technology ratio Z2/Z1.
log-normal AR(1) process as
lnZjt = ρz lnZjt−1 + εzt, εzt ∼ N (0, σ2z) (2.4.5)
where ρz is the autoregressive coefficient and σz is the standard deviation of the
innovation. The autoregressive coefficient is chosen as ρz = 0.95 according to Garin,
Pries, and Sims (2018).31
Figure 2.7 describes the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the labour market
related and other key variables to the relative technology shock of the high-wage
sector, Z2t/Z1t, in the log-linearised model.
Consistent with the analytical relations (2.3.39) and (2.3.40), the relative techno-
logical progress in the high-wage sector initially generates a rise of the wage gap, ωt,
via its impact on labour demand. At the same time, its labour allocation, zt, also
increases since the relative labour demand curve (2.3.33) shifts out when the shock
occurs with a more than one elasticity of substitution between goods. Afterwards,
31Garin, Pries, and Sims (2018) point out that setting the autoregressive coefficient of sector-
specific productivity sufficiently persistent is inevitable to generate labour reallocation across sec-
tors in a disaggregated sector model.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to a relative technology shock, Z2t/Z1t
Source: Author’s own
Notes: A one percent relative productivity shock of sector 2, Z2t/Z1t, is applied. Y-axis is
expressed in terms of percentage deviation. κ is the capital share of sector 2, the upper case
Y , C, W , K, N represent aggregate variables, and V indicates welfare.
both revert to the steady state as the effects of the shock fade away. However, the
magnitude of the impulse responses rests upon labour mobility frictions governed
by the magnitude φ. As seen in the first two graphs, the higher degree of labour
mobility frictions (or the lower φ), the bigger response of the wage gap and the
smaller response of labour allocation. The graphs show that in the economy with
φ = 0.0, the case of immobile labour, the wage gap reacts substantially immediately
when the shock occurs but the relative labour allocation stands still. In contrast, a
counter-factual case demonstrates that in the economy with a low level of mobility
friction, φ = 3.0, the wage gap only slightly increases because labour can switch
sectors smoothly.
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We would also expect the degree of labour mobility frictions to affect the re-
sponses of other key economic variables to the relative technology shock. Partic-
ularly, the higher degree of mobility frictions (the lower φ) is, it is expected that
aggregate output (Yt), consumption (Ct), economy-wide wage level (Wt), and wel-
fare (Vt) rise by less. The responses in the figure are well in line with what we would
expect.
All these simulations imply that despite the relative increase of labour demand
in the high-wage sector, driven by a sector-specific technology shock, it is difficult
for workers to move into the high-wage sector because of barriers to inter-sectoral
mobility and accordingly the wage gap between sectors expands. Such labour misal-
location triggers output and welfare loss compared to those levels in the less frictional
economy.
2.4.4 Modifications of the Benchmark Model
Previously, it is assumed that household preferences are separable in consumption
and leisure, and the labour income share is the same across sectors. Now, we relax
these assumptions and examine two modified models with alternative assumptions.
The first case of modifications is to assume a non-separability of consumption and
labour supply in preferences. The second case is to apply different labour income
shares between sectors.
2.4.4.1 Non-separability in Preferences
The household’s utility increases in its consumption and decreases in its labour
supply as the benchmark model, but it has a non-separable preference as introduced
by King, Plosser, and Robelo (1988).
U(Ct, Nt) =
[
Cξt+s(1−Nt+s)1−ξ
]1−θ
− 1
1− θ (2.4.6)
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where ξ ∈ (0, 1) determines intratemporal substitution between consumption and
leisure. With this utility function, only the Euler equation and the intratemporal
optimality condition are changed to32
(Euler equation)
1[
Cξt (1−Nt)1−ξ
]θ
C1−ξt
=
β(1 +Rt+1 − δ)[
Cξt+1(1−Nt+1)1−ξ
]θ
C1−ξt+1
(2.4.7)
(intratemporal optimality condition)
Wt
C1−ξt
=
1− ξ
ξ
· 1
(1−Nt)ξ (2.4.8)
Thus, non-separability of consumption and leisure in preferences does not affect
on the wage gap and labour allocation across sectors. It only influences aggregate
variables such as consumption, capital stock and labour supply.
2.4.4.2 Different Labour Income Shares
For the case of different labour income shares between sectors, the sectoral Cobb-
Douglas production function can be rewritten as
Yjt = (ZjtLjt)
αj K
1−αj
jt (2.4.9)
where αj is the labour income share in sector j. The marginal product of labour
and the free capital mobility condition are derived by
(marginal product of labour)
Wjt = αjγj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Njt
(2.4.10)
32See the Appendix 2.A.5 for the derivation.
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(free movement of capital)
κjt
κit
=
γj
γi
(
1− αj
1− αi
)(
Yjt
Yit
)σ−1
σ
(2.4.11)
These conditions are different from those in the benchmark model. Different labour
income shares influence sectoral variables such as sectoral wages and employment
differently.
Table 2.7 compares the results from this assumption of different labour income
shares with the results from the benchmark model. Sectoral labour income shares,
α1 and α2 are set to 0.763 and 0.625, respectively, which are simply computed as
labour compensation divided by the sum of capital and labour compensation by
sector in the US during 1990 to 2015 using EU KLEMS database. In this modified
model, both the relative wage of the high-wage sector and its labour allocation are
down from the levels in the benchmark. This is because a higher labour income
share in the low-wage sector increases its marginal labour productivity followed by
a rise in the wage level, relative to that in the high-wage sector. Accordingly, workers
have more incentive to stay in the low-wage sector compared to in the benchmark
economy. Yet this assumption of different labour income shares lowers both the
wage gap and labour allocation compared to the benchmark model, so it has just
level effects, which is in line with the argument in Gollin and Rogerson (2014).
Table 2.7: Modification of the benchmark model
data model (φ = 0.7)
1990-2000 (1) benchmark (2) different α
ω12 1.821 1.830 1.622
z12 0.496 0.496 0.467
data model (φ = 0.4)
2001-2016 (1) benchmark (2) different α
ω12 2.011 2.038 1.766
z12 0.435 0.437 0.423
Source: Author’s own
Notes: α1 and α2 are set to 0.763 and 0.625, respectively (EU KLEMS).
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To see the net effect of different labour income shares on the wage gap and
labour allocation, I simulate the model with different α for a given value of φ.
Table 2.8 shows that a fall in the labour income share in the high-wage sector (α2)
causes the decrease in both the wage gap and its labour allocation. Hence, the
assumption of different labour income shares has limits in explaining the increasing
wage gap. Furthermore, US data show that both sectors’ labour income shares have
very slightly declined since the 1990s, and thus the difference in labour income share
between sectors has been almost constant (0.137 in the 1990s → 0.139 after 2000,
EU KLEMS).33
Table 2.8: Net effect of different labour income shares
different α, given φ = 0.7
α1 = 0.76, α2 = 0.65 α1 = 0.76, α2 = 0.60
ω12 1.655 1.590
z12 0.473 0.460
Source: Author’s own
2.5 Conclusion
There is overwhelming evidence in existing studies that labour reallocation is a
crucial component of economic growth and a reduction in wage inequality. In this
chapter, we assessed the role of barriers to inter-sectoral labour mobility through
a multi-sector general equilibrium model. In the model, labour mobility frictions
are introduced in the form of limited substitutability in labour supply between
sectors. It demonstrates that labour mobility frictions can play a decisive role for
the increasing wage gap and labour clustering in the low-wage sector, which cannot
be explained alone by changes in the labour demand side, for example, technological
progress.
33See the Appendix 2.A.6 for details about sectoral labour income share.
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The main findings from the calibrated model are that the degree of mobility
frictions has increased throughout more than two decades, thus being much higher
after 2000 than it was in the 1990s. Additionally, an elevation in the level of labour
mobility frictions incurs a non-trivial economic loss in terms of output and welfare by
worsening labour misallocation and wage inequality. When a sector-specific technol-
ogy shock occurs, the largely frictional economy experiences even larger distortions
in its labour market than the economy with less mobility frictions.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Model Derivations
2.A.1.1 Wage Gap and Labour Allocation without Frictions: Equation
(2.2.5) & (2.2.6)
From the household maximisation problem, the following first order conditions are
derived.
[Ct] C
−θ
t = λt
[Kt+1] λt = βλt+1(1 +Rt+1 − δ)
[Njt] λtWjt = ν
(
J∑
j=1
Njt
)χ
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. From the last condition, the wage gap between
any two sectors, i and j, becomes unity (wage equality).
Wjt
Wit
= 1
Next, from the firms’ maximisation problems, we can get each sector’s demand
function and marginal product of labour as
Pjt = γj
(
Yjt
Yt
)− 1
σ
Wjt = αγj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Njt
where the labour market clearing condition, Ljt = Njt, is used. By using these
conditions, we get the ratio of sectoral prices and the ratio of sectoral wages.
Pjt
Pit
=
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)− 1
σ
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Wjt
Wit
=
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)1− 1
σ
(
Njt
Nit
)−1
By combining these two equations and plugging in the wage equality condition, the
labour allocation condition can be derived as
Njt
Nit
=
PjtYjt
PitYit
2.A.1.2 Aggregate Real Wage Index: Equation (2.3.3)
The aggregate wage is conceptually the maximum earning from supplying one unit
of the aggregate labour Nt. If there is a continuum of sectors j ∈ [0, 1], the household
income maximisation problem is given by
max
{Njt}j
∫ 1
0
(WjtNjt) dj
s.t. Nt ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
ϕ
− 1
φ
j ·N
φ+1
φ
jt
)
dj
] φ
φ+1
= 1
The first order condition with respect to Njt is
Wjt = λtϕ
− 1
φ
j N
1
φ
jtN
− 1
φ
t
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By dividing the first order conditions of any
two sectors, i and j, we get
Wjt
Wit
=
(
ϕj
ϕi
)− 1
φ
(
Njt
Nit
) 1
φ
⇒ Njt = ϕjϕ−1i W φjtW−φit Nit
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Putting this into the constraint yields
[∫ 1
0
ϕ
− 1
φ
j
(
ϕjϕ
−1
i W
φ
jtW
−φ
it Nit
)φ+1
φ
dj
] φ
φ+1
= 1 ⇒ Nit = ϕiW
φ
it[∫ 1
0
ϕjW
φ+1
jt dj
] φ
φ+1
By plugging this into the objective function
∫ 1
0
(WitNit)di, we obtain
∫ 1
0
ϕiW
φ+1
it di[∫ 1
0
ϕjW
φ+1
jt dj
] φ
φ+1
=
(∫ 1
0
ϕj ·W 1+φjt dj
) 1
φ+1
≡ Wt
This shows that the maximum earning from supplying one unite of Nt is the same
as the aggregate wage index Wt that we defined.
2.A.1.3 Labour Supply for Sector j: Equation (2.3.6)
In the general case, suppose that there is a continuum of sectors j ∈ [0, 1]. The
aggregate labour supply index is
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
(
ϕ
− 1
φ
j ·N
φ+1
φ
jt
)
dj
] φ
φ+1
The household minimises Nt for any given earning level Qt ≡
∫ 1
0
(WjtNjt)dj by
deciding labour allocation Njt. This is namely the disutility minimisation problem
since labour supply entails disutility to the household.
min
{Njt}j
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
(
ϕ
− 1
φ
j ·N
φ+1
φ
jt
)
dj
] φ
φ+1
s.t. Qt ≡
∫ 1
0
WjtNjtdj
The first order condition with respect to Njt is
λtWjt = ϕ
− 1
φ
j N
− 1
φ
t N
1
φ
jt
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where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By dividing the first order conditions of any
two sectors, i and j, we get
Njt =
ϕj
ϕi
(
Wjt
Wit
)φ
Nit
Putting this into the aggregate labour supply index gives
Nt = ϕ
−1
i W
−φ
it Nit
[∫ 1
0
(
ϕj ·W φ+1jt
)
dj
] φ
φ+1
= ϕ−1i W
−φ
it NitW
φ
t
By rearranging, we finally get the labour supply for sector j as
Njt = ϕj
(
Wjt
Wt
)φ
Nt
2.A.1.4 Demands for Intermediate Goods: Equation (2.3.13)
In the general case, suppose that there is a continuum of sectors j ∈ [0, 1]. The
aggregate output is
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
(γj · Y
σ−1
σ
jt )dj
] σ
σ−1
The final good firm maximises its profit by optimally combining each of intermediate
goods.
max
{Yjt}j
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
(PjtYjt)dj
where Pt is the price of final goods and Pjt is the price of sector j’s goods. The first
order condition with respect to Yjt is
Pjt = γjY
− 1
σ
jt PtY
1
σ
t
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By dividing the first order conditions of any two sectors, i and j, we obtain
Yit =
(
γi
γj
)σ (
Pit
Pjt
)−σ
Yjt
Putting this into the aggregate output equation yields
Yt = γ
−σ
j P
σ
jtYjt
[∫ 1
0
γσi · P 1−σit di
] σ
σ−1
= γ−σj P
σ
jtYjt
{[∫ 1
0
γσi · P 1−σit di
] 1
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Pt ≡ 1
}−σ
By rearranging, we finally get the demands for good j as
Pjt = γj
(
Yjt
Yt
)− 1
σ
2.A.1.5 Aggregate Price Level: Equation (2.3.14)
The aggregate price is basically the minimum cost to produce one unit of the final
goods Yt. If there is a continuum of sectors j ∈ [0, 1], the final output firm’s cost
minimisation problem is given by
min
{Yjt}j
∫ 1
0
(PjtYjt)dj
s.t. Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
γj · Y
σ−1
σ
jt dj
] σ
σ−1
= 1
The first order condition with respect to Yjt is
Pjt = λtγjY
− 1
σ
jt Y
1
σ
t
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By dividing the first order conditions of any
two goods, i and j, we get
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Pjt
Pit
=
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)− 1
σ
⇒ Yjt = γσj γ−σi P−σjt P σitYit
Putting this into the constraint gives
[∫ 1
0
γj
(
γσj γ
−σ
i P
−σ
jt P
σ
itYit
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
= 1 ⇒ Yit = γ
σ
i P
−σ
it[∫ 1
0
γσj · P 1−σjt dj
] σ
σ−1
By plugging this into the cost function
∫ 1
0
(PitYit)di, we obtain
∫ 1
0
γσi · P 1−σit di[∫ 1
0
γσj · P 1−σjt dj
] σ
σ−1
=
[∫ 1
0
γσj · P 1−σjt dj
] 1
1−σ
≡ Pt
This shows that the minimum cost to produce one unite of Yt is the same as the
aggregate price index Pt that we defined.
2.A.1.6 Factor Prices: Equation (2.3.16) & (2.3.17)
Sector j’s cost minimisation problem is
min
{Ljt,Kjt}
WjtLjt +RtKjt
s.t. Yjt = (ZjtLjt)
αK1−αjt , Ljt ≥ 0 , Kjt ≥ 0
The first order conditions in sector j are
[Ljt] Wjt = λtαYjtL
−1
jt
[Kjt] Rt = λt(1− α)YjtK−1jt
[λt] Yjt = (ZjtLjt)
αK1−αjt
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By combining the first two conditions, we have
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Wjt
Rt
=
α
1− α
Kjt
Ljt
(2.A.1)
By substituting out Kjt or Ljt in the third condition, the conditional factor demands
are derived as
Ljt = Z
−α
jt
(
Wjt
Rt
1− α
α
)α−1
Yjt
Kjt = Z
−α
jt
(
Wjt
Rt
1− α
α
)α
Yjt
Next, given above equations, the marginal cost in sector j can be calculated as
MCjt = Wjt
∂Ljt
∂Yjt
+Rt
∂Kjt
∂Yjt
= WjtZ
−α
jt
(
Wjt
Rt
1− α
α
)α−1
+RtZ
−α
jt
(
Wjt
Rt
1− α
α
)α
= WαjtR
1−α
t Z
−α
jt (1− α)α−1α−α = Pjt (2.A.2)
The last equivalence is justified by MCjt = Pjt in perfect competition. If we substi-
tute out Rt from (2.A.1) and (2.A.2), the wage in sector j is finally derived as
Wjt = α
Yjt
Ljt
Pjt = αγj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Ljt
Likewise, if we substitute out Wjt, the capital rental rate in sector j can be derived
as
Rt = (1− α) Yjt
Kjt
Pjt = (1− α)γj
(
Yt
Yjt
) 1
σ Yjt
Kjt
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2.A.1.7 Relative Labour Demand: Equation (2.3.20)
By dividing any two sectors’ (i and j) marginal products of labour (2.3.16) against
each other,
Wjt
Wit
=
γj
γi
(
Yjt
Yit
)σ−1
σ
(
Ljt
Lit
)−1
=
γj
γi
[(
Zjt
Zit
)α(
Ljt
Lit
)α(
κjt
κit
)1−α]σ−1σ (
Ljt
Lit
)−1
=
γj
γi
(
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)
σ
(
Ljt
Lit
)α(σ−1)−σ
σ
(
κjt
κit
) (1−α)(σ−1)
σ
From the condition of the free movement of capital (2.3.31), the ratio of capital
stocks between sectors is derived as
κjt
κit
=
(
γj
γi
) σ
1+α(σ−1)
(
Zjt
Zit
) α(σ−1)
1+α(σ−1)
(
Ljt
Lit
) α(σ−1)
1+α(σ−1)
By substituting out κjt/κit, the equation which shows the relationship between the
wage gap and the relative labour demand is finally derived.
zdij,t =
(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
1
ωij,t
)1+α(σ−1)
where ωij,t = Wjt/Wit and zdij,t = Ljt/Lit.
2.A.1.8 φt as a function of the wage gap and labour allocation: Equation
(2.4.1)
By rearranging (2.3.39) with respect to Z2t/Z1t, we obtain
(
Z2t
Z1t
)α(σ−1)
=
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)(
1−τ2
1−τ1
)φ
(
γ
1−γ
)σ · (ω12,t)1+α(σ−1)+φ
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By plugging this into (2.3.40), we get
(z12,t)1+α(σ−1)+φ =
(
γ
1− γ
)σφ(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)1+α(σ−1)(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)(1+α(σ−1))φ
×
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)φ (
1−τ2
1−τ1
)φ2
(
γ
1−γ
)σφ · (ω12,t)(1+α(σ−1)+φ)φ
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)1+α(σ−1)+φ(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)φ(1+α(σ−1)+φ)
· (ω12,t)(1+α(σ−1)+φ)φ
This can be simplified to
z12,t =
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)φ
· (ω12,t)φ
By taking the logarithm, we finally obtain
φt =
lnz12,t − ln ϕ1−ϕ
lnω12,t + ln
1−τ2
1−τ1
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2.A.2 A Multi-sector Model with Differential Taxation
With differential taxation between sectors, the household optimisation problem can
be written as
max
{Ct+s,Kt+s+1, Njt+s}∞s=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
C1−θt+s
1− θ − ν
N1+χt+s
1 + χ
)
s.t. Nt ≡
(
J∑
j=1
ϕ
− 1
φ
j ·N
φ+1
φ
jt
) φ
φ+1
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
=
J∑
j=1
(1− τj)WjtNjt +RtKt − τk(Rt − δ)Kt + Πt
where τj and τk are the labour income tax for sector j and the net capital income
tax, respectively.
The government balances its expenditure, Gt, and tax income. Hence the gov-
ernment budget constraint is
Gt =
J∑
j=1
τjWjtNjt + τk(Rt − δ)Kt
Then, the goods market clearing condition can be written as
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt
By dividing any two sectors’ labour supply functions against each other, the
following equation can be derived.
zsij,t =
ϕj
ϕi
·
(
1− τj
1− τi
)φ
· ωφij,t
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By combining this with the relative labour demand equation (2.3.20), the equi-
librium wage gap and labour allocation can be derived as
ω∗ij,t ≡
Wjt
Wit
=
[(
γj
γi
)σ (
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)(
ϕj
ϕi
)−1(
1− τj
1− τi
)−φ] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
z∗ij,t ≡
Njt
Nit
=
[(
γj
γi
)σφ(
Zjt
Zit
)α(σ−1)φ(
ϕj
ϕi
)1+α(σ−1)(
1− τj
1− τi
)(1+α(σ−1))φ] 11+α(σ−1)+φ
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2.A.3 Sector Classification: Cluster Analysis
The cluster analysis is a method of classifying objects on the basis of a set of mea-
sured variables into some different groups (clusters) such that objects within a group
are more similar (closer) to each other than to those in other groups. To classify 35
industries into high- and low-wage sectors, I choose two variables which are mean
wage (x1) and median wage (x2) in logarithm for each industry between 2000 and
2016. Then, the Euclidean distance between any two industries i and j is given by
dij =
√
(x1i − x1j)2 + (x2i − x2j)2
The distance between groups is measured by using the average-linked method which
calculates the average distance between all pairs of objects in two groups. Figure
2A.1 illustrates the average distance between groups. Based on the dendrogram,
there exist five clusters in terms of dissimilarity value 0.3. Finally, I classify the top
two groups as the high-wage sector and the other groups as the low-wage sector.
Figure 2A.1: Dendrogram, Cluster analysis of industrial wages
Source: Author’s own, from BEA
Notes: Five clusters (groups): industry 1 / industries 2 - 9 / industries 10-18 / industries
19-25 / industries 26-35. Each number on the horizontal axis indicates an industry and the
number is the same as the wage rank in ascending sort order as in Table 2.3.
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2.A.4 Alternative Ways of Backing Out φt
By taking logs of equations (2.3.39) and (2.3.40), φ can be expressed as a function
of the technology gap and the wage gap, or labour allocation as
φAt = G
(
Z2t
Z1t
, ω12,t
)
=
σ ln γ
1−γ + α(σ − 1) ln Z2tZ1t − ln
ϕ
1−ϕ − (1 + α(σ − 1)) lnω12,t
lnω12,t + ln
1−τ2
1−τ1
(2.A.3)
φBt = H
(
Z2t
Z1t
,z12,t
)
=
(1 + α(σ − 1))
(
ln ϕ
1−ϕ − lnz12,t
)
lnz12,t − σ ln γ1−γ − α(σ − 1) ln Z2tZ1t − (1 + α(σ − 1)) ln 1−τ21−τ1
(2.A.4)
With other calibrated parameters and actual data, these functions allow us to es-
timate two alternative mobility friction parameters (φAt and φ
B
t ), one from (2.A.3),
and the other from (2.A.4). Figure 2A.2 depicts the backed-out φs. Both lines
similarly show downward trends.
Figure 2A.2: Backed-out φs with alternative ways, US
Source: Author’s own, from BEA NIPA, EU KLEMS
Notes: The initial level of φBt is adjusted to fit the initial φ
A
t .
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2.A.5 Modifications of the Benchmark Model
2.A.5.1 Non-separability in Preferences
The household maximises its lifetime utility subject to the flow budget constraint.
max
{Ct+s,Kt+s+1, Nt+s}∞s=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs

[
Cξt+s(1−Nt+s)1−ξ
]1−θ
− 1
1− θ

s.t. Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt = WtNt +RtKt + Πt
The first order conditions are
[Ct]
[
Cξt (1−Nt)1−ξ
]−θ
· ξCξ−1t = λt
[Kt+1] λt = βλt+1(1 +Rt+1 − δ)
[Nt]
[
Cξt (1−Nt)1−ξ
]−θ
· (1− ξ)(1−Nt)−ξ = λtWt
The modified optimal conditions are the Euler equation and the intratemporal op-
timality condition as follows:
(Euler equation)
1[
Cξt (1−Nt)1−ξ
]θ
C1−ξt
=
β(1 +Rt+1 − δ)[
Cξt+1(1−Nt+1)1−ξ
]θ
C1−ξt+1
(intratemporal optimality condition)
Wt
C1−ξt
=
1− ξ
ξ
· 1
(1−Nt)ξ
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2.A.6 Sectoral Labour Income Share
Figure 2A.3: Sectoral labour income share αj, US
Source: Author’s own, from EU KLEMS
Notes: Sectoral labour income share is computed as labour compensation divided by the
sum of capital and labour compensations. It is weighted by the industrial number of persons
engaged.
Chapter 3
How Differential Matching
Efficiency Matters
3.1 Introduction
We have hitherto found that frictions, which exist in such forms as barriers to inter-
sectoral labour mobility, are the key to the labour market puzzle. What still remains
to be explored is to identify the principal source of labour mobility frictions.
Following the lead of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model (henceforth, DMP), the matching process of workers and jobs has been a
central focus of the research on labour market dynamics. In the canonical DMP
model, frictions stemming from the matching process prevent Walrasian wage de-
termination and labour market clearing so that wages are settled upon through
bargaining between firms and workers, and a portion of the labour force becomes
unemployed. When production takes place in several different sectors, workers can
not just move within sectors but also across sectors. It is possible that the extent of
labour mobility frictions is uneven across sectors. Thus, different frictions such as
differential matching efficiency will be reflected in varying labour mobility dynamics
across sectors. Low matching efficiency in an industry, for example, can act as a
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barrier to entry and hinder labour movements to the industry.
Convincing evidence of the presence of differing matching efficiency between sec-
tors is that the duration of the selection process in hiring employees differs across
sectors. According to van Ours and Ridder (1993), a vacancy duration is composed
of periods of application and selection, and the latter is much longer than the for-
mer. They define the selection period as a time span for assessing a candidate’s
productivity so that this duration increases with the required skill level. The dura-
tion of the selection process proxies matching efficiency since efficiency depends on
the quality of the job matching process as well as its swiftness.1
Figure 3.1 displays the average length of the interview process by industry or-
dered according to their mean wage level in the US labour market. A positive rela-
tionship between the average hourly earnings and the length of the interview process
is clearly observed, indicating that the higher the industry’s wage, the longer the
selection or screening process. This observation suggests that it is harder for firms
in the high-wage sector to find the right person for their vacancies than it is for the
low-wage sector, leading to more delayed hiring processes in the high-wage sector.
Alternatively, it is more difficult for job seekers to obtain a job in the high-wage
sector resulting in an extended job search duration. This comes down to differential
matching efficiency between sectors.
The key hypothesis in this chapter is that the main source of differential match-
ing efficiency is unbalanced sectoral productivity. This relationship can be inferred
from a skill mismatch between firms and job seekers. Firms in a high productiv-
ity sector require a high level of skill set from job applicants, and therefore they
are choosier in selecting workers. This results in lower matching efficiency in the
high productivity sector than in the low productivity sector. This argument is con-
sistent with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, pp 400) and Williamson (2013, pp
1In contrast, the application period is dependent on market tightness which is the ratio of
vacancies to job seekers. The more job applicants relative to vacant positions, the shorter is the
period of building a pool of candidates (application period).
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Figure 3.1: Average length of interview process by industry, US
Source: Glassdoor Economic Research, BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES)
Notes: The data of the interview process includes only the firms with at least 100 job
seekers’ reviews between January 2017 to June 2017. Hourly earning is the mean in the
year 2016. The numbers next to the dots indicate each industry: 1-Computer Software &
Hardware, 2-Biotech & Pharmaceuticals, 3-Aerospace & Defence, 4-Accounting & Legal,
5-Consulting, 6-Media & Publishing, 7-Bank & Financial Services, 8-Business Services, 9-
Internet & Tech, 10-Energy & Utilities, 11-Insurance, 12-Telecommunications, 13-Health
Care & Hospitals, 14-Wholesale, 15-Architecture & Civil Engineering, 16-Construction, 17-
Education & Schools, 18-Manufacturing, 19-Real Estate, 20-Transportation & Logistics,
21-Arts & Entertainment, 22-Consumer Electronics, 23-Automotive, 24-Retail, 25-Farming
& Agriculture, 26-Consumer Service, 27-Supermarket, 28-Restaurant & Bars
205) who point out that sectoral productivity shocks account for skill mismatch and
corresponding matching inefficiency in the sector. Such a link is underpinned by a
significant inverse relationship between sector-specific productivity and its matching
efficiency in the US labour market, which will be validated with empirical evidence.2
It is common in the literature to represent a matching process as a function of the
number of job seekers and vacant positions taken as inputs which are transformed
into the flow of new hires as the output, in the same manner as the production
function. The empirically verified standard type of DMP matching technology is
2We shall discuss this fact in detail later in section 3.2.
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Hjt = µj ·M(Ujt, Vjt)
where µj is the residual in the matching function which is also known as ‘matching
efficiency’, and Hjt, Ujt, and Vjt are the number of new matches, the unemployed
and vacancy postings in sector j at time t. This function consists of two parts:
The first building block, M(Ujt, Vjt), is determined purely by the combination of
job seekers and vacancies. This part is an increasing function in both components.
The second part, matching efficiency µj which is the central focus in this chapter,
depends on unobserved factors other than inputs. This is a multiplicative shifter of
the compound of both inputs. Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) define this match-
ing efficiency as the productivity of the job matching process. Like TFP in the
production function, this parameter scales the efficiency of the matching process up
or down, and thus higher (lower) matching efficiency creates more (less) matches for
a given number of job seekers and vacancies. This reflects the extent of frictions in
matching markets.
Most previous research has focused on the former element and the relation be-
tween inputs, named the Beveridge curve. In general, less attention has been paid to
matching efficiency and it is often treated as an exogenous parameter. Besides, by
laying emphasis on aggregated employment and unemployment, they pay no atten-
tion to labour mobility between sectors. Even in the research about different sectors,
most studies set matching efficiency to be the same across sectors (Pissarides, 1994;
Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno, 2009; Krause and Lubik, 2010).
However, some pioneering studies suggest that matching efficiency may vary in
terms of sector or time and its shifts are a key source of instability of the cur-
rent labour market. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) give several reasons for this
variance. For example, the gap in skill sets possessed by job seekers and skills re-
quired by industries, the so-called skill mismatch, and the search and mobility costs
can generate differential matching efficiency. Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) argue
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that matching efficiency depends on job seekers who are categorised by demographic
characteristics and unemployment duration. Likewise, Barnichon and Figura (2015)
estimate an aggregate matching function which is equipped with different matching
efficiency arising from worker heterogeneity and market segmentation. Thus, it is
the variations in the degree of heterogeneity that make overall matching efficiency
vary over time. Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2013) and Gavazza, Mongey,
and Violante (2016) construct a generalised matching function. They show that new
matches depend on not only job seekers and vacancies but also recruiting intensity
which differs by industry.
To analyse the relationship between matching efficiency and labour market vari-
ables and its effects on the labour market, I develop a stylised two-sector search and
matching model. The key feature of the model is the salient difference in matching
efficiency between sectors originating from the gap in sector-specific productivity.
The main finding is that differential matching efficiency could trigger labour market
distortions in such a way that the sectoral wage gap increases by preventing labour
from freely flowing between sectors. This provides a clue to the puzzle of why labour
has structurally been concentrated in the low-wage sector despite the widening wage
gap since the 2000s. Additionally, this model economy, which effectively captures
properties of the US labour market dynamics, shows that a productivity boom biased
towards the high-wage sector is likely to amplify the wage gap and even decrease the
relative employment share of the sector, which would not occur under a frictionless
economy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents some key
stylised facts about matching efficiency from the US labour market. Section 3.3
presents a two-sector search and matching model with differential matching effi-
ciency. Section 3.4 we calibrate to the US labour market and compare it with the
data. Finally, section 3.5 gives our conclusion. The Appendices provide further
details and derivations on the proposed model and data.
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3.2 What Determines the Matching Efficiency in
the US Labour Market: Some Stylised Facts
In this section, we focus on the differences in matching efficiency across industries
and investigate what creates these differences.
3.2.1 Vacancy Duration
The vacancy duration is a key concept used to assess the efficiency of the matching
process or the labour market density. This duration refers to the expected average
length of time taken to fill open job positions. It is calculated as the ratio of the
number of vacancies Vjt to the number of hires Hjt as
average vacancy duration =
Vjt
Hjt
where its reciprocal, Hjt/Vjt, is the probability of filling a vacancy.
3
The vacancy duration, calculated using data from monthly Job Openings and
Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS) by the US BLS, varies across industries in the
US. Notably, it is longer in most high-wage industries than in low-wage industries.
Figure 3.2 displays each industry’s mean vacancy duration relative to the total
industry in the US ordered by wage level. The bar chart demonstrates that the
duration of filling job openings in the top five industries in terms of wage level is
about 1.6 times longer than in the bottom five industries. This implies that job-
worker matches in the labour market of the high-wage sector are much more difficult.
The vacancy duration in finance & insurance or information, which are classified into
the sector with the highest wage, far exceeds the average of the whole industry (=1)
while that of the low-wage sector such as accommodation & food service or retail
3The inverse of the probability of an event is equivalent to the expected period until the event
occurs. The vacancy duration is assumed to be a random variable with a geometric or a Poisson
distribution. See the Appendix 3.A.1 for the proof.
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trade is far below the average.
Figure 3.2: Average vacancy duration by sector, US
Source: Author’s own, from US BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS),
US BEA National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Notes: Each sector’s duration is averaged between Jan 2001 - Jun 2017 except for Jan 2008 -
Dec 2010. The figure is the relative value with respect to the total industry (=1). Industries
are ordered by average wage level during 2001 - 2016, and the wage of health care & social
assistance is calculated in terms of hospital & ambulance service.
3.2.2 A Useful Decomposition of Vacancy Duration Gap
The sectoral matching function can be written as a Cobb-Douglas form with constant
returns of scale which has been empirically verified in numerous previous studies (see,
e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).
Hjt = µj ·M(Ujt, Vjt) ⇔ hjtLjt = µj ·M(ujtLjt, vjtLjt)
⇔ hjt = µj ·M(ujt, vjt) = µj · uηjtv1−ηjt (3.2.1)
where Ljt is the labour force, and hjt, ujt, and vjt are the rate of new hires, un-
employment and vacancy postings, respectively. η is the elasticity of matches with
respect to the number of the unemployed.
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Then, the rate of filling a vacancy is
q(θjt) ≡ Hjt
Vjt
=
µj ·M(ujt, vjt)
vjt
=
µj · uηjtv1−ηjt
vjt
= µj ·
(
ujt
vjt
)η
= µj ·
(
1
θjt
)η
(3.2.2)
where θjt ≡ vjt/ujt denotes the market tightness. By taking the logarithm,
ln q(θjt) = lnµj − η · ln θjt (3.2.3)
Since the inverse of q(θj) is the vacancy duration, the gap in the vacancy duration
between sector 1 and sector 2 can be written as
ln
1
q(θ2t)
− ln 1
q(θ1t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vacancy duration gap
= ln q(θ1t)− ln q(θ2t)
= (lnµ1 − lnµ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) diff. in matching efficiency
+ η12 · (ln θ2t − ln θ1t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) diff. in market tightness
⇒ ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
= ln
µ1
µ2
+ η12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
(3.2.4)
Here the vacancy duration gap is decomposed into two parts: (i) the effect of
the difference in matching efficiency, and (ii) the effect of the difference in market
tightness. Table 3.1 shows the results of the decomposition of the vacancy duration
gap. I regress the vacancy duration gap between one high-wage sector (sector 2)
and one low-wage sector (sector 1) on the difference in market tightness using OLS
over the period January 2001 through June 2017. In the first table, accommodation
& food service is set as a base industry of the low-wage sector, as is retail trade
in the second table.4 Then the average contribution of each part on the vacancy
4Setting other low-wage industries (e.g. construction) as the base industry shows a similar
result (or a large contribution of part (i) on the vacancy duration gap). See the Appendix 3.A.2
for details.
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Table 3.1: Decomposition of vacancy duration gap
sector 1: Accom. & Food service ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
(i) l̂n µ1µ2 (ii) η̂12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
sector 2 level level [contrib.%] level [contrib.%] η̂12
finance & Insurance 0.92 0.59∗∗∗ [ 64.1] 0.33 [ 35.8] 0.37∗∗∗
Information 0.74 0.58∗∗∗ [ 78.9] 0.16 [ 21.2] 0.50∗∗∗
Professional & Business 0.25 -0.12∗∗∗ [ -50.1] 0.37 [150.2] 0.59∗∗∗
Wholesale trade 0.40 0.31∗∗∗ [ 76.7] 0.10 [ 23.9] 0.54∗∗∗
Manufacturing 0.35 0.51∗∗∗ [146.1] -0.16 [ -46.1] 0.45∗∗∗
Health care & Social assistance 0.86 0.34∗∗∗ [ 39.4] 0.52 [ 60.7] 0.52∗∗∗
Transport, Warehouse & Utilities 0.22 0.22∗∗∗ [ 99.8] 0.00 [ 0.4] 0.48∗∗∗
sector 1: Retail trade ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
(i) l̂n µ1µ2 (ii) η̂12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
sector 2 level level [contrib.%] level [contrib.%] η̂12
finance & Insurance 0.96 0.65∗∗∗ [ 67.4] 0.31 [ 32.7] 0.34∗∗∗
Information 0.78 0.60∗∗∗ [ 76.6] 0.19 [ 23.8] 0.53∗∗∗
Professional & Business 0.29 -0.08∗ [ -26.1] 0.37 [126.7] 0.56∗∗∗
Wholesale trade 0.45 0.33∗∗∗ [ 73.4] 0.12 [ 27.5] 0.56∗∗∗
Manufacturing 0.39 0.54∗∗∗ [137.4] -0.15 [ -37.0] 0.46∗∗∗
Health care & Social assistance 0.91 0.35∗∗∗ [ 38.0] 0.57 [ 62.2] 0.54∗∗∗
Transport, Warehouse & Utilities 0.26 0.23∗∗∗ [ 89.2] 0.03 [ 11.7] 0.73∗∗∗
Source: Author’s own, from BLS JOLTS
Notes: Accommodation & food service and retail trade are set as the base industries of the
low-wage sector (sector 1) in each table. The sample covers the period Jan 2001 - Jun 2017.
The upper bar and the hat denote the mean values and the estimated values, respectively.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
duration gap is calculated using the estimated coefficients from the regressions and
the sample means of the dependent and the independent variables. For example, the
average contribution rate of the part (ii) to the vacancy duration gap is the fraction(
η̂12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
/ ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
)
.5 The results suggest that the vacancy duration gap is largely
caused by part (i) the difference in matching efficiency, showing its relatively high
contribution in most pairs of industries. The contribution of part (i) in the duration
gap between the low-wage industries and the high-wage industries such as finance
& insurance, information, wholesale trade, or manufacturing is over two-thirds.6
5This is similar to the growth accounting. For example, from the Solow growth accounting
equation ∆ lnYt = ∆ lnAt+α∆ lnLt+ (1−α)∆ lnKt, we get the contribution of labour to output
growth as α∆ lnLt/∆ lnYt.
6For the cases of professional & business or health care & social assistance, the contribution
of market tightness gap is larger. Many occupations in these industries require sector-specific
certificates or licences (e.g. medical licence, law licence, etc.) besides formal education. Thus, the
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3.2.3 Inverse Relationship between Sector-specific Produc-
tivity and Matching Efficiency
A sector’s matching efficiency turns out to be inversely related to its own produc-
tivity. This fact convincingly answers a key question about the source of differing
matching efficiency across sectors, or what is a source of labour mobility frictions.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) point out that low matching efficiency can be
attributed to skill mismatch7 because most firms look for industry-specific skilled
persons but not all job seekers have the skills. The difference between the skills
required by industries and the skills possessed by workers may also lengthen the
duration spent to complete job matches for a given set of inputs. They empha-
sise that shocks such as technological progress increase skill mismatch and reduce
matching efficiency as workers need to accommodate to new industry requirements.
Behrenz (2002) estimates the effects of posted job’s characteristics on its vacancy
duration. His empirical results suggest that more stringent skill requirements, which
might be due to technology renovation, are the primary cause of lowered matching
efficiency, resulting in prolonged job vacancy. According to Williamson (2013), such
a skill mismatch can come about when a sectoral shock occurs. A positive shock to
productivity in a sector’s production makes firms demand candidates with higher
skill-sets. For example, with automation in manufacturing, the demand for routine
engineering tasks (e.g. maintaining equipment and measuring its performance) is
decreasing while the demand for cognitive engineering (e.g. creativity, complex in-
job markets in such industries depend more on labour demand and supply with the certificates
than on matching efficiency. As to manufacturing, the contribution of market tightness gap is
negative. This implies that differential matching efficiency is a dominant factor for the vacancy
duration gap although market tightness in manufacturing is less than in retail trade.
7To understand it intuitively, it is helpful to first look at an extreme case of zero match elasticity,
or η = 0. In this case, the new matches only depends on matching efficiency and vacancies, or
hjt = µj · vjt, and the rate of filling a vacancy is equal to the matching efficiency, or q(θjt) = µj .
Labour supply is inelastic up to the number of vacancies, but the scale of matches is adjusted by
the degree of matching efficiency µj . The answer to the question of what factors constrain job
matches or why µj 6= 1 will be identified by other factors apart from the number of job seekers
and vacancies. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) regard skill mismatch as one of those causes.
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formation processing) is increasing (Bughin et al., 2018). Through this process the
skill mismatch between firms and job seekers in the sector increases.
Figure 3.3 describes the relationship between sector-specific productivity and its
matching efficiency. Matching efficiency is implicitly derived from equation (3.2.1)
using actual data of hires, vacancies and unemployed persons from the US BLS
JOLTS, and is calculated on an annual basis considering its time-varying. I obtain
Figure 3.3: Correlation between productivity and matching efficiency by sector, US
Source: Author’s own, from BLS JOLTS, EU KLEMS
Notes: X-axis is the logged productivity (1-year lagged, ln zj,t−1) and Y-axis is the logged
implicit matching efficiency (lnµjt). Implicit matching efficiency is derived from µjt =
hjt/(u
η
jtv
1−η
jt ) using equation (3.2.1), where I use η = 0.25 as in the calibration in section
3.4. The sample covers the period from 2001 to 2015.
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the data of sector-specific average labour productivity from EU KLEMS. As in the
figure, matching efficiency is significantly negatively correlated with sector-specific
labour productivity in the majority of industries since 2001, lending weight to the
view of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Williamson (2013). For instance, in
total industry and manufacturing, the correlations between matching efficiency (µjt)
and lagged productivity (zjt−1) are -0.897 and -0.834, respectively. Strong negative
correlations are also shown in other industries such as wholesale trade, ICT industry,
finance & insurance, and education.
To look in depth at the link between sectoral labour productivity and matching
efficiency, I estimate panel data regressions as follows:
d lnµj,t =
(∑
l=1
ϑl · d lnµj,t−l
)
+ ζ0 · d lnLPj,t + ζ1 · d lnLPj,t−1 + νj + j,t (3.2.5)
j,t ∼ iid(0, σ2 )
where µjt is the time-varying matching efficiency,
8 LPjt is the sector j’s labour
productivity at time t, νj is the sector-specific effect, and jt is the error. The term
within parenthesis is used for dynamic panel models. This panel data consists of
14 cross-sectional industries and 15-year time series between 2001 and 2015. All
variables are transformed to a rate of change by taking log difference for the panel
data stationarity.9
Table 3.2 shows the estimates of cross-industry panel data models for the rela-
tionship between sector-specific productivity and matching efficiency. The second
column is the result estimated by the generalised least squares (GLS) taking account
of LR test for sector-level heteroskedastic error structure and Wooldridge test for au-
8While we show the average contribution of the matching efficiency in the second stylised
fact, here I set up the time-varying matching efficiency in order to see the relationship between
productivity and matching efficiency over time and to examine their causality.
9According to a panel data unit root test (Im–Pesaran–Shin test), the level data of productivity
and matching efficiency have unit roots. With the log-difference variables, the null hypothesis of a
unit root is rejected at the 1% significance level.
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tocorrelation in the panel data. Additionally, I run dynamic panel data regressions
to reduce the endogeneity problem as well as considering the influence of the past
matching efficiency on the current one. The last two columns are Arellano-Bond
(system GMM) dynamic panel data estimations using different lags of the depen-
dent variable as regressors.10 All the estimations show that explanatory variables
are statistically significant and the sector-specific productivity is inversely correlated
with the present and future sectoral matching efficiency.11
Table 3.2: Estimations using panel data
dependent variable: dlnµt GLS
a Dynamic Panel (system GMM)b
dlnµt−1 - −0.047 (0.074) −0.053 (0.057)
dlnµt−2 - - −0.230 (0.058)∗∗∗
dlnLPt −0.504 (0.187)∗∗∗ −1.684 (0.562)∗∗∗ −1.404 (0.545)∗∗∗
dlnLPt−1 −0.461 (0.179)∗∗∗ −1.335 (0.362)∗∗∗ −1.077 (0.342)∗∗∗
Wald χ-square 16.30∗∗∗ 19.13∗∗∗ 45.94∗∗∗
autocorr. testc
AR(1) - −2.20∗∗ −2.51∗∗
AR(2) - −2.19∗∗ −0.31
Hansen testd - 11.21 7.74
No. observations 198 170 156
Source: Author’s own, from BLS JOLTS, EU KLEMS
Notes: aHeteroskedasticity and AR(1) within panels are allowed according to LR and
Wooldridge tests. bArellano–Bond dynamic panel data estimations. cArellano–Bond test
for serial correlation in ∆j,t (H0 : No autocorrelation). The first difference of error is neces-
sarily autocorrelated in AR(1). dH0 : Overidentifying restrictions are appropriate.
eValues
within parenthesis indicate cluster-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
In summary, the facts which guide the modelling in this chapter are that there
exists cross-industry variation in matching efficiency. This difference influences job
matching differently for each sector. Notably, different technological progress be-
tween sectors exacerbates the matching efficiency gap.
10In this estimation, the first difference equation is usually used to eliminate sector-specific
effects, and lagged dependent variables (GMM-type instruments) and first differences of the ex-
ogenous variables (standard instruments) are used as instruments.
11We might consider reverse causality (µ→ LP ), but there is little evidence for this, empirically
and theoretically. According to the variance decomposition from a VAR model based on annual
data of total industry, the components of implicit matching efficiency (V , U , H) altogether account
for as little as 2% - 6% of the productivity variation over a 5-year period.
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3.3 A Two-sector Search and Matching Model
We have seen previously that heterogeneous matching efficiency is an essential factor
in labour flow across sectors. To analyse its role in the labour market, I use a
two-sector search and matching framework embedded with a differential matching
efficiency mechanism.
The basic model setting follows Pissarides (1994), Acemoglu (2001), and Krause
and Lubik (2006, 2010). The economic environment consists of the high-wage sector
(sector 2) and the low-wage sector (sector 1), and the final goods are produced as
an aggregate of these two sectors’ goods. This economy is populated by a represen-
tative household. The household consists of a continuum of working-age members
normalised at the closed interval [0, 1] who are employed in either sector, or are
unemployed.
Figure 3.4 depicts the model timeline. The initial allocation of members across
sectors is given at the beginning. Once firms in each sector post job vacancies, the
unemployed persons search for jobs in either sector, and workers in the low-wage
sector endeavour to switch to the high-wage sector with some degree of search in-
tensity. In these attempts, job seekers are faced with differential matching efficiency
depending on in which sector they apply for a job. When a job seeker gets a job
offer from a firm, the wage is determined by bilateral bargaining. Then she works
at the firm until being separated from the firm. If the job seeker finds a job in the
low-wage sector, she works there as well as engaging in on-the-job (OTJ) search to
move to the high-wage sector. Through this labour mobility process, new matches
between workers and jobs are created, a fraction of jobs are dissolved, and hence
labour is reallocated across sectors at the end of the period.
The primary difference between the approach of existing research and the two-
sector model put forward in this chapter is the presence of differential matching
efficiency between sectors. More importantly, the process of productivity-driven
matching efficiency is embedded in the model based on the empirical facts and
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Figure 3.4: Model timeline
Notes: ‘sec’ represents sector, ‘vac’ for vacancies, and ‘unemp’ for unemployment.
operates as a crucial factor for labour allocation and wage distribution. Yet the
explanation on the wage gap and labour misallocation is neglected by existing multi-
sector search and matching models. Next, I argue that the choice of a decreasing
returns to scale (DRS) technology for each sector’s production is vital to track labour
mobility between sectors as it shows the inverse relationship between a sector’s
wage and its employment share consistent with actual data. A constant returns to
scale (CRS) technology as in Acemoglu (2001) and Krause and Lubik (2006, 2010)
cannot explain this phenomenon. Hence, the framework proposed in this chapter can
describe current labour market dynamics and show how different matching efficiency
triggers labour market distortions.
3.3.1 Model
3.3.1.1 Production Technology
In the spirit of Acemoglu (2001), the technology for producing the unique final out-
put is assumed to have a CES-type aggregator between intermediate goods, meaning
that the final goods are produced by combining goods from two sectors.
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yt = At · F (y1t, y2t) = At
[
(1− γ)y
σ−1
σ
1t + γy
σ−1
σ
2t
] σ
σ−1 (3.3.1)
where yt is the output of the final goods at time t, yjt is the output of sector
j ∈ {1, 2}, and At is the aggregate TFP. γ is the share of sector 2’s goods in
the aggregation production which can be interpreted alternatively as technological
distribution or the relative importance of sector 2’s goods. σ ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity
of substitution between two intermediate goods. When σ → ∞, two intermediate
goods are perfect substitutes, when σ → 0, two goods are perfect complements
(or Leontief production function), and when σ → 1, it will be the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
The final good firm’s profit maximisation yields the set of demands for the two
intermediate goods as12
p1t = (1− γ)A
σ−1
σ
t
(y1t
yt
)− 1
σ
(3.3.2)
p2t = γA
σ−1
σ
t
(y2t
yt
)− 1
σ
(3.3.3)
where pjt is the price of sector j’s goods and pt is the price of the final goods which
is assumed to be the numeraire as follows:13
1 ≡ pt = A−1t
[
(1− γ)σp1−σ1t + γσp1−σ2t
] 1
1−σ (3.3.4)
The intermediate goods, yjt, are also produced competitively within the sector
using its labour input njt. Each sector has a DRS technology in labour,
14 and its
output is adjusted by sector-specific productivity zjt.
12See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
13See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
14The DRS technology connects the wage level to the labour input via the marginal product of
labour αyjt/njt. Whereas in the standard literature on search and matching models, it is assumed
that firms have CRS technology, yjt = zjtnjt. Its marginal product of labour is zjt so that this
technology cannot show the relationship between labour input and wage.
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yjt = zjtn
α
jt , j ∈ {1, 2} (3.3.5)
where α is the labour income share.
3.3.1.2 Matching Technology
The matching function relates job seekers and vacancies to new hires. Here each
sector’s job matching function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas form, so it is a CRS,
increasing and concave function of both arguments as is standard in the literature.
h1t = µ(z1t) ·M(u1t, v1t) = µ(z1t) · uη1tv1−η1t (3.3.6)
h2t = µ(z2t) ·M(u2t + stn1t, v2t) = µ(z2t) · (u2t + stn1t)ηv1−η2t (3.3.7)
where st is the search intensity of workers in sector 1, and sector 2’s matching func-
tion involves stn1t which is the measure of efficiency units of job seekers from sector
1 as in Pissarides (2000, Ch 4).15 In the job market in sector 2, unemployed and
employed job seekers coexist. I assume that the unemployed’s search intensity is
unity,16 and the match elasticity η is the same for all sectors which is a common
assumption in the literature.17 Lastly, µjt is a positive time-varying matching effi-
ciency which is a function of sector-specific productivity, or µjt = µ(zjt), consistent
with the third empirical fact in the previous section. The matching function satisfies
the conditions of h1t ≤ min{u1t, v1t} and h2t ≤ min{u2t+stn1t, v2t}. Without labour
market frictions, the number of matches is equal to the minimum of the number of
15Pissarides (2000) coins a new term ‘efficiency unit of search’ to express a worker’s input or
search intensity for matching.
16Krause and Lubik (2006, 2010) clarify that endogenous search intensity of the unemployed
does not have an influence on the propagation mechanism of a two-sector search and matching
model.
17The assumption of the constant matching elasticity across sectors is common in the disaggre-
gated matching function literature (Barnichon and Figura, 2015). S¸ahin et al. (2014), by estimating
match elasticity by industry, show that most of those differences between industries are statistically
insignificant.
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job seekers and that of vacancies.
Each sector’s labour market tightness θjt, vacancy filling rate of firms q(θjt), and
job finding rate of job seekers f(θjt) are defined as
θ1t ≡ v1t
u1t
(3.3.8)
θ2t ≡ v2t
u2t + stn1t
(3.3.9)
q(θ1t) ≡ µ(z1t) ·M(u1t, v1t)
v1t
= µ(z1t) · θ−η1t (3.3.10)
q(θ2t) ≡ µ(z2t) ·M(u2t + stn1t, v2t)
v2
= µ(z2t) · θ−η2t (3.3.11)
f(θ1t) ≡ µ(z1t) ·M(u1t, v1t)
u1t
= µ(z1t) · θ1−η1t (3.3.12)
f(θ2t) ≡ µ(z2t) ·M(u2t + stn1t, v2t)
u2t + stn1t
= µ(z2t) · θ1−η2t (3.3.13)
Here, the inverse of each probability, or q(θjt)
−1 and f(θjt)−1, are the expected
duration of vacancies and job seeking, respectively. Hence, the average time that it
takes for a firm to find a worker, q(θjt)
−1, depends on the sector’s matching efficiency
µ(zjt), market tightness θjt, and what job seekers do before they meet firms st.
3.3.1.3 Firms’ Value Functions
Each sector’s firm maximises its expected profit by deciding the number of vacancies
and labour inputs subject to the evolution of employment.18 This maximisation
problem can be cast in the ‘asset value’ term which is the present value of expected
profit for a firm having a filled job and choosing to post a vacancy.
When a vacancy job matches with a worker, the firm’s value contains the value
18See the Appendix 3.A.3 for directly solving the firm’s profit maximisation problem.
128
of preserving the employment relationship and the value when the existing match
dissolves. The value of a filled job (Jjt) can be written as
J1t = αp1tz1tn
α−1
1t − w1t (3.3.14)
+ βEt [(1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))J1t+1 + (1− ρ)stf(θ2t)V1t+1 + ρV1t+1]
J2t = αp2tz2tn
α−1
2t − w2t + βEt [(1− ρ)J2t+1 + ρV2t+1] (3.3.15)
where β is the discount factor,19 ρ is the separation rate, and stf(θ2t) is the prob-
ability of an employed worker in the low-wage sector being matched with a job in
the high-wage sector.20 wjt is the real wage and Vjt is the value of a vacant position
in sector j. The first term on the right-hand side, αpjtzjtn
α−1
jt , is the value of the
marginal product of labour for each sector. Hence, in the case of a vacancy being
filled, the firm earns a profit of (αpjtzjtn
α−1
jt − wjt) and holds a continuation value.
In sector 1, there are three states in the continuation period: the worker stays within
the sector or she is separated from the job due to either a sector switch or a breakup.
In sector 2, in the next period, the employment relationship can continue or other-
wise. Thus, the firm’s value is the expected present profit of filling its vacancy with
a worker.
Similarly, the value from a vacant position is
Vjt = −κjt + βEt [q(θjt)Jjt+1 + (1− q(θjt))Vjt+1] (3.3.16)
where κjt is the vacancy cost in sector j. The right-hand side describes that posting
a vacancy incurs costs (κjt) until the vacancy is filled.
Here, firms’ free entry to the labour market is assumed. This ensures that the
value of a new entry is zero; that is Vjt = 0. By plugging this into (3.3.16), we
19Since firms are owned by the household, they use the same discount factor to the household.
20The portion of workers in sector 1 who finds a job in sector 2 is stn1tf(θ2t) and thus the part
of stf(θ2t) is the probability of the employed workers in sector 1 finding a job in sector 2.
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obtain each sector’s job creation condition as
βEtJjt+1 =
κjt
q(θjt)
(3.3.17)
The intuition of this condition is straightforward. Firms create jobs until the
duration-weighted marginal cost from creating an additional vacancy (right-hand
side) equals the expected discounted value of a filled job (left-hand side). By sub-
stituting (3.3.14) or (3.3.15) into this equation, it can be written as21
κ1t
q(θ1t)
= βEt
[
αp1t+1z1t+1n
α−1
1t+1 − w1t+1 + (1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1))
κ1t+1
q(θ1t+1)
]
(3.3.18)
κ2t
q(θ2t)
= βEt
[
αp2t+1z2t+1n
α−1
2t+1 − w2t+1 + (1− ρ)
κ2t+1
q(θ2t+1)
]
(3.3.19)
Likewise, the marginal vacancy cost weighted by the vacancy duration is equivalent
to the right-hand side which can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal
benefit of having a filled job. The benefit is comprised of a period marginal profit,
which is the part of the marginal product value of the employee over her wage, and
a continuation value.
3.3.1.4 Workers’ Value Functions
Agents consume all their income in every period and are risk neutral which means
that utility is a simple linear function of consumption, u(cit) = cit, as is standard in
the DMP-type search and matching model. Worker in the low-wage sector (sector 1)
make a decision of how much effort to put into searching for a job in the high-wage
sector (sector 2). Thus the lifetime value of the worker in sector 1 consists of two
parts: (i) the surplus remaining after search costs are deducted from her wage, (ii)
the continuation value which incorporates the values in three states: the value of a
21See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
130
continued employment contract, the value of the worker moving to sector 2, and the
value of when she is separated from the job. For a worker in sector 2, the lifetime
value is her current wage plus the value in the continuation period in which there
are two states: extension and discontinuance of the employment contract. Hence
the values of an employed person in each sector, Ejt, can be expressed as
E1t = max
st
w1t − φ(st) (3.3.20)
+ βEt [(1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))E1t+1 + (1− ρ)stf(θ2t)E2t+1 + ρU1t+1]
= max
st
w1t − φ(st) + βEt [(1− ρ)E1t+1 + (1− ρ)stf(θ2t)(E2t+1 − E1t+1) + ρU1t+1]
E2t = w2t + βEt [(1− ρ)E2t+1 + ρU2t+1] (3.3.21)
In the search and matching literature, search costs represent a broad array of costs
incurred to the household such as the physical cost of job search or training borne
by the household. The search cost function is assumed to be φ(st) ≡ τsιt,22 where
τ > 0 is the scale parameter and ι > 0 is the degree of convexity.
Similarly, the value of an unemployed individual (Ujt) who searches for each type
of jobs is comprised of the net unemployed benefit and her continuation value, which
is expressed by
Ujt = b− τ + βEt [f(θjt)Ejt+1 + (1− f(θjt))Ujt+1] (3.3.22)
where b is the unemployment benefit. The search intensity of an unemployed person
is normalised to one (sut = 1) as mentioned before.
Unemployed agents can apply for a job in either sector as in a standard two-sector
search and matching model (Acemoglu, 2001; Krause and Lubik, 2006). Intuitively,
22The canonical search cost function is convex, or ι > 1, considering the shoe leather cost which
mounts at an increasing rate in search intensity. However, according to Gautier, Moraga-Gonza´lez,
and Wolthoff (2016), different search cost curves coexist suggesting that if an individual spends a
lot of time at an early stage of job search and gradually tapers search intensity off over time, the
search cost function may be concave, or ι < 1.
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since the unemployed from sector 1 can apply for a job in sector 2, they can move
to the pool of the unemployed in sector 2. Still, workers face different matching
efficiency depending on in which sector they try to find a job. Since they can apply
for any sector, the value of unemployment is the same across sectors, or U1t = U2t.
Using this condition, the unemployed free mobility condition can be derived as
f(θ1t)(E1t+1 − U1t+1) = f(θ2t)(E2t+1 − U2t+1) (3.3.23)
3.3.1.5 Bargaining
The wage is determined via Nash bargaining by maximising the weighted average
of the net surpluses of firms and workers.
wjt = arg max (Ejt − Ujt)ψ(Jjt − Vjt)1−ψ (3.3.24)
where ψ is the worker’s bargaining power.23 This yields
(1− ψ)(Ejt − Ujt) = ψ(Jjt − Vjt)
⇒ Ejt − Ujt = ΨJjt (3.3.25)
where Ψ ≡ ψ/(1 − ψ). By using this condition with the job creation condition
(3.3.17), the unemployed free mobility condition (3.3.23) can be rewritten as
κ1tθ1t = κ2tθ2t (3.3.26)
23There is no convincing evidence for different bargaining power between sectors. Many studies
on a multi-sector search and matching model, for example, Krause and Lubik (2010) and Pilossoph
(2014) set the same bargaining power across sectors. Additionally, the union affiliation rate does
not seem to be significantly different in two sectors: The US union affiliation rate is 5.9% in the
high-wage sector and 6.9% in the low-wage sector in the year 2018 (source: US BLS).
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3.3.1.6 Equilibrium Search Intensity
The investment on job search is determined by the marginal condition, derived from
value maximisation of employed job seekers. From the value function of the worker
in sector 1, (3.3.20), its first derivative with respect to search intensity is computed
as
φ′(st) = τιsι−1t = βEt(1− ρ)f(θ2t)(E2t+1 − E1t+1) (3.3.27)
With the job creation condition (3.3.17) and the bargaining condition (3.3.25), we
get the equilibrium search intensity.
τιsι−1t = βΨEt(1− ρ)f(θ2t)(J2t+1 − J1t+1)
= Ψ(1− ρ)f(θ2t)
[
κ2t
q(θ2t)
− κ1t
q(θ1t)
]
(3.3.28)
This demonstrates that search intensity is an increasing function of job finding rate
because if the job finding rate rises, the return to search investment increases. Search
intensity also increases in the difference in the marginal cost between sectors since
a higher marginal cost is linked to a higher wage.
3.3.1.7 Government
The government provides unemployment benefit at a rate b per person, funded by
a lump-sum tax Tt levied on households. It is assumed that the government follows
a balanced budget policy as
Tt = b(u1t + u2t) = but (3.3.29)
where ut is the total number of unemployed persons in the economy.
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3.3.1.8 Household
As previously stated, the representative household consists of a continuum of working-
age members who are employed in either sector, or are unemployed. The household’s
role is to pool members’ incomes and distribute consumption goods equally to all
members. There are four income sources: wage in sector 1, wage in sector 2, unem-
ployment benefit, and profit from firms.
The household’s period-by-period budget constraint is
ct + τs
ι
tn1t + τut = w1tn1t + w2tn2t + but + Πt − Tt (3.3.30)
where ct ≡
∫ 1
0
cit di is the aggregate consumption of goods which is the sum of
individual member i’s consumption. τsιt and τ indicate the search cost of workers
in sector 1 and that of the unemployed, respectively. The aggregate firm profit is
denoted by Πt ≡ yt −
∑
j(wjtnjt + κjtvjt).
3.3.1.9 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the final goods market clears.
ct + τs
ι
tn1t + τut = yt − κ1tv1t − κ2tv2t (3.3.31)
A dynamic equilibrium given the sequence of exogenous variables {At, zjt}∞t=0,
j ∈ {1, 2} and the initial labour allocation nj0, is a sequence of quantities and prices
{ct,njt+1,ujt, vjt, st,Tt, pjt,wjt}∞t=0 satisfying (i) each agent’s optimisation condition,
(ii) the bargaining condition, and (iii) the goods market clearing condition.
The following system of equations describes this equilibrium:
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(demands for goods)
p1t = (1− γ)A
σ−1
σ
t
(y1t
yt
)− 1
σ
(3.3.32)
p2t = γA
σ−1
σ
t
(y2t
yt
)− 1
σ
(3.3.33)
(job creation conditions)
κ1t
q(θ1t)
= βEt
[
αp1t+1
y1t+1
n1t+1
− w1t+1 + (1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1)) κ1t+1
q(θ1t+1)
]
(3.3.34)
κ2t
q(θ2t)
= βEt
[
αp2t+1
y2t+1
n2t+1
− w2t+1 + (1− ρ) κ2t+1
q(θ2t+1)
]
(3.3.35)
(equilibrium search intensity)
τιsι−1t = Ψ(1− ρ)f(θ2t)
[
κ2t
q(θ2t)
− κ1t
q(θ1t)
]
(3.3.36)
(wages determination)24
w1t = ψ
(
αp1t
y1t
n1t
+ (1− (1− ρ)st)κ2tθ2t
)
+ (1− ψ)(τsιt + b− τ) (3.3.37)
w2t = ψ
(
αp2t
y2t
n2t
+ κ2tθ2t
)
+ (1− ψ)(b− τ) (3.3.38)
(evolution of employment)
n1t+1 = (1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))n1t + q(θ1t)v1t (3.3.39)
n2t+1 = (1− ρ)n2t + q(θ2t)v2t (3.3.40)
24See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
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(unemployment)
ut = u1t + u2t = 1− n1t − n2t (3.3.41)
(free unemployed mobility)
κ1tθ1t = κ2tθ2t (3.3.42)
(fiscal balance)
Tt = but (3.3.43)
(resource constraint)
ct + τs
ι
tn1t + τut = yt − κ1tv1t − κ2tv2t (3.3.44)
where the output technologies yt = At
[
(1 − γ)y
σ−1
σ
1t + γy
σ−1
σ
2t
] σ
σ−1 , yjt = zjtn
α
jt are
given, and market tightness θ1t = v1t/u1t, θ2t = v2t/(u2t + sn1t) and vacancy filling
rate q(θjt) = µ(zjt) · θ−ηjt are defined as before.
3.3.2 Steady State and Comparative Statics
An important question is how a differential change in matching efficiency affects
the labour market variables such as market tightness, sectoral wages, and labour
allocation. Accordingly, before analysing the model quantitatively, we study the
core mechanism generating labour market distortions in the model analytically. I
first derive the steady state sectoral wage gap and labour allocation and then discuss
the implications of differential matching efficiency.
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3.3.2.1 Steady State Wage Gap
At steady state, equilibrium search intensity can be derived from (3.3.36) as
s∗ =
[
Ψ
1− ρ
τι
θ∗2
(
κ2 − µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1−η1 κ
η
2
)] 1
ι−1
= s¯ (3.3.45)
where search intensity is assumed to be fixed as s¯ at steady state. Start by solving
for market tightness from this equation and the free unemployed mobility condition
(3.3.42).
θ∗2 =
τιs¯ι−1
Ψ(1− ρ)
(
κ2 − µ(z2)µ(z1)κ
1−η
1 κ
η
2
) (3.3.46)
θ∗1 =
κ2
κ1
θ∗2 (3.3.47)
These equations show the positive relationship between the relative matching effi-
ciency and the market tightness. When the relative matching efficiency of sector
2 decreases, firms in the sector post fewer vacancies, which leads to less market
tightness. This process, in turn, decreases sector 1’s market tightness as more un-
employed individuals come and apply to this sector.
Substituting out the term of firm’s revenue per worker from the job creation
condition (3.3.35) and the wage determination (3.3.38), sector 2’s wage is solved.
w∗2 = Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)
)
κ2
µ(z2)
θ∗η2 + κ2θ
∗
2
]
+ (b− τ) (3.3.48)
Likewise, sector 1’s wage is derived from (3.3.34), (3.3.37), and (3.3.45).
w∗1 = Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)(1− µ(z2) · s¯θ∗1−η2 )
)
κ1
µ(z1)
θ∗η1 + (1− (1− ρ)s¯)κ2θ∗2
]
+ b− τ(1− s¯)
(3.3.49)
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Hence, the difference in steady state wage between two sectors is25
w∗2 − w∗1 = Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)− s¯(1− ρ)f(θ∗2)
)(
κ2
q(θ∗2)
− κ1
q(θ∗1)
)]
− s¯τ
= Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)
)(
τιs¯ι−1
Ψ(1− ρ)
)η
1
µ(z2)
(
κ2 − µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1−η1 κ
η
2
)1−η]
+ τ s¯ι(ι− s¯1−ι)
(3.3.50)
From the first line of the equation, we know that the wage gap is related to the dif-
ference in vacancy costs weighted by each sector’s vacancy duration. Particularly, if
both marginal vacancy costs are equal to each other, or κ2/q(θ
∗
2) = κ1/q(θ
∗
1), with no
search cost, the equilibrium becomes the Walrasian law of one wage (w∗1 = w
∗
2). Intu-
itively, in the economy without frictions where there exist neither vacancy duration
nor job search, all wages are equalised across sectors, even when the productivity gap
remains. With frictions, however, the difference in marginal vacancy costs, which can
be amplified by differential matching efficiency, prevents wage convergence between
sectors. The last line of the equation elucidates the effect of differential matching
efficiency on the wage gap as follows.
Proposition 1. In the steady state, a rise in the relative productivity of sector 2
increases its relative wage via a fall in the relative matching efficiency as
∂(w∗2 − w∗1)
∂ (µ(z2)/µ(z1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
· ∂ (µ(z2)/µ(z1))
∂ (z2/z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
> 0
Importantly, this matching efficiency gap comes from the productivity gap z2/z1.
Thus the productivity gap cannot induce the wage gap by itself but can do so only
through the friction process, namely productivity-driven matching efficiency.
25Here, the wage gap is derived as the difference between sectoral wages to make it tractable.
For the sake of argument, I will use the definition of the wage gap as the ratio of two wages,
ω = w2/w1, later in the numerical analysis. See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
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3.3.2.2 Steady State Sectoral Labour
The steady state total unemployment can be derived by equating the flow out of
unemployment, (f(θ1) + f(θ2))u, with the flow into unemployment, ρ(1− u).
u∗ =
ρ
f(θ∗1) + f(θ
∗
2) + ρ
= u¯ (3.3.51)
where we assume that the total unemployment is given as u¯ at steady state.
The steady state equations of two sectors’ employment evolution (3.3.39), (3.3.40),
and unemployment (3.3.41) can be written as
(ρ+ (1− ρ)s¯f(θ∗2))n1 = f(θ∗1)u1 (3.3.52)
ρn2 = f(θ
∗
2)(u2 + s¯n1) (3.3.53)
u¯ = u1 + u2 = 1− n1 − n2 (3.3.54)
By substituting (3.3.52) and (3.3.54) into (3.3.53), we have sector 2’s steady state
employment share as26
n∗2 =
f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗ + f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
u¯X∗
ρ+ f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗
(3.3.55)
where X∗ ≡ ρ+ s¯(1− ρ)f(θ∗2) + (1− s¯)f(θ∗1).
Likewise, the sector 1’s steady state employment share is
n∗1 = 1− u¯− n∗2 =
ρ− ρu¯− u¯f(θ∗2)
ρ+ f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗
(3.3.56)
Hence, the steady state relative labour allocation of sector 2 in terms of sector 1
is derived by dividing n∗2 by n
∗
1 as
27
26See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
27See the Appendix 3.A.3 for the derivation.
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z∗ ≡ n
∗
2
n∗1
=
f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗ + f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
u¯X∗
ρ− ρu¯− u¯f(θ∗2)
(3.3.57)
=
1− (1− u¯)
 ρµ(z1) (κ1κ2)1−η (Ψ(1−ρ)τιs¯ι−1 )1−η (κ2 − µ(z2)µ(z1)κ1−η1 κη2)1−η
+s¯(1− ρ)µ(z2)
µ(z1)
(
κ1
κ2
)1−η
+ (1− s¯)

ρ(1−u¯)
µ(z2)
(
Ψ(1−ρ)
τιs¯ι−1
)1−η (
κ2 − µ(z2)µ(z1)κ
1−η
1 κ
η
2
)1−η
− u¯
The effect of the relative matching efficiency on the sectoral labour allocation
rests upon the levels of the vacancy costs, the separation rate and other parameters.
In a simple case, if the separation rate is assumed to be close to zero, ρ ' 0, then
the steady state relative labour allocation28 can be simplified as
z∗ '
(1− u¯)
[
s¯µ(z2)
µ(z1)
(
κ1
κ2
)1−η
+ (1− s¯)
]
− 1
u¯
(3.3.58)
It is straightforward to show the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the steady state, a rise in the relative productivity of sector 2
decreases its relative labour allocation via a fall in the relative matching efficiency.
In other words,
∂(n∗2/n
∗
1)
∂ (µ(z2)/µ(z1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
· ∂ (µ(z2)/µ(z1))
∂ (z2/z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
< 0
As the productivity-driven matching efficiency of the high-wage sector declines, its
relative labour allocation will shrink.
As summarised in Table 3.3, when the relative matching efficiency of sector 2
(µ(z2)/µ(z1)) decreases due to the sector-specific technological progress (z2/z1), the
wage gap (ω) consequently rises and at the same time the relative labour allocation
28If either y1t or y2t is zero in the aggregation production, there can be a corner solution.
However, with the CES-type aggregator in this model, the possibility of a corner solution is ruled
out since combining some of each good in the aggregation is strictly preferred to using only one
good.
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of sector 2 (z) ends up falling, which cannot be explained by standard neoclassical
theory.29
Table 3.3: Source and effect of labour mobility friction
z2
z1
↑ (friction process)===========⇒ µ(z2)
µ(z1)
↓ (market distortion)=============⇒ ω ↑ z ↓
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
To solve the model quantitatively, we first need to calibrate the model by specifying
parameter values and processes for exogenous variables. Calibrating the model can
show how differential matching efficiency between sectors affects the sectoral wage
gap and labour allocation numerically, and allows us to compare the baseline model
with counter-factual models where no frictions exist. Furthermore, we can answer
the question of how shocks to sector-specific productivity influence the labour market
variables by simulating the calibrated model.
The model is calibrated based on the US economy from the year 2001 with
quarterly frequency. The industries are classified according to the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) at the 38 sub-industry level and the sub-
industries are divided into two sectors in terms of their ranks in the wage level as
Table 3.4.30
29The standard theory was discussed in section 1.2.1 “Neoclassical Theory of the Wage Gap
and Labour Mobility: What It Can and Cannot Explain” in Chapter 1.
30Three industries of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; real estate and rental and
leasing; government are excluded.
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Table 3.4: Sector classification
sector 1 (low-wage) sector 2 (high-wage)
industries wagea industries wagea
accommodation & food service 23.1 miscellaneous manufacturing 52.6
retail trade 30.9 electrical equipment & applications 54.9
other service (excl.government) 33.8 motor vehicles, trailers & parts 56.5
administrative & waste management 34.5 primary metals 57.6
apparel & leather & allied products 34.7 paper products 58.0
textile mills & textile product mills 37.0 machinery 58.7
wood products 37.4 wholesale trade 64.0
furniture & related products 37.8 other transportation equipment 73.9
educational services 38.3 professional & technical services 78.1
arts, entertainment & recreation 40.7 information 79.1
food & tobacco products 42.2 chemical products 79.6
printing & related activities 44.4 mining 83.9
plastics & rubber products 44.8 finance & insurance 84.7
health care & social assistance 45.6 utilities 85.5
transportation & warehousing 47.7 computer & electronic products 89.0
fabricated metal products 48.0 petroleum & coal products 91.5
nonmetallic mineral products 48.5 management of companies 98.9
construction 49.4 - -
Source: BEA NIPA
Notes: aAverage annual wages per full-time employee between 2000-2016, in terms of thou-
sand dollars. b The cutoff between the two sectors is based on the average-linkage cluster
analysis using the Euclidean distance of industrial wages. See the Appendix 2.A.3 for details.
3.4.1.1 Model Parameters
I set the discount factor, β, to the standard quarterly value of 0.99 from the lit-
erature. There are three technology parameters in production: the intermediate
sector’s output elasticity of labour, the technology distribution, and the elasticity
of substitution between two sectors’ goods, {α, γ, σ}. α is set to 0.66 based on the
average labour income share of the US total economy (excl. agriculture) between
1991 and 2012 (source: OECD). The elasticity of substitution between goods σ and
the technology distribution parameter γ can be identified using the two demand
functions for intermediate goods as in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). By dividing
the two sectors’ demand functions, (3.3.32) and (3.3.33), we obtain the following
log-transformed linear equation.
142
ln
(p2t · y2t
p1t · y1t
)
= ln
( γ
1− γ
)
+
σ − 1
σ
ln
(y2t
y1t
)
Thus the two parameters can be estimated by regressing the ratio of output values
on the ratio of volumes. I use the sum of each industry’s nominal value added in
sector j as sector j’s output value (pjtyjt), and the sum of its real value added as
sector j’s volume (yjt). The result shows that σ and γ are around 1.25 and 0.54,
31
respectively, using the value added data between 1990 and 2015 from BEA’s NIPA
tables.
Next, the economy-wide match elasticity, η can be estimated by the following
regression. The logarithmic transformation of the aggregate matching function is
lnHt = lnµ+ η lnUt + (1− η) lnVt ⇔ ln Ht
Vt
= lnµ+ η ln
Ut
Vt
The OLS estimate32 is η = 0.25 which is similar to the estimate in Yashiv (2000).
I use the data of the number of hires (Ht), unemployed persons (Ut), and vacancies
(Vt) in total industry between 2001 and 2017 from BLS JOLTS.
The separation rate between workers and firms is chosen to be ρ = 0.10. Ac-
cording to Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), this value captures overall sepa-
rations which include job destruction by both workers and firms, and Shimer (2005)
approximates the quarterly separation rate to be 0.10 by taking the short-term un-
employment rate into account.
The cost of a vacancy is likely to be proportional to output per worker (Hagedorn
and Manovskii, 2008).33 From the data of value added per person by industry
31ln
(
p2t·y2t
p1t·y1t
)
= 0.1432 + 0.2015 ln
(
y2t
y1t
)
, R
2
= 0.6806
32ln HtVt = −0.0170 + 0.2526 ln UtVt , R
2
= 0.5158
33They calibrate the vacancy cost which is a function of the combination of capital and labour
costs.
κjt = κ
Kajt + κ
Waξjt
where ajt is the output per unit of labour, κ
K is the steady state capital flow cost of posting a
vacancy, κW is its flow labour cost, and ξ is a positive parameter.
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between 2001 and 2015 (source: EU KLEMS), I find that value added per person in
high-wage industries is on average 3.8 times as large as that in low-wage industries.
I firstly choose the high-wage sector’s vacancy cost, κ2 = 0.30 so that this value,
with average values of actual data (vacancy duration, per capita value added and
real wage) and calibrated parameters (α, β, ρ), satisfies the following steady state
job creation condition in sector 2.
κ2
q(θ2)
= β
[
α
p2y2
n2
− w2 + (1− ρ) κ2
q(θ2)
]
Then, by dividing κ2 by 3.8, the low-wage sector’s vacancy cost is set at κ1 = 0.08.
The standard search cost function is assumed to be strictly convex as in the
literature. There are two parameters associated with the search cost function: the
scale of search cost, τ , and the elasticity of search cost with respect to search in-
tensity, ι. I first choose ι = 1.30 according to Christensen et al. (2005) and Krause
and Lubik (2010) who regard the search cost as sufficiently elastic to search effort.34
Given the calibrated parameters (ρ, ψ, ι) and the US average vacancy filling rate
and job finding rate (f(·), q(·)), the search cost parameter τ is fixed to match the
equilibrium search intensity of an employed worker with one fifth of the unemployed
person’s search intensity as in Mortensen (1994). This yields τ = 0.32.35
The unemployment benefit b is set to a value such that the unemployed worker’s
earnings, or the outside option value (= b − τ),36 is close to that in the US labour
market. Since the average income replacement rate of unemployed persons’ earnings
34Christensen et al. (2005) estimate the search elasticity to be 1.8, and Krause and Lubik (2010)
choose it as 1.1.
35τ is calculated by plugging other parameters and data into the following equilibrium search
intensity equation.
τιsι−1 = Ψ(1− ρ)f(θ2)
[
κ2
q(θ2)
− κ1
q(θ1)
]
where search intensity s is set to 0.2 which is one fifth of the unemployed person’s search intensity
(su = 1).
36During job search, the unemployed person earns some real outside option value (b − τ).
According to Pissarides (2000), this value includes unemployment insurance benefits, the income
from odd and irregular jobs, and the imputed return from unpaid leisure activities.
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in the US between 2001 and 2011 is 13 percent (source: OECD),37 I choose b = 0.38
which makes the outside option value (= 0.06) approximately 13 percent of the
mean labour income (= 0.49) in the model. Setting b = 0.38 is also similar to the
calibrations of Shimer (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2010).38
I choose the worker’s bargaining power ψ = 0.5 following the convention in the
labour search and matching literature.
Table 3.5 lists parameter values and their descriptions.
Table 3.5: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 discount factor
α 0.66 sector output elasticity
σ 1.25 elasticity of substitution between goods
γ 0.54 technology distribution
η 0.25 match elasticity
ρ 0.10 separation probability
κ1 0.08 sector 1’s vacancy cost
κ2 0.30 sector 2’s vacancy cost
ι 1.30 search cost elasticity (convexity)
τ 0.32 search cost scale
b 0.38 unemployment benefit
ψ 0.50 worker’s bargaining power
µ¯1 1.00 sector 1’s average matching efficiency (normalised)
µ¯2 0.62 sector 2’s average matching efficiency
ζ0 -1.60 coefficient of productivity
ζ1 -1.20 coefficient of lagged productivity
ρA 0.92 autoregressive coefficient of aggregate TFP
ρz 0.95 autoregressive coefficient of sector-specific productivity
σA 0.013 standard deviation of innovation, aggregate TFP shock
σz 0.003 standard deviation of innovation, sector-specific shock
Notes: The main target economy is the US. The values are assigned to parameters in the
baseline model. The motivation for each value is described in the text. µ¯j can be interpreted
as the average matching efficiency when zjt follows a log-normal AR(1) process with mean
zero.
37The income replacement rate is defined as unemployment benefit levels (incl. unemployment
insurance and unemployment assistance benefits) as a percentage of previous earnings.
38Shimer (2005) sets the unemployment benefit to 0.40 and Krause and Lubik (2010) calibrate
it as 0.39 in a standard-type search and matching model. These values are below sectoral wages
and the economy-wide wage level.
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3.4.1.2 Forcing Process
As discussed in the previous section, each sector’s matching efficiency is inversely
related to its sector-specific productivity. This relation can be expressed by39
µjt = µ¯j · zζ0jt · zζ1jt−1 ' µ¯j · zζ0+ζ1j,t,t−1 (3.4.1)
where µ¯j is the average matching efficiency, ζ0 and ζ1 are negative coefficients. To
get the rightmost term, the mean of two consecutive periods’ productivities (zj,t,t−1)
is used by taking account of a slight change in productivity quarter on quarter.
As to µ¯j, I calculate average sectoral matching efficiency between 2001 and 2017
by applying the actual data and the calibrated match elasticity (η = 0.25) to the
matching function. When the average matching efficiency of sector 1 is normalised
to µ¯1 = 1, that of sector 2 becomes µ¯2 = 0.62.
Finally, I set ζ0 = −1.60 and ζ1 = −1.20 to match the average coefficient esti-
mates of the two dynamic panel regressions of matching efficiency on labour pro-
ductivity as in Table 3.2.
3.4.2 Simulations
In this section, I perform numerical simulations with the above-calibrated param-
eters on the proposed model, with a focus on how differing matching efficiency
39The regression equation (3.2.5) can be written as in terms of the deviation from the initial
values as
lnµt − lnµt−1 = ζ0(ln zt − ln zt−1) + ζ1(ln zt−1 − ln zt−2)
lnµt−1 − lnµt−2 = ζ0(ln zt−1 − ln zt−2) + ζ1(ln zt−2 − ln zt−3)
...
+ lnµ1 − lnµ0 = ζ0(ln z1 − ln z0) + ζ1 ln z0
lnµt − lnµ0 = ζ0(ln zt − ln z0) + ζ1 ln zt−1
The last line can be transformed to µt = (µ0/z
ζ0
0 ) ·zζ0t zζ1t−1 = µ¯ ·zζ0t zζ1t−1. Here the lagged dependent
variables are excluded since their coefficients are small and not significant as in Table 3.2.
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influences the wage gap and labour allocation between sectors. Counter-factual
simulations with no inter-sectoral frictions are also carried out.40
3.4.2.1 Steady State Relations
In the two-sector equilibrium model, both the sectoral wage gap and labour al-
location change as the relative matching efficiency changes. Differential matching
efficiency is initially the result of unequal productivity between sectors in this model.
As the ratio of sector-specific productivities, z2/z1, rises, the relative matching ef-
ficiency, µ2(z2)/µ1(z1), decreases, otherwise it increases. Then the change in the
relative matching efficiency influences labour market dynamics by changing sectoral
wages and employment which further distorts the wage gap and labour allocation
between sectors.
Figure 3.5 plots the steady state labour market variables and the aggregate
consumption against the relative productivity. The wage gap and relative labour
allocation are defined as a ratio of ω ≡ w2/w1 and z ≡ n2/n1, respectively. As
the ratio of sector 2’s productivity to sector 1’s productivity (z2/z1) rises, forcing
the relative matching efficiency of sector 2 (µ(z2)/µ(z1)) to decline, the equilibrium
wage gap (ω) goes up while the relative labour allocation of sector 2 (z) goes
down, expectedly. In accordance with our discussion in the previous section, these
results demonstrate that a lower level of matching efficiency in the labour market
of the high-wage sector can cause labour concentration in the low-wage sector while
simultaneously causing the sectoral wage gap to widen. The third graph displays the
aggregate consumption level (c) against the relative productivity. When matching
efficiency is relatively balanced between sectors (or when both sectors’ productivities
are similar to each other), aggregate consumption grows due to the increase in
aggregate output by labour reallocation. However, the consumption level begins
40In counter-factual simulations, there is no inter-sectoral mobility frictions so that the friction
process (3.4.1) is turned off, µjt = µ¯j . However, there still exist search and matching type frictions
from the matching function.
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(a) wage gap (b) relative labour allocation
(c) aggregate consumption (d) search intensity
Figure 3.5: Steady state variables against relative productivity
Source: Author’s own
Notes: In ‘with Friction’ simulation (baseline model, solid black line), the differential
matching efficiency process driven by different sector-specific productivities is included
(µjt = µ¯j · zζ0+ζ1j,t,t−1) while in ‘without Friction’ simulation (dotted green line), the process is
turned off (µjt = µ¯j).
to descend when the difference in matching efficiency (or productivity) between
sectors is comparatively large because labour movements from sector 1 to sector 2
will be so sluggish that the negative effect of different matching efficiency surpasses
the positive effect of productivity improvement. Lastly, the differential matching
efficiency matters to the extent of the equilibrium search intensity (s). The search
intensity of workers in sector 1 rises in the early stage since the return to job search
investment increases by enhancing the possibility of securing a higher wage job.
However, as the larger difference in matching efficiency reduces its return, workers
become discouraged from increasing their input on the job search.
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A different result is produced from a counter-factual simulation without friction
in which the process of productivity-driven matching efficiency (3.4.1) is turned off.
Each sector’s matching efficiency, µj = µ¯j, now no longer depends on its productiv-
ity. The green dotted lines in Figure 3.5 describe the changes of the four variables
against the relative productivity when frictions do not exist. Without the friction
process, the wage gap levels off41 and the relative labour allocation increases with the
productivity ratio, contrary to the case with frictions. This indicates that without
the friction process, all wages are being equalised by inter-sectoral labour mobility
even though the productivity gap increases. Put differently, the productivity gap
can trigger the wage gap only via the friction process. Next, the aggregate consump-
tion, and by extension welfare, increases monotonically because the positive effect
of sector 2’s productivity improvement fully contributes to the economy. The search
intensity linearly increases since the lack of friction in the labour market raises a
worker’s chance of finding a job in the high-wage sector. This is because firms in
sector 2 create more jobs as the sector’s productivity goes up, and accordingly its
market tightness (vj/uj) rises. Equilibrium search intensity of workers in sector 1
keeps increasing with the relative productivity, provided that there exist no frictions.
3.4.2.2 Deterministic Simulation
Next, I run a deterministic simulation using actual data of relative productivity,
or z2/z1. This simulation is equivalent to the case where all agents have perfect
foresight about the evolution of relative productivity. This simulation illustrates
the structural transformation of employment and the transition of the wage gap
over the last two decades.
To collect the time series of sectoral productivity, I take the sectoral average
of labour productivity weighted by each industry’s hours worked using the annual
41The wage gap is not equal to unity since there exist the difference in initial matching efficiency,
or µ¯1 6= µ¯2 as well as the difference in vacancy cost, or κ1 6= κ2 in the case of no friction.
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data of industrial labour productivity index between 2001 and 2016 from the US
BLS Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) database.42 Then, quarterly data of
productivity are obtained by linear interpolation between annual data. We retain
the same sector classification used in Table 3.4. Figure 3.6 plots the time series
of productivity ratio between sectors. According to the data, the relative labour
productivity has increased at an annual rate of 0.14 percent since 2001.
Figure 3.6: Relative productivity (z2/z1), US
Source: BLS Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC)
Notes: Each sector’s productivity (zj) is averaged over all industries within its sector,
weighted by industrial hours worked. The trend shows an annual growth rate of 0.14 percent
between 2001 - 2016. Since the data provided from BLS are indexed, the initial level is
adjusted from 1.00 to 1.93 for the wage gap in the model to fit the actual wage gap in 2001.
To implement this deterministic simulation, the following steps are carried out.
• step 1: Feed the actual data of relative productivity z2/z1 (z1 is normalised to
1) in 2001 into the model equation system in section 3.3.
• step 2: Given the actual data of relative productivity, steady state values of
{yj, pj, vj, θj, µj, s, nj, wj} can be solved and then the initial wage gap ω and
labour allocation z are derived for the year 2001.
42This average labour productivity data can be a proxy for zj (= yj/n
α
j ) in the model.
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• step 3: By feeding the time series of relative productivity by the year 2016,
the transition paths of the wage gap and labour allocation between 2001 and
2016 are extracted. End at the new steady state with the relative labour
productivity in 2016.
From this deterministic simulation, we can show how closely the proposed two-
sector search and matching model tracks the actual data in the labour market. Fig-
ure 3.7 demonstrates that the model well accounts for the labour market dynamics
since the 2000s. Through the process in which the relative labour productivity of the
high-wage sector has risen (or its relative matching efficiency has been lower), the
wage gap between sectors has increased and at the same time the relative labour al-
location of the high-wage sector has shrunk. The simulation for the wage gap tracks
the actual data closely in terms of level and direction. A pattern of the actual wage
gap, in which the gap reduced during the global financial crisis, is also shown in the
(a) wage gap (b) relative labour allocation
Figure 3.7: Deterministic simulations
Source: Author’s own, from BEA NIPA, BLS LPC
Notes: ‘with Friction’ (solid black line) is the simulation with the baseline model while in
‘without Friction’ simulation (dotted green line), the friction process of productivity-driven
matching efficiency is turned off, or µjt = µ¯j . The initial (z) in the model is adjusted to fit the
data of labour allocation in 2001 (0.43 → 0.47). The correlation of ω between data and model
is 0.86, and that of z is 0.93.
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model economy. For the labour allocation, the simulation captures the actual data
by displaying a downward curve, despite having more fluctuations than the actual
data and thus having some difficulty generating the secular decline. This is because
in the model each sector’s labour allocation is directly affected by the period change
in the matching efficiency. I also conduct counter-factual simulations without fric-
tions which show that the wage gap levels off and the relative labour allocation of
the high-wage sector slightly increases in contrast to the case with frictions. Again,
the labour market puzzle cannot be explained alone by sector-specific productivity
progress but can be explained with labour mobility frictions.
3.4.2.3 Stochastic Simulation
By adopting stochastic processes on the aggregate TFP, At, in equation (3.3.1) and
the sector-specific productivity, zjt, in equation (3.3.5), we can assess the extent
to which this two-sector search and matching framework contributes to explaining
observed fluctuations in the wage gap and labour allocation between sectors.
I assume that the aggregate shock, At, follows the Markov process of a mean
zero AR(1) in logarithm as
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εAt, εAt ∼ N (0, σ2A) (3.4.2)
where ρA is the autoregressive coefficient and σ
2
A is the variance of the innovation.
For the sector-specific shock, in the two-sector model, what matters is the relative
productivity between two sectors. Thus, without loss of generality, I normalise sector
1’s productivity to one, and specify sector 2’s stochastic process as an exogenous
log-normal AR(1) process.
ln z2t = ρz ln z2t−1 + εzt, εzt ∼ N (0, σ2z) (3.4.3)
where ρz is the autoregressive coefficient and σ
2
z is the variance of the innovation.
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It is assumed that both shocks are orthogonal to each other. The parameter
ρA is set as 0.92 as is fairly common in the literature. I choose the autoregressive
coefficient of sector-specific productivity, ρz = 0.95 according to Garin, Pries, and
Sims (2018).43 For the shock magnitudes, I first estimate the standard deviation
of the sector-specific shock as σz = 0.003 using the data
44 while I parameterise the
standard deviation of the aggregate TFP shock as σA = 0.013 such that the model
can match that of the US per capita output over the sample period.
Moments from this stochastic simulation are reported in Table 3.6. The time
series of the US economy consists of the data from the first quarter of 2001 to the
fourth quarter of 2016 (64 sample period).45 All variables are measured on per
capita and real value basis, and transformed by taking logarithms. The time series
are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter by setting the smoothing parameter
to 1,600. To compare actual statistics with those of model, I simulate the model
Table 3.6: Cyclical properties: US economy and model economy
US economy model economies
(with friction) (without friction)
σ(y) = 1.15 σ(y) = 1.15 σ(y) = 1.14
variable (x) σ(x)/σ(y) ρ(x, y) σ(x)/σ(y) ρ(x, y) σ(x)/σ(y) ρ(x, y)
consumption 0.81 0.92 0.89 0.99 0.90 1.00
labour income share 0.32 -0.21 0.19 -0.26 0.13 -0.45
labour productivity 0.72 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.90 0.98
employment 0.57 0.78 0.37 0.63 0.35 0.69
real wage 0.84 0.37 0.52 0.98 0.50 1.00
Source: Author’s own, from BEA, BLS
Notes: The period covered for the statistics of the US economy is from 2001.1Q to 2016.4Q
(64 periods). σ(x) is the percentage standard deviation of variable x. σ(x)/σ(y) is the
relative volatility of variable x with respect to output y. ρ(x, y) is the correlation between
variable x and output y. The US data of employment is constructed in terms of the number
of employees.
43Garin, Pries, and Sims (2018) point out that setting the autoregressive coefficient of sector-
specific productivity sufficiently persistent is inevitable to generate labour reallocation across sec-
tors in a disaggregated sector model.
44The quarterly standard deviation, σz, is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the
annual relative productivity data (1990-2016) by the square root of four.
45See the Appendix 3.A.5 for a more detailed description of the data.
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economy with the same period as the US time series and obtain the model economy’s
variables.
The table contains the cyclical properties of the US and model economies de-
veloped above. For each economy, the first column shows each variable’s relative
volatility with respect to output σ(x)/σ(y) (x: variable, y: output), and the sec-
ond column provides a correlation of each variable with output ρ(x, y). The model
economies, regardless of whether or not it includes the friction mechanism, replicate
the actual data of the main labour market variables. These cyclical properties are
quite similar to those in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996).
Figure 3.8 displays impulse response functions of the labour market variables to
one percent relative productivity shock of sector 2. In this simulation, the high-
wage sector biased productivity improvement amplifies the wage gap and lowers
its relative employment share, which the ideal frictionless economy cannot explain.
These results satisfy both the negative relationship between employment and labour
productivity, which is in line with the ‘labour push’ theory (Hansen and Randall,
1992; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007; etc.), and the widening wage gap. While Gal´ı
(1999) blames price stickiness for the negative relationship, the model put forward
in this chapter shows the same result in the two-sector framework by adopting the
Figure 3.8: Impulse responses to relative productivity shock (z2t/z1t)
Source: Author’s own
Notes: ‘with Friction’ (solid black line) is the simulation with the baseline model while in
‘without Friction’ simulation (dotted green line), the friction process of productivity-driven
matching efficiency is turned off, or µjt = µ¯j .
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rigidity of labour mobility.
The dotted line depicts dynamic responses after the shock under the setting with-
out the friction process. This counter-factual simulation shows that the response of
the wage gap to the relative productivity shock is very little and the response of the
relative labour allocation increases in contrast with the baseline model. Accordingly,
the increase of consumption to the shock is larger and longer lasting in the friction-
less economy than its increase in the frictional economy since positive productivity
shocks in the high-wage sector frictionlessly contributes to the production of the
economy as well as its consumption.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that job-worker matching efficiency plays a pivotal role
in the labour market. Notably, the difference in matching efficiency between sectors
leads to labour market distortions by standing in the way of labour mobility across
sectors. That is to say, low matching efficiency in the high-wage sector acts as a
barrier preventing workers from entering this sector. We have also seen that uneven
sector-specific productivity progress is the primary source of differential matching
efficiency.
We assessed the role of differing matching efficiency in inter-sectoral labour
mobility and the wage gap dynamics through a two-sector search and matching
model which is embedded with the friction process, or productivity-driven differ-
ential matching efficiency. The proposed model is quite useful in accounting for a
puzzling phenomenon in the current labour market.
The model illustrates that differential matching efficiency driven by the produc-
tivity gap between sectors exacerbates the matching frictions and impedes inter-
sectoral labour mobility, and therefore impacts the labour market negatively in a
way that distorts labour allocation and widens the wage gap. However, the model
without the friction process cannot explain the labour market puzzle, even when the
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productivity gap increases. We have recognised that the interaction of the produc-
tivity gap and differential matching efficiency is indispensable to demonstrate the
empirically plausible wage gap and labour misallocation. All these results suggest
that a reduction of the difference in matching efficiency via balanced, unbiased pro-
ductivity progress across sectors might reduce labour market distortions and further
improve the welfare of the economy.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Expected Vacancy Duration
Let ϕ denote the probability of filling a vacancy and m denote the discrete length
of time until a vacancy is successfully filled. The probability by time length can be
Prob(m = 1) = ϕ
Prob(m = 2) = (1− ϕ) · ϕ
Prob(m = 3) = (1− ϕ)2 · ϕ
...
Prob(m = t) = (1− ϕ)t−1 · ϕ
...
Then, the expected vacancy duration is
E(m) =
∞∑
t=1
[
t · (1− ϕ)t−1 · ϕ]
= ϕ+ 2(1− ϕ)ϕ+ 3(1− ϕ)2ϕ+ 4(1− ϕ)3ϕ+ · · ·
= ϕ+ (1− ϕ)ϕ+ (1− ϕ)2ϕ+ (1− ϕ)3ϕ+ · · · ⇒ 1
+ (1− ϕ)ϕ+ (1− ϕ)2ϕ+ (1− ϕ)3ϕ+ · · · ⇒ 1− ϕ
+ (1− ϕ)2ϕ+ (1− ϕ)3ϕ+ · · · ⇒ (1− ϕ)2
...
=
1
1− (1− ϕ) =
1
ϕ
Hence, the expected vacancy duration is equal to the reciprocal of the probability
of filling a vacancy.
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3.A.2 Decomposition of Vacancy Duration Gap
Table 3A.1: Decomposition of vacancy duration gap
sector 1: Arts, Ent. & Rec.a ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
(i) l̂n µ1µ2 (ii) η̂12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
sector 2 level level [contrib.%] level [contrib.%] η̂12
finance & Insurance 1.25 0.80∗∗∗ [ 64.2] 0.45 [ 35.8] 0.42∗∗∗
Information 1.07 0.85∗∗∗ [ 79.2] 0.23 [ 21.1] 0.44∗∗∗
Professional & Business 0.58 0.11∗ [ 18.6] 0.47 [ 81.7] 0.58∗∗∗
Wholesale trade 0.74 0.54∗∗∗ [ 73.0] 0.20 [ 27.5] 0.54∗∗∗
Manufacturing 0.68 0.76∗∗∗ [111.3] -0.08 [ -11.1] 0.48∗∗∗
Health care & Social assistance 1.20 0.60∗∗∗ [ 50.4] 0.60 [ 49.7] 0.49∗∗∗
Transport, Warehouse & Utilities 0.55 0.46∗∗∗ [ 83.4] 0.09 [ 17.0] 0.47∗∗∗
sector 1: Construction ln q(θ1t)
q(θ2t)
(i) l̂n µ1µ2 (ii) η̂12 ln
θ2t
θ1t
sector 2 level level [contrib.%] level [contrib.%] η̂12
finance & Insurance 1.57 0.60∗∗∗ [ 38.0] 0.97 [ 61.7] 0.51∗∗∗
Information 1.39 0.70∗∗∗ [ 50.4] 0.69 [ 49.6] 0.51∗∗∗
Professional & Business 0.90 0.03∗ [ 2.9] 0.87 [ 96.9] 0.53∗∗∗
Wholesale trade 1.05 0.49∗∗∗ [ 46.5] 0.56 [ 53.5] 0.47∗∗∗
Manufacturing 1.00 0.66∗∗∗ [ 65.9] 0.34 [ 33.8] 0.50∗∗∗
Health care & Social assistance 1.52 0.57∗∗∗ [ 37.3] 0.95 [ 62.6] 0.46∗∗∗
Transport, Warehouse & Utilities 0.87 0.37∗∗∗ [ 43.1] 0.49 [ 56.7] 0.48∗∗∗
Source: Author’s own, from BLS JOLTS
Notes: aArts, entertainment, and recreation. bThe sample covers the period Jan 2001 -
Jun 2017. The upper bar and the hat denote the mean values and the estimated values,
respectively. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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3.A.3 Model Derivations
3.A.3.1 Demands for Goods: Equation (3.3.2) & (3.3.3)
In the general case, suppose that there is a continuum sectors j ∈ [0, 1]. The
aggregate output is
yt = At
[∫ 1
0
(γjy
σ−1
σ
jt )dj
] σ
σ−1
where γj is the technology distribution parameter. The final good firm maximises
its profit by optimally combining each of intermediate goods.
max
{yjt}j
ptyt −
∫ 1
0
(pjtyjt)dj
The first order condition with respect to yjt is
pjt = ptAt
[∫ 1
0
(γjy
σ−1
σ
jt )dj
] 1
σ−1
γjy
− 1
σ
jt
where pt is the price of final goods and pjt is the price of sector j’s goods. By
dividing the first order conditions of any two goods, i and j, we obtain
yit =
(
γi
γj
)σ (
pit
pjt
)−σ
yjt
Plugging this into the aggregate output equation yields
yt = Atγ
−σ
j p
σ
jtyjt
[∫ 1
0
γσi p
1−σ
it di
] σ
σ−1
= A1−σt γ
−σ
j p
σ
jtyjt
{
A−1t
[∫ 1
0
γσi p
1−σ
it di
] 1
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= pt ≡ 1
}−σ
By rearranging, we finally get the demands for good j as
pjt = γjA
σ−1
σ
t
(
yjt
yt
)− 1
σ
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3.A.3.2 Aggregate Price Level: Equation (3.3.4)
The aggregate price is the minimum cost to produce one unit of the final goods yt.
If there is a continuum of sectors j ∈ [0, 1], the final output firm’s cost minimisation
problem is given by
min
{yjt}j
∫ 1
0
(pjtyjt)dj
s.t. yt ≡ At
[∫ 1
0
γjy
σ−1
σ
jt dj
] σ
σ−1
= 1
The first order condition with respect to yjt is
pjt = λtγjAty
− 1
σ
jt y
1
σ
t
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By dividing the first order conditions of any
two goods, i and j, we get
pjt
pit
=
γj
γi
(
yjt
yit
)− 1
σ
⇒ yjt = γσj γ−σi p−σjt pσityit
Putting this into the constraint gives
At
[∫ 1
0
γj
(
γσj γ
−σ
i p
−σ
jt p
σ
ityit
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
= 1 ⇒ yit = γ
σ
i p
−σ
it
At
[∫ 1
0
γσj p
1−σ
jt dj
] σ
σ−1
By plugging this into the cost function
∫ 1
0
pityitdi, we obtain
∫ 1
0
γσi p
1−σ
it di
At
[∫ 1
0
γσj p
1−σ
jt dj
] σ
σ−1
= A−1t
[∫ 1
0
γσj p
1−σ
jt dj
] 1
1−σ
≡ pt
This shows that the minimum cost to produce one unite of yt is the same as the
aggregate price index pt that we defined.
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3.A.3.3 Firm’s Profit Maximisation
Each sector’s firm maximises its expected present value of profit by deciding the
number of vacancies and labour inputs subject to the evolution of employment.
max
{vj,t+l, nj,t+l+1}∞l=0
Et
∞∑
l=0
βl [pjt+lyjt+l − wjt+lnjt+l − κjt+lvjt+l]
s.t. n1t+1 = (1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))n1t + q(θ1t)v1t for firms in sector 1
n2t+1 = (1− ρ)n2t + q(θ2t)v2t for firms in sector 2
The first order conditions are
[vjt] κjt = λjtq(θjt)
[n1t+1] λ1t = βEt
[
αp1t+1z1t+1n
α−1
1t+1 − w1t+1 + (1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1))λ1t+1
]
[n2t+1] λ2t = βEt
[
αp2t+1z2t+1n
α−1
2t+1 − w2t+1 + (1− ρ)λ2t+1
]
where λj is the Lagrange multiplier. By substituting λj out, each sector’s job cre-
ation condition is derived as
κ1t
q(θ1t)
= βEt
[
αp1t+1z1t+1n
α−1
1t+1 − w1t+1 + (1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1))
κ1t+1
q(θ1t+1)
]
κ2t
q(θ2t)
= βEt
[
αp2t+1z2t+1n
α−1
2t+1 − w2t+1 + (1− ρ)
κ2t+1
q(θ2t+1)
]
These equations are the same as equations (3.3.18) and (3.3.19).
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3.A.3.4 Job Creation Conditions: Equation (3.3.18) & (3.3.19)
By substituting (3.3.14) and the free entry condition (Vjt = 0) into (3.3.17), sector
1’s job creation condition is derived as
κ1t
q(θ1t)
= βEtJ1t+1
= βEt
[
αp1t+1z1t+1n
α−1
1t+1 − w1t+1 + β(1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1))J1t+2
]
= βEt
[
αp1t+1z1t+1n
α−1
1t+1 − w1t+1 + (1− ρ)(1− st+1f(θ2t+1))
κ1t+1
q(θ1t+1)
]
Likewise, by substituting (3.3.15) and the free entry condition into (3.3.17),
sector 2’s job creation condition is derived as
κ2t
q(θ2t)
= βEtJ2t+1
= βEt
[
αp2t+1z2t+1n
α−1
2t+1 − w2t+1 + β(1− ρ)J2t+2
]
= βEt
[
αp2t+1z2t+1n
α−1
2t+1 − w2t+1 + (1− ρ)
κ2t+1
q(θ2t+1)
]
3.A.3.5 Wage Determinations: Equation (3.3.37) & (3.3.38)
Substituting (3.3.14), (3.3.20), and (3.3.22) into the bargaining condition (3.3.25)
yields
w1t − φ(st) + βEt [(1− ρ)E1t+1 + ρU1t+1 + (1− ρ)stf(θ2t)(E2t+1 − E1t+1)] =
Ψ
(
αp1tz1tn
α−1
1t − w1t + βEt [(1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))J1t+1 + (ρ+ (1− ρ)stf(θ2t))V1t+1]
)
+ b− τ + βEt [f(θ1t)E1t+1 + (1− f(θ1t))U1t+1]
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By imposing the free entry condition V1t = 0 and then rearranging, we get
(1 + Ψ)w1t = Ψαp1tz1tn
α−1
1t + φ(st) + b− τ
+ βEt[Ψ(1− ρ)(1− stf(θ2t))J1t+1 − (1− ρ)E1t+1 − ρU1t+1
− (1− ρ)stf(θ2t)(E2t+1 − E1t+1) + f(θ1t)E1t+1 + (1− f(θ1t))U1t+1]
= Ψαp1tz1tn
α−1
1t + φ(st) + b− τ + βEt [Ψf(θ1t)J1t+1 −Ψ(1− ρ)stf(θ2t)J2t+1]
With (3.3.17) and (3.3.26), sector 1’s wage determination equation is derived as
w1t = ψ
(
αp1t
y1t
n1t
+ (1− (1− ρ)st)κ2tθ2t
)
+ (1− ψ)(τsιt + b− τ)
Likewise, by substituting (3.3.15), (3.3.21), and (3.3.22) into (3.3.25) and impos-
ing the free entry condition V2t = 0, we obtain
w2t + βEt [(1− ρ)E2t+1 + ρU2t+1] = Ψ
(
αp2tz2tn
α−1
2t − w2t + βEt [(1− ρ)J2t+1]
)
+ b− τ + βEt [f(θ2t)E2t+1 + (1− f(θ2t))U2t+1]
By rearranging, this can be written as
(1 + Ψ)w2t = Ψαp2tz2tn
α−1
2t + b− τ
+ βEt [Ψ(1− ρ)J2t+1 − (1− ρ)E2t+1 − ρU2t+1 + f(θ2t)E2t+1 + (1− f(θ2t))U2t+1]
= Ψαp2tz2tn
α−1
2t + b− τ + βEt [Ψ(1− ρ)J2t+1 + ΨρJ2t+1 + Ψf(θ2t)J2t+1 −ΨJ2t+1]
= Ψαp2tz2tn
α−1
2t + b− τ + βEtΨf(θ2t)J2t+1
With (3.3.17), sector 2’s wage determination equation is derived as
w2t = ψ
(
αp2t
y2t
n2t
+ κ2tθ2t
)
+ (1− ψ)(b− τ)
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3.A.3.6 Steady State Wage Gap: Equation (3.3.50)
From (3.3.48) and (3.3.49), the difference in sectoral wages can be derived as
w∗2 − w∗1 = Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)
)(
κ2
µ(z2)
θ∗η2 −
κ1
µ(z1)
θ∗η1
)]
+ Ψ
[
s¯(1− ρ)κ2θ∗2 − s¯(1− ρ)
µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1θ
∗η
1 θ
∗1−η
2
]
− s¯τ
= Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)
)
θ∗η2
µ(z2)
(
κ2 − µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1−η1 κ
η
2
)]
+ Ψs¯(1− ρ)θ∗2
(
κ2 − µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1−η1 κ
η
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= τιs¯ι from (3.3.45)
−s¯τ
= Ψ
[(
1
β
− (1− ρ)
)(
τιs¯ι−1
Ψ(1− ρ)
)η
1
µ(z2)
(
κ2 − µ(z2)
µ(z1)
κ1−η1 κ
η
2
)1−η]
+ τ s¯ι(ι− s¯1−ι)
where (3.3.46) is used in the last line.
3.A.3.7 Steady State Labour Allocation: Equation (3.3.57)
The steady state total unemployment can be derived by equating the flow out of
unemployment (f(θ1) + f(θ2))u, with the flow into unemployment ρ(1− u).
u∗ =
ρ
f(θ∗1) + f(θ
∗
2) + ρ
= u¯
By substituting (3.3.52) and (3.3.54) into (3.3.53), we obtain
ρn2 = f(θ
∗
2)(1− n1 − n2 − u1 + s¯n1)
= f(θ∗2)
(
1− n1 − n2 − ρ+ s¯(1− ρ)f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
n1 + s¯n1
)
= f(θ∗2)
(
1− n2 − ρ+ s¯(1− ρ)f(θ
∗
2) + (1− s¯)f(θ∗1)
f(θ∗1)
(1− n2 − u¯)
)
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By rearranging, we obtain the sector 2’s employment share as
n∗2 =
f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗ + f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
u¯X∗
ρ+ f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗
where X∗ ≡ ρ+ s¯(1− ρ)f(θ∗2) + (1− s¯)f(θ∗1).
Then, the sector 1’s employment share can be
n∗1 = 1− u¯− n∗2 =
ρ− ρu¯− u¯f(θ∗2)
ρ+ f(θ∗2)− f(θ
∗
2)
f(θ∗1)
X∗
By dividing these sectoral employment shares from each other, the steady state
relative labour allocation of sector 2 can be derived as
n∗2
n∗1
=
f(θ∗2)
[
1− 1
f(θ∗1)
X∗ + 1
f(θ∗1)
u¯X∗
]
ρ− ρu¯− u¯f(θ∗2)
=
1− (1− u¯)
[
ρ
f(θ∗1)
+ s¯(1− ρ)f(θ∗2)
f(θ∗1)
+ (1− s¯)
]
ρ(1−u¯)
f(θ∗2)
− u¯
=
1− (1− u¯)
[
ρ
µ(z1)θ
∗1−η
1
+ s¯(1− ρ)µ(z2)
µ(z1)
θ∗1−η2
θ∗1−η1
+ (1− s¯)
]
ρ(1−u¯)
µ(z2)θ
∗1−η
2
− u¯
=
1− (1− u¯)
[
ρ
µ(z1)
(
κ2
κ1
)1−η
θ∗1−η2
+ s¯(1− ρ)µ(z2)
µ(z1)
(
κ1
κ2
)1−η
+ (1− s¯)
]
ρ(1−u¯)
µ(z2)θ
∗1−η
2
− u¯
=
1− (1− u¯)
 ρµ(z1) (κ1κ2)1−η (Ψ(1−ρ)τιs¯ι−1 )1−η (κ2 − µ(z2)µ(z1)κ1−η1 κη2)1−η
+s¯(1− ρ)µ(z2)
µ(z1)
(
κ1
κ2
)1−η
+ (1− s¯)

ρ(1−u¯)
µ(z2)
(
Ψ(1−ρ)
τιs¯ι−1
)1−η (
κ2 − µ(z2)µ(z1)κ
1−η
1 κ
η
2
)1−η
− u¯
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3.A.4 Steady State Model Equations
(demand for goods)
p1 = (1− γ)
(y1
y
)− 1
σ
p2 = γ
(y2
y
)− 1
σ
(job creation condition)
κ1
q(θ1)
= β
[
αp1
y1
n1
− w1 + (1− ρ)(1− sf(θ2)) κ1
q(θ1)
]
κ2
q(θ2)
= β
[
αp2
y2
n2
− w2 + (1− ρ) κ2
q(θ2)
]
(equilibrium search intensity)
τιsι−1 = Ψ(1− ρ)f(θ2)
[
κ2
q(θ2)
− κ1
q(θ1)
]
(wage determination)
w1 = ψ
(
αp1
y1
n1
+ (1− (1− ρ)s)κ2θ2
)
+ (1− ψ)(τsι + b− τ)
w2 = ψ
(
αp2
y2
n2
+ κ2θ2
)
+ (1− ψ)(b− τ)
(evolution of employment)
(ρ+ (1− ρ)sf(θ2))n1 = q(θ1)v1
ρn2 = q(θ2)v2
(unemployment)
u1 + u2 = 1− n1 − n2
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(free unemployed mobility)
κ1θ1 = κ2θ2
(fiscal balance)
T = b(u1 + u2)
(resource constraint)
c+ τsιn1 + τu = y − κ1v1 − κ2v2
where the output technologies y =
[
(1−γ)y
σ−1
σ
1 +γy
σ−1
σ
2
] σ
σ−1 , yj = zjn
α
j are given, and
market tightness θ1 = v1/u1, θ2 = v2/u2, the vacancy filling rate q(θj) = µ(zj)θ
−η
j
are defined as before.
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3.A.5 Data Series of the US Economy
The US data used in the stochastic simulations are real values for the period 2001.Q1
- 2016.Q4. This data is available from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
1. real gross domestic product per capita (chained 2009 dollars)
2. real personal consumption expenditures per capita (chained 2009 dollars)
3. all employees, total nonfarm payrolls
4. civilian noninstitutional population
5. weekly hours of production & nonsupervisory employees, total private
6. real compensation per hour, nonfarm business sector (index 2009=100)
7. gross domestic income
8. gross domestic income: compensation of employees
9. quarterly census of employment and wages by industry (seasonal adjusted by
Census X-12 method) ⇒ w1, w2, n1, n2 constructed
The constructed series using the above raw data are as follows:
• output per capita, y = (1)
• consumption per capita, c = (2)
• employment, n = (3) ÷ (4)
• real wage, w = (5) × (6) × 12
• labour income share = (8) ÷ (7)
• labour productivity = (1) ÷ ( (5) × 12 )
Concluding Remarks
The puzzling phenomenon of labour clustering into the low-wage sector despite the
widening wage gap, makes the fundamental assumptions behind the theory of com-
petitive markets highly questionable. This thesis has explored a series of questions
to seek the underlying factors for this phenomenon: (i) Are there any frictions or
barriers to labour mobility across sectors? (ii) If so, can labour mobility frictions
account for labour market distortions? (iii) Lastly, what is the main source of labour
mobility frictions?
First, we have found empirical evidence for labour mobility frictions from the US
labour market. Wage gaps between sectors have been large and increasing during
the last two decades, driven by a rise in unexplained factors. Labour transition
from the high- to the low-wage sectors has increased but has declined in the reverse
direction, leading to labour concentration in less productive sectors. Even when
controlling for a worker’s characteristics, occupation, and work experience, her wage
can significantly increase by an upward movement. The pecuniary costs for workers
to switch sectors have increased. All this evidence supports the existence and even
the increase of labour mobility frictions.
As a next step, we verified that labour mobility frictions cause labour market
distortions. A multi-sector model shows that limited substitutability in labour sup-
ply between sectors triggers the widening wage gap and labour clustering in the
low-wage sector while changes in the labour demand side alone cannot explain these
distortions. From the calibrated model, we estimated that the degree of mobility
frictions has risen and its elevation incurs a non-trivial economic loss in terms of
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output and utility by worsening labour misallocation and wage inequality.
In answering the last question, we identified differential matching efficiency as
one important source of labour mobility frictions. More importantly, this difference
stems from the productivity gap between sectors. A two-sector search and matching
framework embedded with this productivity-driven friction process can simultane-
ously track the actual data of the wage gap and labour allocation in the US. Without
the friction process, the labour market puzzle cannot be explained even when the
productivity gap increases.
This study leaves some possible directions for future research. First, more empir-
ical work on the source of labour mobility frictions is required. Such an attempt will
be a stepping stone to stable growth for the labour market because finding various
sources of frictions is directly connected to correctly diagnosing the root causes of
frictional labour mobility and the unbalanced labour market. Additionally, it is nec-
essary to investigate inter-sectoral labour mobility taking heterogeneous occupations
or skills into account. We have treated job seekers as homogeneous, but in principle,
they must be treated according to their heterogeneous skills. This disaggregated ap-
proach might help analyse current labour market distortions in more detail as well
as shedding light on the driving factors for inter-sectoral labour mobility with regard
to, for example, occupational structure changes. Related economic policies should
also be discussed with an aim to improve economic disparity and promote growth.
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